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Abstract
Remotely generated streaming of the Internet of Things (IoTs) data has become a
vital category upon which many applications rely. Smart meters collect readings for
household activities such as power and gas consumption every second - the readings
are transmitted wirelessly through various channels and public hops to the operation
centres. Due to the unusually large streams sizes, the operation centres are using
cloud servers where various entities process the data on a real-time basis for billing
and power management. It is possible that smart pipe projects (where oil pipes are
continuously monitored using sensors) and collected streams are sent to the public
cloud for real-time ﬂawed detection. There are many other similar applications that
can render the world a convenient place which result in climate change mitigation and
transportation improvement to name a few. Despite the obvious advantages of these
applications, some unique challenges arise posing some questions regarding a suitable
balance between guaranteeing the streams security, such as privacy, authenticity
and integrity, while not hindering the direct operations on those streams, while also
handling data management issues, such as the volume of protected streams during
transmission and storage. These challenges become more complicated when the
streams reside on third-party cloud servers. In this thesis, a few novel techniques are
introduced to address these problems.
We begin by protecting the privacy and authenticity of transmitted readings
without disrupting the direct operations. We propose two steganography techniques
that rely on diﬀerent mathematical security models. The results look promising -
security: only the approved party who has the required security tokens can retrieve
the hidden secret, and distortion eﬀect with the diﬀerence between the original and
protected readings that are almost at zero. This means the streams can be used in
their protected form at intermediate hops or third party servers.
We then improved the integrity of the transmitted protected streams which are
prone to intentional or unintentional noise - we proposed a secure error detection
and correction based stenographic technique. This allows legitimate recipients to
(1) detect and recover any noise loss from the hidden sensitive information without
privacy disclosure, and (2) remedy the received protected readings by using the
corrected version of the secret hidden data. It is evident from the experiments that
our technique has robust recovery capabilities (i.e. Root Mean Square (RMS) <
xxiii
0.01%, Bit Error Rate (BER) = 0 and PRD < 1%).
To solve the issue of huge transmitted protected streams, two compression
algorithms for lossless IoTs readings are introduced to ensure the volume of protected
readings at intermediate hops is reduced without revealing the hidden secrets.
The ﬁrst uses Gaussian approximation function to represent IoTs streams in a
few parameters regardless of the roughness in the signal. The second reduces the
randomness of the IoTs streams into a smaller ﬁnite ﬁeld by splitting to enhance
repetition and avoiding the ﬂoating operations round errors issues. Under the same
conditions, our both techniques were superior to existing models mathematically (i.e.
the entropy was halved) and empirically (i.e. achieved ratio was 3.8:1 to 4.5:1).
We were driven by the question ‘Can the size of multi-incoming compressed
protected streams be re-reduced on the cloud without decompression?’ to overcome
the issue of vast quantities of compressed and protected IoTs streams on the cloud.
A novel lossless size reduction algorithm was introduced to prove the possibility of
reducing the size of already compressed IoTs protected readings. This is successfully
achieved by employing similarity measurements to classify the compressed streams
into subsets in order to reduce the eﬀect of uncorrelated compressed streams.
The values of every subset was treated independently for further reduction. Both
mathematical and empirical experiments proved the possibility of enhancing the
entropy (i.e. almost reduced by 50%) and the resultant size reduction (i.e. up to 2:1).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Recently, there has been an enormous interest in the remote gathering of data to
eﬀectively monitor various activities on real-time bases such as smart homes, smart
grids, climate change, border invasion, smart manufacturing, nuclear facilities or
smart transportations [11]. The data is collected wirelessly using small devices (e.g.
sensors) known as Internet of Things (IoTs) and forwarded to their ﬁnal destination
such as operation centres through the Internet [11]. The continuous streams usually
contain two types of data: (1) normal readings (e.g. meter power readings) and
(2) highly-sensitive information (e.g. household identity, nuclear facility tags, border
screen geometric location, facility IDs or small pictures of the locations coupled with
date and time).
According to Cisco Visual Networking Index (VNI) Complete Forecast for 2015 to
2020 [12], the growth in the number of these devices will increase three-fold from 4.9
billion to 12.2 billion between 2015 and 2020. The IP generated data traﬃc is expected
to explode from 72.5 exabytes (1 exabyte = 260 bytes) to 194.4 exabytes per month
between 2015 and 2020. The report also highlights that 46 percent of that traﬃc will
be sensor streams, in other words, nearly half produced by IoTs. The extremely large
generated streams (i.e. big data) will pose unique challenges regarding security and
data management.
Dealing with these concerns in the high-stream sensors data context will be more
complicated for two main reasons. Firstly, the generators of these streams (e.g.
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remote sensors or smart meters) pose unique challenges (e.g. their presence in an
uncontrollable environment, resource constraints such as memory and power, and
topological constraints where the data should go through multiple public hops to the
ﬁnal destination) which prevent a direct transplant of existing privacy preservation
and authenticity techniques [13]. Secondly, the signiﬁcant size and the speed of these
streams force the operation centres to (1) use a concept called ‘cognitive radio’ where
the data can be sent wirelessly through various shared licensed spectra (i.e. channels)
based on their availability and (2) conduct oﬀshore operations by using cloud public
servers, for example.
Additionally, in 2013 Intel surveyed more than 200 information technology
managers from various technology companies in the United States about their main
concerns regarding IoTs generated big data streams [14]. The top two obstacles are
data security (i.e. privacy, authenticity, and integrity) and data management (i.e.
increased network bottleneck, storage and real-time analysis). Surprisingly, although
these concerns have been well studied independently for static data, tackling them
together received limited attention and are still immature for streaming, dynamic
high-speed IoTs sensors data into the cloud environment [15, 16]. This is due to (1)
the fast, sharp increase of IoTs and their compelled adoption, and (2) the emergence
and the urgent need for the power and capabilities of the cloud infrastructure. To
achieve the incredible beneﬁts from the generated IoTs streams using real-time analysis
while guaranteeing the outcomes, the issues of privacy (i.e. transmitted sensitive
information), authenticity (i.e. the origin of transmitted streams), integrity (i.e.
manipulation detection, remedy, and recovery) and size (i.e. during transmission
and storage) have to be treated together.
The aim of this research is to address these four major problems together
concurrently with the IoTs streaming data to cloud environment and bridge the gap
between them. Therefore, this research proposes new algorithms to be integrated into
the IoTs end-point devices, such as meters and sensors. Further compatible algorithms
are also introduced at intermediate hops or gateways. In contrast, additional
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harmonious techniques will be presented as cloud-enabled algorithms appropriate for
deployment to the cloud.
1.1 Research Scope and Challenges
IoTs streaming data has become a core category upon which many applications rely.
For instance, smart meters gather household power and gas consumptions periodically
(e.g. every second) and transmit them wirelessly through various channels and public
hops to the operation centres [17]. Due to the unprecedented volume of streams and
for real-time analysis, the operation centres are using cloud servers where various
entities process the data on a real-time basis for billings and power management. For
instance, imagine a smart oil pipe project where the pipes are continuously monitored,
and the collected streams are sent to the public cloud for real-time detection of any
possible ﬂaws. There are many projects that help create a more convenient world, such
as solar panels and transportations, and cloud technology is crucial one. Despite the
clear merits of these applications, unique challenges may arise [18]; how can we have a
suitable balance between (1) ensuring the streams security (i.e. privacy, authenticity
and integrity) while not hindering the direct operations on those streams, and (2)
handling the data management issues such as its size during the transmission and
storage. These challenges become more complex in cases where the streams reside
on third-party cloud servers. In the following, these challenges are discussed in more
depth.
• Privacy and Authenticity: The following points shape the unique privacy
and authenticity challenge:
– The presence of IoTs end-point devices in hostile areas.
– The transmission of entities’ (customers) highly-sensitive data through
public networks
– Their residence and processing on third-party cloud servers.
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Due to these challenges, countries such as Australia and the United States are
forming strict regulations on companies mandating that an IoTs client’s sensitive
information must be kept secure from unauthorised access even when the
company performs oﬀshore operations, such as using and storing on cloud servers
[19, 20]. In fact, there are two concerns. (a) From an IoTs customer point of
view, a main concern regards their sensitivity to the privacy and conﬁdentiality
of their personal information, such as their identiﬁcation documents, addresses
and geometric locations; while contrarily they want to ensure the authenticity
of collected power consumption readings (for example) and resultant billings are
completely accurate (i.e. Is this bill calculated correctly and are the readings
from the customer’s premise?). (b) The main worry from an operational
centres’ viewpoint is about ensuring the eﬃcient (applying direct operation on
collected streams) and secure technique that helps them protect their customers’
conﬁdential information.
• Integrity: Due to the sharp growth in the number of IoTs devices that
simultaneously transmit continuous critical streams, the chances of interference
between applications that use identical or overlapping bands are highly increased
(e.g. Bluetooth and ZigBee at 2.4 GHz) [21]. To overcome this, a new
wireless communication technique called Cognitive Radio (CR) has emerged
where applications can use any other available idle bands. The shared spectrum
characteristics create a huge integrity challenge where the transmitted data is
highly prone to intentional attacks (i.e. interference) and unintentional attacks
(i.e. noise) rendering these applications impractical [22]. This is simply because
any slight change in the transmitted readings will result in loss of crucial
information and, more signiﬁcantly, loss of faith in the received readings. In
some cases, it may be too late to ask the source to resend especially in critical
cases; other times the source is often conﬁgured to forget what it sends directly
(i.e. due to resource constraints); lastly, the destination has no return channel
to the source - these contributing factors create many complications [23]. In an
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extreme case, this may happen to millions of premises in the same day!
• Data management: The unforeseen magniﬁcation in the speed and size of
collected IoTs sensor streams renders many operation centres who own these
streams incapable of handling them. This imposes utilizing a third-party
elastic cloud environment to perform direct operations on the collected streams.
The two drawbacks of that are: (1) a huge-unexpected pressure on the
communication infrastructure during the transmission, and (2) exponential
increase in the storage space cost and burdening the available data management.
The unique challenge is that there is a lack of proper data management [14]
models, such as size reduction and direct operations, that is harmoniously
compatible with privacy, authenticity and integrity. This is because many data
management models, such as real-time data mining and size reductions, work
on the original form of the collected readings, but neglect to observe security
aspects or assume that they are beyond the scope of focus. This was acceptable
in the traditional model where the data travelled between point A and point
B, and both belong to the owners of the data. However, this assumption is
not applicable in the cloud environment where the owners of the data want to
employ the power of the third-party cloud infrastructure for better management
while not disclosing any security aspects such as privacy.
Therefore, deeply considering the above core challenges, the following is the
summary of the core issues derived and targeted (See Figure 1.1):
• Protecting privacy requires a way to preserve the sensitive information while not
hindering the direct operation on the collected readings.
• Ensuring the authenticity of the collected readings requires a unique
imperishable seal at the origin that is not disclosed on the cloud level.
• Guaranteeing the integrity requires a mechanism to easily detect any alteration
to the transmitted readings without disrupting direct operations on the
transmitted readings.
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• Improving the communication infrastructure requires size reduction techniques
at the IoTs end-points without losing any bit or disclosing the privacy and
authenticity.
• Improving data management by reducing the burden and the cost on the cloud
level, which requires special size re-reduction models by ﬁnding any potentially
similar correlation between the myriad of multiple-incoming streams.
Privacy of IoTs end point 
sensitive info
Authenticity of collected 
readings
Intentional/unintentional
noise during wireless 
transmission
Mangeing huge data size
during transmission
without revealing privacy
Mangeing the size of
multincoming compressed 
IoTs streams at Cloud 
without privacy disclousure 
RQ-1
RQ-2
RQ-3
RQ-4
Figure 1.1: High IoTs streams in the cloud environment, and the correlated security
and data management problems.
1.2 Research Questions
The core objective of this thesis is to introduce harmonious algorithms that guarantee
and secure the privacy, authenticity and integrity of dynamically high IoTs streams
into the cloud environment while providing better data management by the way of size
reduction. On the other hand, these streams allow direct operations on third-party
servers without security disclosure.
To overcome the above unique challenges and to achieve the stated objectives, the
following research questions were formed.
• Research Question (RQ)-1. How can the privacy of the sensitive
information and the authenticity of the transmitted IoTs sensor
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streams be protected without hindering direct operations at
intermediate hops or cloud?
One of the major issues in IoTs ﬁeld is with the privacy of customer sensitive
information as well as the authenticity of the transmitted collected streams.
These streams reside in remote third-party servers. Researchers have introduced
various models to protect these streams. They mostly rely on implementing
traditional heavy cryptographic mathematical mechanisms, which means they
inherit issues such as large overheads, expensive computational complexity and
changing the form of the data. In doing so, sensitive information would have
to be disclosed to process the streams. Therefore, to address this question, we
understand that:
(i) this must ensure the privacy of transmitted sensitive information
(ii) this must guarantee the authenticity of the normal transmitted readings
(iii) this needs to avoid an increase or change from the original structure of
normal readings
(iv) allows direct operations on the received IoTs streams at cloud public servers
without security disclosure.
• RQ-2. In the ﬁrst research question, our novel technique to guarantee both
privacy and authenticity without changing the form of the readings is by
encrypting the sensitive information and to hide them by using steganography,
randomly, bit-by-bit inside the normal transmitted readings. However, if the
transmitted streams are altered either intentionally or unintentionally during
their travel from the end-point IoTs device to the cloud, we may not be able
to detect or recover the hidden information, and we may lose conﬁdence in
the received readings. Re-requesting and resending these streams will be very
expensive and a burden on the infrastructure. Therefore, our second research
question is: How can any alteration to the transmitted information
be detected and recovered without hindering direct operations at
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intermediate hops or cloud?
The identiﬁed targets from this question are that we need to:
(i) detect any alteration to the transmitted streams using hidden sensitive
information
(ii) recover any lost data from the transmitted sensitive information
(iii) remedy the received streams using the recovered sensitive information
(iv) understand that this does not increase or change the original form of the
transmitted readings to allow continuous direct operations on the collected
streams.
• RQ-3. In the ﬁrst research question, our solution to ensure both the privacy
and the authenticity at the same time is by encrypting only the sensitive
information and hide them randomly on the bit level inside the transmitted
normal readings. Therefore, this leads us to the following question: How
can the size of the protected transmitted IoTs streams that contain
the encrypted hidden information be blindly reduced without any
security disclosure?
The objectives designed from this question are:
(i) reduce the huge size of transmitted sealed readings for improving the
performance and so the eﬃciency
(ii) achieve better results than general compressors by exploiting the new form
of protected readings characteristics
(iii) work seamlessly and blindly with our solution to questions 1 and 2, thereby
not losing any data and ensuring all encrypted and hidden information can
be recovered.
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• RQ-4. On cloud level, multiple compressed streams of protected readings are
received from various sources in a very short period that will quickly reserve
a huge space. Therefore, focus of this question is: Can the multi-incoming
compressed protected IoTs sensor streams be re-reduced without
privacy or authenticity disclosure?
The objectives of this question are:
(i) to re-reduce the massive volume of received compressed streams on cloud
level by exploiting the similarities among a wide range of multi-incoming
streams
(ii) to work seamlessly and blindly with our solution to questions 1, 2 and 3,
thereby not losing any data and so all encrypted and hidden information
can be recovered.
1.3 Limitations of Existing Solutions
A majority of the early solutions that ensure privacy and authenticity relied heavily
on transplanting cryptography techniques such as symmetric, asymmetric and digital
signature [24–29]. These models focused on how to protect the data from point A
to point B (i.e. sender to receiver) during transmission. However, following the
emergence of the cloud (and its compelled adoption for its immense beneﬁts), another
dimension became crucial to any proposed security model in the IoTs ﬁeld - the
eﬃciency aspect because of the huge size and speed of the collected streams (i.e. big
data) that needs to be analysed directly on the cloud without tolerating the security
aspects. Therefore, these solutions became outdated and is currently unﬁt to todays
handling infrastructure. Firstly, they change the form of all original data into a
ciphertext which hinders the ability to work directly on the transmitted streams at
intermediate hops (i.e. where the transmitted data may be collected and compressed)
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or on cloud servers. Secondly, on cloud servers, the privacy of the sensitive information
should be disclosed (i.e. decrypted) to perform operations on the collected streams.
On the other hand, most of the data management models, such as size reduction
and data mining, neglect the security aspects and assume they have access to the
readings directly. This was acceptable when both ends were controlled by the data
owners. However, this is not the case in the cloud infrastructure model where the
readings may end up in public servers in unknown jurisdictions. For instance, most
of the current size reduction (i.e. compression) models are lossy [30] - this means the
models rely on losing some information while trying to maintain the main features of
the waveforms signal. This means they have access to the actual readings, and that
the streams are not required for crucial applications. This kind of compression was
acceptable in the traditional sensor streams, and so most research has been conducted
in this path which can be classiﬁed [31–33] into transformation techniques, parametric
coding and mixed (see Chapter Four). This can easily achieve higher compression
ratios while losing small amount of data. Lossy compression was recently discouraged
after the emergence of smart IoTs applications such as smart meters, and after the
potential use of the remotely collected readings for billings and other purposes.
Conversely, only few research has been done under lossless reduction category such
as in [8, 9]. This is because in ‘lossless compression’, it is an obligation to reconstruct
the exact waveform signal of the readings with original zero loss. These models are
also assuming direct access to the original data.
Therefore, due to the limitations gap between the security and data management
models of IoTs streams in the cloud environment, this thesis concentrates on
developing an end-to-end framework that comprises some unique methods to ensure
security (i.e. privacy, authenticity and integrity). It also provides a privacy preserving
size reduction without hindering direct operations on the protected transmitted
readings.
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1.4 Contributions
To address the research questions explained in Section 1.2, and to bridge the gap
between security techniques and data management models, this thesis introduces a
novel framework that consists of several new techniques to the area of high IoTs data
streams, such as sensors and smart meters. The contributions can be classiﬁed into two
main domains: security for privacy, authenticity and integrity, and data management
for size reduction and data recovery. Figure 1.2 identiﬁes the core contributions and
recognises their links to the core issues.
Privacy of IoTs end point 
sensitive info
Authenticity of collected 
readings
Intentional/unintentional
noise during wireless 
transmission
Mangeing huge data size
during transmission
without revealing privacy
Mangeing the size of
multincoming compressed 
IoTs streams at Cloud 
without privacy disclousure 
RQ-1
RQ-2
RQ-3
RQ-4
Preserving both Privacy of 
sensitive info and 
Authenticity of collected 
readings
Manipulation detection,
recovery and remedy
Privacy and authenticity
preserving size reduction
Cloud Level privacy and 
authenticity preserving 
size re-reduction
Chapter2
Chapter3
Chapter4
Chapter5
Reaserch Questions Reaserch Contributions
Figure 1.2: A summary of research questions, contributions and thesis structure.
• Privacy preserving of private information and authenticity of collected
streams while not hindering direct operations on the readings.
The focus of Chapter 2 is to (1) guarantee the privacy of the customer
sensitive information and (2) ensure the source of origin of the collected
readings. Steganography is employed as an underline mechanism to conceal
the secret information. Two new models are proposed in this chapter which are
Walsh-Hadamard based stenography and Wavelet based steganography. They
vary in their security, hiding capacity and simplicity. Both techniques are neither
increasing nor changing the form of the transmitted readings. In other words,
only data owners can retrieve the seal whereas others are just monitoring and
can use the protected form of the readings.
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• Manipulation detection, remedy, and recovery while not hindering
direct operations on the data nor changing the form of the readings.
Chapter 3 concentrates on the integrity of the transmitted readings by (a)
detecting and recovering any loss from the hidden conﬁdential information
without privacy disclosure, and (b) also curing the received normal readings by
using the corrected version of the secret hidden data. A new model is introduced
in this chapter that uses both steganography, and error detection and correction
technique called Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) syndrome codes. The
model is extensively measured using various well-known benchmarks such as Bit
Error Rate (BER), Percent of Root-mean-square Diﬀerence (PRD) and Root
Mean Square (RMS). It is obvious from the experiments that our technique has
robust recovery capabilities (i.e. BER =0, PRD < 1% and RMS < 0.01%).
• Hidden information preserving size reduction without privacy and
authenticity disclosure
Chapter 4 focuses on reducing the size of protected readings at intermediate
hops without revealing the hidden secrets. Two novel lossless IoTs (smart meter)
readings compression algorithms are proposed. The ﬁrst Gaussian-based model
target is representing IoTs sensor streams in a few parameters regardless of
the irregularity in the signal. The second N-Split model target is reducing the
randomness in the IoTs streams into a smaller ﬁnite ﬁeld to boost duplications
and to avoid the ﬂoating operations round errors issues. After a thorough
evaluation under the same conditions, both our techniques were mathematically
superior to existing models where we successfully halved the entropy, and
empirically we achieved a ratio of 3.8:1 to 4.5:1.
• Cloud-based hidden features preserving size re-reduction
The work in Chapter 5 addresses whether the protected readings of
multi-incoming compressed IoTs can be re-compressed? The answer is an
aﬃrmative - by pre-processing the compressed streams in such a way that it
improves the theoretical entropy and exploits it. This is successfully achieved by
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employing a supervised learning classiﬁer as a similarity measurement to classify
the compressed streams into subsets to reduce the noise impact of dissimilar
compressed streams. The streams in every resultant subgroup have been treated
separately to reduce the size. Both mathematical and empirical experiments
proved the signiﬁcant improvement of the compressed streams entropy (i.e.
almost reduced by half) and the resultant compression ratio (i.e. more than
50%). To the best of our knowledge, there has been no other study that tackles
this issue within the IoTs sensor streams ﬁeld.
1.5 Thesis Structure
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows.
1. Chapter 2 explains the solution to Research Question 1. It presents two
novel privacy preserving and authenticity protection models that rely on
steganography. It also summarises relevant work and presents our algorithms
in main stages. Next, evaluation of diﬀerent characteristics of the proposed
steganography-based techniques are introduced followed by a discussion about
the experiments we performed and the attained results. Finally, we summarised
this chapter.
2. Chapter 3 describes the solution to Research Question 2. It introduces a
resilience to the shared spectrum noise scheme using BCH syndrome codes
combined with steganography to protect the integrity of transmitted protected
IoTs streams. A preliminary introduction about BCH syndrome codes is
provided. Next, we present the mathematical model of our algorithm. A
thorough security and noise impact evaluation are then performed and provided.
The conclusion is ﬁnally drawn for this chapter.
3. Chapter 4 explains the solution to Research Question 3. It introduces two novel
techniques that ensures hidden information preserving size reduction. We begin
by summarising the relevant work and introducing the mathematical models of
14 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
our size reduction algorithms. This is followed up with a detailed discussion on
our experiments and we make comparisons with existing models. Finally, we
summarised this chapter.
4. Chapter 5 introduces the solution to Research Question 4. It presents our
cloud-based size re-reduction model. A preliminary analysis of the received
compressed streams is introduced. Then, our algorithm along with the
evaluation and results are presented. This chapter is lastly concluded.
5. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by summarising the main contributions. It also
draws attention to some of limitations along with possible progressions.
Note, four core chapters (Chapter 2-5) are introduced in a stand-alone
and self-content way. Therefore, each of which has its context including
related work, architecture, algorithms, discussions, evaluations matrices
and experiments.
Chapter 2
Steganography to Protect IoTs
Streams
This chapter answers the ﬁrst research question discussed in Section 1.2. The main
concerns about the privacy of the conﬁdential Internet of Things (IoTs) end-point
nodes, such as household identity, and the authenticity of transmitted streams are
examined along with the limitations raised due to transplanting existing security
algorithms to solve this issue. This chapter then highlights why steganography (stego)
can be a candidate technique to take some of the challenges and what limitations
should be taken into account. Section 2.1.1 introduces the main contributions of
this chapter and how they have been accomplished. Section 2.2 highlights brieﬂy the
key related works and the eﬀorts of other researchers to solve the issue. Sections
2.3 and 2.4 explain in detail our two novel models including the design, sensitive
information protection, randomisation mathematical models, and the hiding and
retrieval strategies. The evaluation of various characteristics of both models along
with an overview comparison between them is introduced in Section 2.5. In Section
2.6, we present detailed experimental examinations of both models, their resultant
eﬀect on the actual IoTs high streams and a comparison with available techniques.
Section 2.7 summarises this chapter.
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2.1 Introduction
Recently, there has been great-interest in and an increase in the amount of
remotely collected data [11]. The purposes of such collections is to monitor
the following: environmental phenomenon, battleﬁeld scenarios, surveillance,
manufacturing automation, traﬃc screening and remote healthcare. The data is
mainly collected using Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs); these comprise large
numbers of small IoTs devices that have limited computational capabilities and low
battery power [34]. Commonly, the collected data includes: 1) normal readings
(environmental or activities data), and 2) highly sensitive information (IDs, battleﬁeld
geometric location or secret nuclear facility features). This information is periodically
sent via a predetermined spectrum (e.g. 2.4 GHz) [21]. However, the extraordinary
amount of transmitted data through continuous surveillance and the massive demand
on the spectrum reservation results in wireless communications issues, such as
‘spectrum scarcity’ [35].
To overcome these issues, a new wireless communication technology called
Cognitive Radio (CR) has emerged [36]. It deploys a simple idea where the licensed
spectrum can be shared by a Secondary User (SU) whenever the Primary User (PU)
is idle, also known as white space. CR allows SU to sense the licensed bands
and whenever the space is white, SUs can utilise these bands to improve the IoTs
communication performance, throughput and reduce the interference between the
applications that use identical or overlapping bands, such as Bluetooth and ZigBee
at 2.4 GHz [21]. Therefore, tremendous eﬀort is currently being spent on developing
various standardisations to exploit this opportunity. For example, a Defence Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) project, titled neXt Generation (XG), is focused
on how unused spectrum technologies, such as television (TV) bands, can be utilised
for US military applications [37, 38]. Also, CR technology has recently been
implemented in various sets of IoTs applications such as smart homes, medicine and
traﬃc screening [39–41]. Despite the obvious advantages, CR Networks (CRNs) cause
many security issues for the transmitted IoTs streams in addition to the traditional
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Figure 2.1: Main issues faced when diﬀerent information (e.g. environmental,
multimedia and soldiers’ sensitive data) are periodically collected by IoTs devices in a
battleﬁeld area and should be sent to cloud-based servers for authorised management.
WSNs troubles which is illustrated in Figure 2.1 and can be categorised in the following
way:
1. The conﬁdentiality and the privacy of the transmitted sensitive content (e.g.
soldiers’ sensitive and geometric locations).
2. The authenticity of the collected normal IoTs readings because of the IoTs device
presence in hostile areas and the possible-natural or malicious interference.
Although these problems have been discussed in traditional WSNs, we are
compelled to target these issues in the context of IoTs today because: 1) they are rarely
targeted in today’s management model where the data is stored and processed by third
parties’ machines (i.e. Cloud Providers (CPs)), and 2) in using CRNs technology, the
data may be sent in a spectrum that has no authentication mechanism, such as TV
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broadcasting [42], as in the XG project (see Fig. 2.1). Therefore, this chapter proposes
a novel solution for these issues based on the following questions:
• How can the IoTs transmitted sensitive information be protected without
disrupting any possible operations at data aggregators and CPs?
• How can the authenticity of the transmitted normal readings be checked,
especially if the data are sent in a spectrum that has no authentication
mechanism, such as a TV band?
• Can both requirements be met without revealing the sensitive information to
CPs?
To solve these issues, most of the early solutions relied heavily on traditional
cryptography techniques, such as symmetric, asymmetric and digital signature
[24–29, 43]. However, they suﬀer from two main limitations:
• The huge delay and overhead of the approaches that result from thousands or
millions of mathematical operations in order to achieve high security, which
usually cannot be handled by existing IoTs end-point devices capabilities (i.e.
memory and power).
• Changing the form of all original data into a ciphertext makes applying
operations on the data more diﬃcult at aggregators (i.e. where the transmitted
data may be collected and compressed) and at CPs.
To solve some of the traditional cryptography issues, a recent non-traditional
cryptography technique called homomorphism has been used [44–46]. The advantage
of this technique is that the encrypted data can be worked on at data aggregators and
CPs points without revealing its meaning and thus provides strong end-to-end security.
However, homomorphic techniques are still not feasible in practical applications,
because their computational operations are very complex [22].
Steganography is another means of protecting sensitive information where a
portion of a secret message, like a watermark, is hidden inside host data and can only
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be retrieved by authorised users. The advantage of steganography over cryptography
is that it requires much lower power and processing capabilities. Therefore, many
solutions have been proposed using one of the steganography aspects called digital
watermarking (i.e. protecting integrity) where a small ﬁxed-length message (e.g.
MAC) is hidden inside the host data [22, 47–51]. There are limitations in these
digital watermarking techniques.
• They mainly provide strong integrity and so the receiver can extract the
watermark and check the validity of the data, but they do not protect the
privacy of the transferred sensitive information, thus raising a conﬁdentiality
issue.
• The watermark is embedded directly inside sensors’ readings, which is called,
‘hiding in the spatial domain’. This restricts the size of the hidden secret message
and becomes a capacity issue. Also, the amount of distortion (the diﬀerence
between the watermarked and the original forms) on the sensors’ readings is
very high, so the watermark should be removed whenever normal readings are
used.
2.1.1 Contributions
This chapter proposes two novel steganographic algorithms: 1) to protect sensitive
node information by hiding them randomly bit-by-bit inside normal IoTs streams
using a generated key; and 2) to provide strong evidence of authenticity by sealing
the normal transmitted readings. These algorithms will address the aforementioned
concerns derived from the ﬁrst research question in Section 1.2. To overcome the
hiding capacity issue, two signal processing techniques called ‘Walsh-Hadamard’ and
‘Wavelet’ are used to transform the normal readings from their spatial domain to their
frequency domain. This results in a set of decomposed values called ‘coeﬃcients’ [52].
Our two models vary in terms of speed, security and the maximum size of conﬁdential
information that can be handled. This will be summarised in the evaluation section
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Figure 2.2: The main scenario of our proposed model where sensors’ sensitive
information is hidden inside normal readings and only authorised users can retrieve
this conﬁdential data.
of this chapter.
2.2 Related Work
Any solution proposed to protect sensitive transmitted IoTs end-point information
should carefully consider the security, eﬃciency and capacity because of the nature of
IoTs devices capabilities and their surrounding environment. However, most existing
proposed solutions lack a suitable balance between these three features.
A majority of the solutions focused on the ﬁrst aspect of security and ignored the
other aspects, such as eﬃciency. For example, models in [53, 54, 57, 58] provide strong
security by using classical cryptography techniques, known as asymmetric encryption.
However, their eﬃciency is poor, because all the data should be decrypted whenever
it is used.
The other stream of solutions has targeted this issue by using homomorphism,
which is a new cryptography technique [46, 56]. Although they tried to have a
reasonable balance between security and eﬃciency by using homomorphic encryption,
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Table 2.1: Related Work Summary.
Protection
Technique
Features Comments
Traditional
Cryptography
[29, 53, 54]
• Use symmetric/asymmetric keys
for encryption at sensors side
• Aggregators and CPs should
decrypt all data before
operations
• Receiver should decrypt all data
before using them
• Low
Conﬁdentiality
• Poor Eﬃciency
• Key’ management
issue
• Unlimited
Capacity
Homomorphic
Encryption
[45, 46, 55, 56]
• Use homomorphic encryption at
sensors side
• Aggregators and CPs can work
on the encrypted form
• Receiver should decrypt all data
before using them
• Strong
Conﬁdentiality
• Is not feasible
in practical
applications
• Low Eﬃciency
• Unlimited
Capacity
Digital
Watermark
[22, 49–51]
• Embed secret message (e.g.
MAC) at sensors side
• Using the spatial domain for
hiding
• Aggregators and CPs can work
on the normal readings
• Receiver should remove the
watermark before using the data
• Strong Integrity
• No Conﬁdentiality
• High Eﬃciency
• Low Capacity
of embedded
messages with
High Distortion
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this non-traditional cryptography is still not feasible in practical applications for its
complexity [22].
The third stream of solutions applied a well-known technique used in multimedia,
known as ‘digital watermarking’ to guarantee the authenticity of the transmitted data
as in models [22, 49–51]. However, these solutions mainly focus on the integrity of the
transmitted data, but they neglect the end-to-end privacy preservation of the sensitive
information, meaning its a security issue. Secondly, only a few bits can be embedded
into the transmitted readings, thus creating capacity issue. Thirdly, the classical
watermarking technique results in a certain amount of overhead in the transmitted
data as can be seen in [51].
Table 2.1 summarises the work that can be categorised into three classes based
on the techniques used: traditional cryptography, non-traditional cryptography, and
digital watermarking.
2.3 Model 1(MD1): Walsh-Hadamard based
Steganography
In this section, a new fast steganography algorithm is introduced which takes into
consideration a reasonable balance between security and eﬃciency in such a way that:
1) there is little eﬀect on the normal IoTs streams, so the readings can be used without
removing the stego (i.e. hidden sensitive information) and 2) it is impossible for
illegitimate parties to extract the hidden information without using an appropriate
key. The algorithm relies on a simple and fast signal processing technique called
Walsh-Hadamard.
The operations at the remotely distributed IoTs end-point device can be
categorised into four stages:
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2.3.1 Obfuscation
The goal of this stage is that the encryption and hiding processes of the sensitive
information in the normal IoTs sensors’ readings must be completely random and
diﬀerent among IoTs devices, and so disallow unauthorised parties from retrieving
them properly. Therefore, a security key is generated for every distributed IoTs node
and will be known only to the end receiver of the data. This key has two main tasks:
1. Encrypt the sensitive information (e.g. IDs and geometric location data) before
the hiding process using Exclusive OR (XOR) operation, which is very fast and
suits the IoTs small devices technical capabilities. This can be shown in Eq 2.1
S˜ = S
⊕
KEY (2.1)
where
⊕
is a XOR operation, S is the original sensitive information and S˜ is
the encrypted form.
2. Generate the sequence of selected coeﬃcients that will be used to hide the
conﬁdential IoTs devices’ information. Then, it will be shifted by one character
and will generate the second layer of selected coeﬃcients and so on. This is
shown in Eq 2.2 and will be fully comprehensible after reading Section 2.3.3.
N˜ = fx(KEY ) (2.2)
where N˜ is the generated sequence of coeﬃcients.
2.3.2 FWHT Transform
Walsh-Hadamrd Transform (WHT) is a well-known process that is used to decompose
a signal into a set of coeﬃcients representing its frequency components [59, 60]. The
signiﬁcance of that is the resultant coeﬃcients can be classiﬁed into: 1) low-sequence
coeﬃcients which represent most of the signal energy, and 2) high-sequence coeﬃcients
representing the less important parts of the signal. The advantage of this technique
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is that the original signal can almost be reconstructed from only the low sequence
components.
For better understanding, Fig 2.3 shows an example of IoTs devices’ readings. a)
Plot for more than 500 temperature samples. b) Plot for the resultant coeﬃcients
after applying WHT, which clearly shows the most energy is in the low sequence
coeﬃcients from 0 to <50, whereas others are less important. Accordingly we erased
all coeﬃcients from >50 to 512 to show their eﬀect on the reconstructed samples. c)
Plot the reconstructed original temperature samples from only <50 coeﬃcients. This
ﬁgure demonstrates the ﬂexibility and the capacity that will be derived from these
coeﬃcients. This inspired us to use signal transformation techniques to hide more
sensitive information related to IoTs end-point data without increasing the actual
IoTs devices’ readings.
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Figure 2.3: IoTs device’ readings: (a) direct plot, (b) after applying Fast
Walsh-Hadamrd Transform (FWHT), and (c) rebuilt form after zeros more than 90
% of FWHT coeﬃcients.
Additionally, there is a fast version of WHT algorithm that will provides the
computational complexity NLogN [61], whereas the complexity of the commonly
used WHT is O(N2) [62]. Therefore, FWHT is used in our algorithm and is shown in
Eq 2.3.
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yn =
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
xiFWHT (n, i), n = 1, 2, ..., N − 1 (2.3)
where yn is the resultant coeﬃcient, xi is the original sample value and FWHT (n, i)
is the applied transformation [61, 62].
FWHT simply works by applying a Walsh generated matrix that is correlated to
the number of samples. The matrix values are +1 and -1. The order of rows in this
matrix can be ‘Sequence’, which is used in signal processing, Hadamard - is used in
controls applications or Dyadic is used in mathematics. A simple FWHT matrix for
only four samples is shown in Eq 2.4 [63].⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
s1
s2
s3
s4
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
+w11 +w12 +w13 +w14
+w21 +w22 −w23 −w24
+w31 −w32 −w33 +w34
+w41 −w42 +w43 −w44
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
c1
c2
c3
c4
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(2.4)
where Ss is the original IoTs device stream, ws is the FWHT matrix value and cs is
the resultant coeﬃcient values.
In our research, FWHT is chosen for two main reasons: 1) the original IoTs
sensors’ readings can be accurately reconstructed from only a few coeﬃcients, allowing
others to be used freely to hide a reasonable amount of sensitive information, and 2)
FWHT uses less storage space, is faster to calculate and consumes fewer resources than
many other transformation techniques, such as Fast Fourier, Chirp Z and Frequency
Response of Digital Filter, because it uses only real additions and subtractions [52].
Therefore, in this work, FWHT is applied to diﬀerent real-time collected IoTs
devices’ readings (e.g. temperature, humidity, light and voltage) and the resultant
coeﬃcients will be reshaped to a two-dimensional (2D) matrix. The ﬁrst few
low-sequence coeﬃcients will not be manipulated because they represent the most
important part of the IoTs devices’ readings. On the other hand, several bits will be
changed in the remainder of FWHT coeﬃcients - the steganography level. Also, to
guarantee the minimum acceptable amount of distortion to the actual IoTs devices’
readings, we performed many experiments to select an appropriate steganography
26 CHAPTER 2. STEGANOGRAPHY TO PROTECT IOTS STREAMS
level to demonstrate how many bits can be hidden in the less important coeﬃcients.
This is shown in Fig 2.4. From the results of those experiments, about 5 bits will be
hidden in the randomly-selected high-sequence coeﬃcients.
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Figure 2.4: Eﬀect of applying steganography using diﬀerent levels
1bit/2bits/3bits/5bits on the resultant distortion for each coeﬃcient.
2.3.3 Hiding in Walsh-Hadamard Matrix
At this stage, the sensitive information will be hidden inside the resultant coeﬃcients,
after applying FWHT to the IoTs devices’ readings. However, to guarantee a high
level of security and to prevent unauthorised parties from accessing this information,
three layers of security are implemented. These are:
1. the sensitive information is encrypted using a security shared key
2. the key is used to scramble and reshape the resultant coeﬃcients from a vector
to a matrix of M -by-N
3. the key is used to generate the selected coeﬃcients’ order in a vector space.
This will guarantee that only an authorised receiver who has the security key can
extract and decrypt the sensitive information properly.
The detailed process of hiding is shown in Fig 2.5. After applying FWHT to
the normal IoTs readings, the resultant coeﬃcients are scrambled and reshaped to
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Figure 2.5: Block diagram shows the steps of hiding sensitive IoTs device information
inside their normal readings.
M -by-N matrix. The key is then used to encrypt the sensitive information after
converting both to bits. Next, the key will be used to generate the selected order of
ﬁrst row coeﬃcients, which is based on the American Standard Code for Information
Interchange (ASCII) positions of the key character set. After that, the secret bits will
be embedded corresponding to this order. After ﬁnishing all the selected coeﬃcients,
the key will be shifted by one character to generate the second row of selected
coeﬃcients; this will be used to hiding again, and so on.
Fig 2.6 shows a simple example of how the shared key can be used to generate the
order of selected coeﬃcients for a single row. It starts by converting the key into ASCII
and a default position value will be given. Then, order the key ASCII in ascending
order and another position value will be assigned (i.e. ascending position order).
Finally, return the key ASCII to its original order using the default position order
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(to avoid having two diﬀerent keys resulting in a similar sequence of numbers).The
resultant ascending position order is regarded as the ‘selected coeﬃcients order’. In
our algorithm, the key length will be more than 32 symbols in length.
Coefficient Order : 3 7 8 4 1 6 2 5
Key Character Set :  A     X     Z     N    1    R    5    N
Defult ASCII Order : 65    88    90   78   49  82  53  78
 Default Position Order : 1      2      3     4    5    6    7    8
Ascending ASCII Order : 49   53    65   78   78  82  88  90
Default Position Order : 5     7      1     4    8    6    2    3
Ascending Position Order : 1      2      3     4    5    6    7    8
Default ASCII Order : 65    88    90   78   49  82  53  78
 Default Position Order : 1      2      3     4    5    6    7    8
Ascending Position Order : 3      7      8     4    1    6    2    5
1
2
3
4
5
AXZN1R5
  AXZN1R5
N
N
shift
Figure 2.6: Block diagram shows how a selected coeﬃcients order is generated from
the key in ﬁve steps. The complexity is a vector space.
The detailed hiding algorithm is demonstrated in Algorithm 1. It begins by
initialising the required variables. FWHT is then applied and the resultant coeﬃcients
will be shifted and processed into an integer format. Next, by using the key, the
algorithm will shuﬄe the coeﬃcients into 2D. The secret bits are then hidden in
diﬀerent coeﬃcients. Finally, the 2D coeﬃcients will be reshuﬄed and rescaled to their
original format, then the inverse FWHT is implemented to produce the watermarked
readings which is then transmitted.
2.3.4 Inverse FWHT Re-composition
Following the hiding process, the resultant coeﬃcients are called stego (or sealed)
coeﬃcients. At this stage, the stego coeﬃcients will be re-reshaped and the inverse
FWHT applied to convert IoTs readings from their frequency domain to their original
time domain. The result is a reconstructed form called stego IoTs streams, meaning
it contains hidden conﬁdential information, which is quite similar to the original IoTs
sensor readings. The beauty of that is even the stego IoTs sensor streams can be
used as the original form; however, only authorised receivers with a security key can
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Algorithm 1 The hiding algorithm
1: i, j, k : counters
2: m,n : 2D matrix size
3: coef : FWHT coeﬃcients matrix
4: S : secret bits
5: Apply FWHT on host data
6: Rescale coef → int
7: shuffle coef → 2D
8: /*Start hiding*/
9: while counter < EoF coef do
10: for i = 1 : n do
11: for j = 1 : m do
12: Hide 5 bits of S(k) → coef(i, j)
13: if EoF S then
14: Start again
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: counter = counter + 1
19: end while
20: Re− shuffle coef → original form
21: Re− rescale coef → original form
22: Apply inverse FWHT to host data
23: return watermarked readings
extract the hidden information, such as IDs and geometric location information, and
verify them. The inverse FWHT can be deﬁned by Eq 2.5
xi =
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
ynIFWHT (n, i), i = 1, 2, ..., N − 1 (2.5)
where xi is the original sample value, yn is the resultant coeﬃcient from the
decomposition process and IFWHT (n, i) is the inverse transformation [61, 62].
2.3.5 Retrieval from Walsh-Hadamard Matrix
To properly retrieve and decrypt the hidden sensitive information, the receiver must
have the security key. The process is almost identical to the hiding process except that
it extracts the bits instead of hiding them. Fig 2.7 shows the detailed process. First,
we apply FWHT onto the IoTs sensor readings. The key is then used to reshape
the FWHT coeﬃcients into a 2D matrix. Next, the key is used to generate the
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selected order of the ﬁrst row and start extracting the sensitive bits from each selected
coeﬃcient. The key will then be shifted and will generate the second layer of selected
coeﬃcients, and so on. Finally, by using the key, we can decrypt the secret bits and
verify the resultant information.
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Figure 2.7: The main steps to retrieve the sensitive information.
2.4 Model 2 (MD2): Wavelet-based Steganography
In this section, another novel steganography algorithm is proposed. It focuses on
strengthening the security by using a two-dimensional signal processing technique
called ‘Wavelet’. Our proposed hiding mathematical model takes the advantage of
the obtained wavelet sub-bands tree that complicates the time required for retrieving
the hidden bits illegally.
The operations on the IoTs device’s side can be classiﬁed into the following stages.
2.4.1 Strong Encryption
The goal of this stage is to ensure that the encryption and hiding processes of
the conﬁdential information in the normal IoTs device’s readings must be strong,
completely random and diﬀerent among IoTs devices, and so disallows illegitimate
parties from retrieving them accurately. Therefore, a security key will be generated
for every IoTs device and will be known only to the end receiver of the data (e.g.
operation centres). This key has two main tasks:
1. Encrypts the conﬁdential information, such as IoTs device IDs and geometric
location data, household name, Date of Birth (DoB), address and total watts
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consumption, before the hiding process using Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) encryption - this is very strong and suits the IoTs device’s technical
capabilities. This can be deﬁned in Eq 2.6
fx(O,KEY ) ⇒ E˜ (2.6)
where fx is AES operations, O is the original conﬁdential information and E˜ is
the encrypted form.
2. Generates two random sequences of numbers to build a random matrix that will
be used to hide the sensitive information of IoTs devices. This will become fully
comprehensible after reading Section 2.4.3.
2.4.2 Wavelet Decomposition
Wavelet Transform (WT) is a well-known technique used in signal and image
processing where the content, such as biomedical signal, is transformed from its spatial
domain into its frequency domain to identify the most and the least signiﬁcant parts
of the signal [64]. More precisely, it is a linear transformation that is performed on
the given signal which leads to decomposing it into diﬀering values that represent its
frequency components at a given time called coeﬃcients. WT is shown in Eq 2.7
C(i, j) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(t)ψ(i, j)dt (2.7)
where i and j are positive integers that represent transform parameters. C represents
resultant coeﬃcients. ψ is wavelet function [65]. The WT can be used in two ways
which are either Discrete and Continuous. The Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) is
preferred in most applications, because the produced and analysed real-life information
comes in discrete numbers rather than continuous functions [66].
To conduct DWT decomposition, high-pass and low-pass band ﬁlters are applied
on the original signal. Consequently, two sub-signals called ‘bands’ are obtained. The
ﬁrst sub-band is the low frequency components that represents the approximation of
the original signal. The second is the high-frequency components that represents the
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detailed coeﬃcients. When this process is repeated multiple times, it is known as
multi-level wavelet decomposition [65, 67]. DWT is deﬁned in Eq 2.8.
D(a, b) =
∑
a
∑
b
X(a)Φab(n) (2.8)
where D(a, b) represents DWT coeﬃcients, a and b represent the shift and scale
transform parameters and Φab(n) represents the base-time wavelet function that is
shown in Eq 2.9.
Φab(n) = 2
−a/2Φ(2−an− b) (2.9)
In this work, DWT is chosen for two main reasons: 1) it produces a tree
of sub-bands which helps with strengthening the security of embedding while not
increasing the original size of the data; where the total number of coeﬃcients from all
decomposed sub-bands are equal to the original signal samples, and 2) the signal can
almost be reconstructed from only the most signiﬁcant coeﬃcients - the approximation
sub-band coeﬃcients - allowing free use of the detailed sub-band coeﬃcients in order
to hide conﬁdential information with minimum amount of distortion on the original
transmitted readings (as in electricity consumption). This inspired us to use wavelet
to hide more conﬁdential information related to IoTs device securely without eﬀecting
the actual readings of the IoTs devices.
Therefore, in this work, the 5-level wavelet packet decomposition will be
applied on diﬀerent real-time readings from IoTs devices readings (e.g. watts,
heat-index, wind chill, humidity and temperature), which results in 32 sub-bands
as shown in Fig. 2.8. A wavelet family called ‘Daubechies’ with the order 2
(db2) is chosen in the decomposition process, because its performance in analysing
discontinuous-disturbance-dynamic signals has already been proven to be perfect [68].
To achieve minimum amount of distortion, the low frequency sub-bands coeﬃcients
(from 1 to 16) will not be changed because they represent the most signiﬁcant parts
of the IoTs readings. On the other hand, a number of bits will be manipulated into
the rest of the detailed sub-bands coeﬃcients - this is called the steganography level,
because the conﬁdentiality of the hidden sensitive information and the imperceptibility
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to human senses are our top priorities[69]. To guarantee the minimum acceptable
distortion on the actual readings, many experiments have been conducted to select
an appropriate steganography level (i.e. how many bits can be embedded in the
least important sub-bands). Consequently, about ﬁve bits will be hidden in the
randomly-selected high-frequency sub-bands coeﬃcients.
Smart meter readings
      e.g. Watts 0,0
1,0 1,1
2,0
3,0
2,1 2,2 2,3
3,1 3,2 3,3 3,4 3,5 3,6 3,7
Level 1
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Figure 2.8: Decomposing IoTs streams (e.g. smart meter) into 32 sub-bands.
2.4.3 Embedding in Wavelet Tree
At this stage, the conﬁdential information from households will be hidden inside
the resultant sub-bands coeﬃcients tree after applying DWT to the IoTs device,
namely from the smart meter. However, to guarantee a high level of security and to
prevent unauthorised parties from retrieving this information, two layers of security
are implemented. These are explained below:
1. the conﬁdential information is encrypted using the security key (i.e. shared key)
2. the key is used to generate the selected coeﬃcients order from diﬀerent rows in
the form of a random 2D space M × N
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This will guarantee that only an authorised receiver who has the security key can
extract and decrypt the conﬁdential information properly.
Generating Hiding Matrix: To achieve the goal of hiding the secret bits in an
entirely random way that is diﬀerent among IoTs devices, the security key is used to
generate two random sets of numbers as deﬁned in Eq 2.10
Z ⇐
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
c˜ = fx1(K)
r˜ = fx2(K)
(2.10)
where c˜ and r˜ are the generated sequences of numbers. The combinations of c˜ and r˜
is used to build a 2D M X N matrix Z.
Z{m,n} =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
r1, c1 r1, c2 · · · r1, cn
r2, c1 r2, c2 · · · r2, cn
...
...
. . .
...
rm, c1 am,2 · · · rm, cn
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(2.11)
where Z is a 2D generated matrix (see 2.11). m represents the number of rows, and n
represents the number of columns which is < 32. (rm, cn) which represents a position
of a sub-band coeﬃcient in the wavelet tree.
There are two crucial 2D matrices in our algorithm that can be seen in Fig 2.12.
The ﬁrst is matrix C which corresponds to the readings’ coeﬃcients. The second is
matrix Z which corresponds to the generated random order that should be followed
to hide the secret bits. Here, the size of the 2D matrices is m × n. Therefore, our
algorithm relies on the total number of readings, the decomposition level and the total
number of sub-bands used in hiding process. This is shown in Eq 2.12.
(m,n) =
{
TR × 2
(2L)2
}
,
{
TR
(2L)
}
(2.12)
where TR is the total number of readings. L represents the decomposition level
used.
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For example, assume that the total number of IoTs readings (in watts) contains
1024 samples and the used decomposition level is ﬁve (see Eq 2.13). Consider:{
m =
1024× 2
(25)2
⇒ 16
}
,
{
n =
1024
(25)
⇒ 32
}
(2.13)
  6   8  1  5  2  9  4  10  7  3
Key Symbols :  X  c    !    W   2    m    R    z      a   Q
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Ascending Position : 1    2    3    4    5     6     7     8   9    10
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Figure 2.9: This example demonstrates how the 2D hiding matrix order is generated
from the key in ﬁve steps.
For a better understanding, Fig 2.9 shows a simple example of how the key can
be used to generate the 2D hiding matrix order (Z). First, the key is converted into
ASCII and a default position value will be allocated. The key ASCII is then ordered
in descending mode and another position value will be given (i.e. descending position
order). Next, the key ASCII is returned to its original order using the default position
order to avoid having two diﬀerent keys resulting in an identical sequence of numbers
and the resultant descending position order is regarded as r˜. A similar process is
repeated to generate c˜, except that ascending order is used instead of descending.
Finally, Z is built from the combination of r and c. However, in our algorithm, the
key length contain more than 32 symbols.
Embedding Process: The detailed process of hiding is shown in Fig 2.10, 2.11 and
2.12. DWT is applied to the normal IoTs device’s readings, which result into a 32
sub-bands coeﬃcients tree. Only non-signiﬁcant sub-bands coeﬃcients (from 16 to
31) will be split, rescaled and converted into bits be used in the hiding process (see
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Figure 2.10: Block diagram shows how an example of IoTs readings are decomposed,
split, rescaled and converted into bits.
3
Smart Grid’s Sensitive information
Grid ID: 321752
Geomtric Location: X/Y/Z
Household
Name: Alsharif Abuadbba
DoB : 1/1/1986
Address: 1/200 XXX 
Convert
into bits
100100010100111...
XOR
100000110110001...
000100100010110...
Secret  bits
=
Total Watts: 19000
Smart Meter
.........
Date: 20/5/2014
Security KEY
(e.g. AXZ2MCn1..)
Figure 2.11: An example of how conﬁdential information is encrypted before hiding.
Fig 2.10). The key is then used to encrypt the conﬁdential information (see Fig 2.11).
Finally, the secret bits will be hidden in the sub-bands coeﬃcients tree corresponding
to the early generated 2D matrix order Z (see Fig 2.12). If all selected coeﬃcients
are used and if there are more secret bits, the key then will be shifted 1-character to
generate another two random sequences of numbers that will be used to hide, and the
process repeats.
Algorithm 2 clearly demonstrates the steps followed in the hiding process in a
pseudo-code. However, to make sure that all high-frequency coeﬃcients are ready for
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Figure 2.12: Block diagram shows how the secret bits are hidden corresponding to the
2D matrix order Z.
the steganography, they should be rescaled to a positive integer format before the
process.
Algorithm 2 The hiding algorithm
1: Apply ⇒ 5 level wavelet decomposition
2: Split ⇒ high frequency sub-bands from 16 to 31
3: Add ⇒ (lowest value + -1) to all coeﬃcients
4: Multiply ⇒ all coeﬃcients by 10000
5: Convert ⇒ coeﬃcients from double to integer
6: while counter < Total coefficients do
7: Start hide secret bits into 2D matrix
8: end while
9: Convert ⇒ coeﬃcients from integer to double
10: Divide ⇒ all coeﬃcients by 10000
11: Subtract ⇒ (lowest value + -1) from all coeﬃcients
12: Recombine ⇒ high and low frequency sub-bands
13: Apply ⇒ Inverse 5 level wavelet re-composition
14: return ⇒ stego readings
For clariﬁcation, Fig 2.10 and 2.12 show a simple example of a split sub-bands
coeﬃcients of size 8 × 8. However, the size of the 2D matrix has no ﬁxed size and
can be changed based on the total number of decomposed readings and the level of
decomposition. For example, if the total number of readings is 512, and 5-level wavelet
decomposition is applied, a 2D matrix will be generated. The columns represent the
32 sub-bands and each has its own row that is a list of coeﬃcients (i.e. each sub-band
has a list of 16 coeﬃcients). Only the high-frequency sub-bands that range from 16
to 31 will be used. Therefore, 16 sub-bands are split and, according to our example,
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each has its own 16 coeﬃcients. Due to space limitations in the illustrated ﬁgures,
only size 8× 8 portions are on view.
2.4.4 Wavelet Reconstruction
Following the hiding process, the resultant sub-bands coeﬃcients are called stego
coeﬃcients. At this stage, the stego coeﬃcients will be re-embedded into the 32
sub-bands coeﬃcients tree and the inverse DWT is applied to convert IoTs readings
from their frequency domain to their original time domain. The result of that is a
reconstructed form called ‘stego IoTs readings’ (i.e. they contain hidden conﬁdential
information) which is similar to the original IoTs stream. The beauty of that is even
the stego IoTs readings can be used as the original form; however, only authorised
receivers with a security key can extract the hidden information and verify them (e.g.
grid IDs, household name, an individuals DoB, address and the total watts used). The
inverse DWT is deﬁned by Eq 2.14
X =
∑
a
∑
b
D(a, b)Φab(n) (2.14)
where X is the original form of data.
It should be noted that the focus of this chapter is to protect the IoTs conﬁdential
information and to seal the accumulated readings. However, to improve the eﬃciency
of communication and reduce the payload, compatible size reduction techniques may
be applied before transmitting the stego readings [68, 70]. The only condition is that
the stego readings must be fully recovered at the receiver side, because losing a single
bit may result in losing a portion of the hidden secret bits. This will be discussed
further in detail in Chapter 4.
2.4.5 Extracting from Wavelet Tree
To accurately retrieve and decrypt the hidden conﬁdential information, the receiver
must have the security key. The process is roughly identical to the hiding process
except that it retrieves the bits instead of hiding them. First, DWT is applied to
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the IoTs readings which results in 32 sub-bands tree. Only the detailed sub-bands
coeﬃcients will be split and used in the retrieving process. Next, the key is used to
generate two random sequences of numbers which are used to build the M×N matrix
(Z). The secret bits will then be retrieved corresponding to this order. After that,
the key will be shifted into 1-character to generate another two random sequences of
numbers that will be used to extract information, and so on. Finally, by using the
key the secret bits will be decrypted and the resultant information can be veriﬁed.
To evaluate the accuracy of the extracted information, the secret bits have been
carefully checked after every retrieval process using Bit Error Ratio (BER) which can
detect any data loss even down to one bit[71]. From our simulations, all BERs were
0 which means that all secret bits are recoverable.
BER =
Br
BT
× 100% (2.15)
Br is the number of erroneous bits and BT is the number of bits.
2.5 Evaluation
In this section, the proposed algorithms will be evaluated in terms of the key strength,
security of the hidden data, the size of the embedded sensitive data and the used
distortion measurements.
2.5.1 Key Strength Analysis
The security of the algorithms proposed in this work requires that the recipient know in
advance the full IoTs devices readings and the security key, otherwise the conﬁdential
hidden data cannot be extracted and decrypted properly.
The most signiﬁcant parameter is the security key. It is used to provide two layers
of security: 1) by encrypting conﬁdential information and 2) by generating a random
order of coeﬃcients in the form of a vector and 2DM×N matrix to hide the encrypted
bits randomly (see Fig 2.6 and 2.11). Therefore, this key should be kept secret and
known only to two parties: 1) the sender (e.g. smart meter) where the key should be
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Table 2.2: Examples of key lengths and possible combinations
Key length Character set Probabilities
64 US-ASCII 7.2e+134
64 UTF-8 1.3e+154
64 UTF-16 ∞
128 US-ASCII 5.2e+269
128 UTF-8 ∞
128 UTF-16 ∞
burned and used whenever the collected IoTs device’s readings are sent, and 2) the
receiver (e.g. operation centres) who can properly retrieve and check the validity of
the hidden sensitive information, whereas only the stego IoTs device’s readings can
be seen by other parties (e.g. public cloud providers). In our research, the key is
generated and is kept secret at the IoTs end-point and at the recipient side. Our
algorithms’ key strength can be quantiﬁed as the number of entropy bits H (see Eq
2.16) where 2H is the number of possibilities that should be exhausted by an intruder
during a brute-force attack.
H = log2N
L (2.16)
L is the symbol’s length and N symbolises the probabilities of these symbols. Table
?? displays examples of diﬀerent key lengths, character sets and the total number of
their probabilities. Therefore, the longer the key and character set are, the stronger
the algorithm becomes.
2.5.2 MD1: Walsh-Hadamard based Steganography
Unauthorised retrieval: The key is used to generate a hiding order in
one-dimensional vector format. Therefore, to protect the hidden and secret
information from being extracted without the key, the total number of combinations
after applying FWHTs on the host data (i.e. normal IoTs device readings) should
have a suitable size (see Eq 2.17).
T =
m∑
i=1
R!×
n∑
j=1
C!×NL (2.17)
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where T is the total number of combinations, R and C are the number of rows and
columns from the reshaped coeﬃcients matrix using the generated vectors.
Hidden Data Size: The total amount of hidden data mainly relies on the total
number of IoTs device’s readings (e.g. watts) and the Walsh-Hadamard resultant
one-dimensional coeﬃcients (see Eq 2.18).
b =
t∑
i=1
v × l (2.18)
where b is the total number of hidden bits, t is the total coeﬃcients, v is the selected
values, and l is the number of hidden bits in each Walsh-Hadamard resultant values.
2.5.3 MD2: Wavelet-based Steganography
Unauthorised Retrieval Analysis: The key is employed to create a hiding order
in 2D format to match the resultant wavelet tree. Therefore, to prevent retrieving
the hidden, conﬁdential information without the key, after the DWT decomposition
of the IoTs devices readings host data, the 32 sub-bands coeﬃcients tree should have
a suitable size (e.g. > Key length)(see Eq 2.19).
T =
r∑
i=t
R!×
c∑
j=t
C!×NL (2.19)
where T is the total combinations’ number, R and C are the rows and columns numbers
from the 32 sub-bands coeﬃcients tree and t is the minimum number of sub-bands
coeﬃcients that can be used from each row.
Assume smart meter’s readings (in watts) comprise 1024 samples in length, and
the 32 sub-bands coeﬃcients matrix are a 32 × 32 size after applying DWT. The
assumed threshold (t) is 32× 16, the key length is 128 and its character set is UTF-8
(see Eq 2.20).
T =
32∑
i=1
32!×
32∑
j=16
32!× 256128 ⇒ T = ∞ (2.20)
Consequently, this proves that the ability to properly retrieve and decrypt the
intended conﬁdential information in a reasonable time is highly improbable.
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The Size of Hidden Data: The total amount of hidden data relies on the total
number of IoTs device’s readings (e.g. watts) and the steganography level (see Eq
2.21).
b =
t∑
i=1
n
2
×B (2.21)
where b is the total number of hidden bits, t is the total coeﬃcients’ number in each
sub-band after decomposing the original samples, n is the total sub-bands number,
B is the steganography level, that is the number of hidden bits in each sub-band’s
coeﬃcient.
This means that after decomposing the normal readings with 5-level DWT , the
resultant coeﬃcients will be distributed under 32 sub-bands. Only high-frequency
sub-bands from 16 to 31 are split resulting in a 2D matrix. The total number of
columns represent the maximum sub-bands’ number of 16, and the total number of
rows represent the maximum number of resultant coeﬃcients under each sub-band.
In every coeﬃcient, several bits will be hidden at the steganography level; therefore,
the longer the total number of readings, the larger the size of the hidden data. We
conducted intensive experiments to achieve a reasonable balance between the size of
hidden bits in each coeﬃcient and the resultant distortion as explained in Section
2.5.3. Based on that, about 5 bits will be hidden in each coeﬃcient. Therefore, the
total size of hidden data will be an accumulation of the total number of bits hidden
in each high-frequency sub-bands coeﬃcient.
For example, assume that 5-level DWT decomposition is applied to normal
IoTs readings, each resultant sub-band coeﬃcients number is 512 (i.e. value of n).
Therefore, the 2D split matrix will be the size of 16 × 512 (i.e. 16 is the value of t).
Also, assume about 5 bits (i.e. value of B) are hidden in each coeﬃcient. Therefore,
around 5120 bytes (5 KB) of conﬁdential data can be hidden inside these coeﬃcients.
2.5.4 Comparison of our MD1 vs MD2
Two novel models are introduced that rely on the Walsh-Hadamard and Wavelet signal
processing techniques. Our ﬁrst algorithm, MD1, relies on a much lighter and faster
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transformation technique, such as Fast Walsh-Hadamard Transform in terms of time
(i.e. linearithmic complexity n log n) and operations (i.e. based on additions and
subtractions) [61]. However, the output is a one-dimensional vector of coeﬃcients and
so the generated random order is also a vector level which results in mild security.
On the other hand, the second model, MD2, relies on wavelet transform and the
production of multi-dimensional sub-bands wavelets tree. This is a relatively expensive
process requiring both time, based on quadratic complexity, and operations, based on
multiplications[72]. Nevertheless, due to the obtained two-dimensional wavelet tree,
the random order also generated in 2D dimensional space.
In terms of the possible of hidden data size, MD1 can hide more data by using
more than 80% of the obtained coeﬃcients, whereas MD2 can embed less data by
using only low sub-bands that hold 50% of the coeﬃcients. Conversely, both models
demonstrated < 0.5% resultant distortion in all cases, as discussed in the Experiments
and Results section. In brief, this means the Walsh-Hadamard based model (MD1)
has a faster and higher hiding capacity with mild security, whereas the wavelet-based
model (MD2) is slower with a lower hiding capacity, but maintains stronger security.
2.5.5 Steganography Eﬃciency Measurement
To accurately evaluate the eﬀect of our algorithms on the diﬀerence between the
original and the stego IoTs device’s readings (i.e. resultant distortion), a well-known
measurement called a Percent of Root-mean-square Diﬀerence (PRD) is calculated,
after applying the signal processing transforms. The PRD can accurately measure
any reconstruction error between the original and the reconstructed form as deﬁned
in Eq 2.22 [1].
PRDj =
√∑m
i=1(ci − c˜i)∑m
i=1(c
2
i )
× 100 (2.22)
where ci is an original coeﬃcient, and c˜i is the reconstructed stego form.
Identically, the distortion caused by the retrieving process is measured by
calculating PRD between the original and the extracted IoTs device’s readings after
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removing all hidden, sensitive bits. The results are presented in the next section of
this paper.
2.6 Experiments and Results
Our experiments are classiﬁed into two main parts: 1) Embedding which is used by
distributed IoTs devices to hide secret information in their normal readings and the
steps explained in Sections 2.3 and 2.4; 2) Extraction occurring on the recipient side
(e.g. operation centres) so even if the IoTs devices’ normal readings contain the hidden
sensitive information are intercepted or tampered with by unauthorised parties, it will
not disclose any information and it can be easily checked and veriﬁed.
2.6.1 MD1: Walsh-Hadamard based Steganography
In our experiments, various IoTs devices’ readings were randomly selected from two
diﬀerent datasets. The ﬁrst dataset is collected and published by Intel Berkeley
Research Lab 2004 [73], and the second is collected and published by research group
from University of North Carolina at Greensboro 2010 [74]. For brevity in this chapter,
most of the results that will be shown are data, such as temperature, humidity, light
and voltage, are collected by environmental monitoring IoTs sensors. Experiments
were performed for each result to hide and retrieve the sensitive information according
to our algorithm described in Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.5. The conﬁdential data was a
set of information that must be kept conﬁdential such as IDs, geometric location data
and other private information. These are converted into bits to be hidden inside IoTs
device’s readings.
To obtain unbiased results, we experimented with our proposed algorithm with
diﬀerent keys as well as various IoTs streams lengths, such as 512, 1024, 2048 and
4096 samples. Also, to get the highest distortion eﬀect, all high sequence coeﬃcients
have been used. For brevity, we present six cases of our results. 1) Fig. 2.13 shows an
example of four original IoTs streams plots (temperature, humidity, light and voltage)
used to hide sensitive information, and the stego form before and after the stego
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Figure 2.13: Four examples of IoTs sensors’ readings: (a) direct plot for original form
(b) stego form that contains the hidden sensitive information (i.e. IDs and geometric
location data) and (c)extracted form (i.e. after removing the sensitive information).
Table 2.3: PRD results for temperature and humidity IoTs sensors readings from
Dataset 1
Temperature Humidity
Segment
No
PRD %
stego
PRD %
Extracted
PRD %
stego
PRD %
Extracted
1 0.1482 0.1705 0.0820 0.1016
2 0.1413 0.1702 0.0912 0.1048
3 0.1781 0.2128 0.0764 0.0940
4 0.1791 0.2055 0.0717 0.0892
5 0.1205 0.1440 0.0795 0.0943
6 0.1792 0.2115 0.0700 0.0842
7 0.1575 0.1930 0.0678 0.0800
8 0.1339 0.1633 0.0772 0.0933
9 0.1251 0.1535 0.0845 0.1037
10 0.1760 0.1979 0.0769 0.0920
11 0.1683 0.1969 0.0756 0.0892
12 0.1226 0.1495 0.0977 0.1203
extraction process. 2) Table 2.3 shows the exact PRD results from the temperature
and humidity IoTs streams between the original and stego form as well as between the
original and the extracted forms. 3) Table 2.4 shows the PRD results from light and
voltage IoTs readings. 4) Fig. 2.14 proves that whenever a ﬁxed amount of sensitive
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data is hidden in a bigger host data size, the amount of distortion is slightly decreased.
5) Fig.2.15 shows that, despite using all host data samples in the hiding process with
diﬀerent sizes (e.g. 512, 1024 and 2048), our algorithm behaviour and the resultant
distortion is still stable whenever the same number of host data samples is used. 6)
Fig. 2.16 accurately measures the time and the space taken by the proposed algorithm
to accomplish both phases of the hiding and the extraction which clearly is very low
- < 0.03 seconds - in all cases.
Table 2.4: PRD results for light and voltage IoTs sensors readings
Light Voltage
Segment
No
PRD %
stego
PRD %
Extracted
PRD %
stego
PRD %
Extracted
1 0.0354 0.0423 0.1712 0.5733
2 0.0129 0.0150 0.5072 0.2203
3 0.0672 0.0670 0.3266 0.2187
4 0.0658 0.0789 0.7298 0.2287
5 0.0617 0.0767 0.0721 0.3220
6 0.0672 0.0715 0.5449 0.2485
7 0.0677 0.0793 0.6236 0.2388
8 0.0410 0.0484 0.6989 0.1923
9 0.0296 0.0357 0.6114 0.2093
10 0.0841 0.1014 0.2169 0.2277
11 0.0691 0.0886 0.3319 0.2509
12 0.0672 0.0670 0.2204 0.2104
In all cases, despite the diﬀerent sizes of IoTs sensors’ readings and diﬀerent ranges
of values, all PRDs are ≤ 0.6 %. This means that the eﬀect will only be to the third
or fourth decimal values which are ignored in the temperature and humidity cases.
This proves that our proposed algorithm will be stable and provide little distortion on
the original IoTs sensors’ readings. On the other hand, it oﬀers a great advantage by
securing the sensitive information in such a way that: 1) does not increase the actual
IoTs streams size, 2) preserves the bandwidth, storage space and power consumption
at the distributed IoTs end-point environment, and 3) only an authorised receiver
can retrieve the hidden secured information: others (e.g. CPs) can only see the
watermarked form which is almost similar to the original IoTs readings.
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Table 2.5: PRD results for temperature and humidity IoTs sensors readings from
Dataset 2
Temperature Humidity
Segment
No
PRD %
Watermarked
PRD %
Extracted
PRD %
Watermarked
PRD %
Extracted
1 0.0174 0.0761 0.0327 0.1335
2 0.0177 0.0776 0.0289 0.1386
3 0.0168 0.0766 0.0280 0.1458
4 0.0172 0.0773 0.0326 0.1338
5 0.0145 0.0695 0.0315 0.1333
6 0.0197 0.0765 0.0300 0.1350
7 0.0208 0.0778 0.0265 0.1391
8 0.0148 0.0807 0.0354 0.1447
9 0.0135 0.0789 0.0278 0.1449
10 0.0173 0.0753 0.0277 0.1329
11 0.0175 0.0761 0.0332 0.1475
12 0.0188 0.0784 0.0299 0.1419
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Figure 2.14: Fixed amount of sensitive data of size X is hidden in diﬀerent host data
size 512/1024/2048/4096. Distortion decreased with more host data size. (a) PRDs
between the original and stego form, (b) PRDs between the original and the extracted
form.
Comparison with Existing Models To the best of our knowledge, there is no
research that used steganography with Walsh-Hadamard Transform signal processing
to protect the privacy and the authenticity of the collected and transmitted data in
the IoTs sensor streams context. However, recent work proposed by Huang and Fang
48 CHAPTER 2. STEGANOGRAPHY TO PROTECT IOTS STREAMS
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Number of Cases
A
m
ou
nt
 o
f D
is
to
rti
on
 1
00
%
(b) PRD Results Original−Extracted
512  Temperature Samples
1024 Temperature Samples
2048 Temperature Samples
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Number of Cases
A
m
ou
nt
 o
f D
is
to
rt
io
n 
10
0%
(a) PRD Results Original−Watermarked
512 Temperature Samples
1024 Temperature Samples
2048 Temperature Samples
All Samples are used in 
hiding process
All Samples are used in 
hiding process
Figure 2.15: Despite using all host data samples, there is stability in the resultant
distortion whenever we used the same number of samples (e.g. 16 cases use 512, 16
cases use 1024 and 16 cases use 2048) temperature samples. (a) PRDs between the
original and stego form, (b) PRDs results between the original and the extracted form.
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Figure 2.16: The required time and space to hide and extract sensitive information in
the collected IoTs sensors readings.
[51] has a similar approach with diﬀerent context. Therefore, our work is compared
with this recent technique in [51] where the authors used a histogram and quad-tree
decomposition to hide user identiﬁcation in the transmitted image.
There are three main improvements in our technique: 1) The capacity of the
hidden information is much higher in our algorithm than in model [51] where up
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Table 2.6: Summary of improvements.
Feature Model in [51] Our algorithm
Size of hidden information per
coeﬃcient
1 bit 5 bits
Extra Overheads >= x% 0%
Hiding Mechanism Static Dynamic-Random
Security Key -
√
to 5 bits can be hidden in each coeﬃcient because of using FWHT, whereas only 1
bit can be embedded in their algorithm. 2) There is no overhead in our algorithm
which means the size of the watermarked coeﬃcients is equal to the original size,
whereas the algorithm in [51] has a certain size of overheads because of using quad-tree
decomposition. 3) Most importantly, our algorithm is more secure than the model in
[51] because they are hiding the sensitive bits directly into a static ﬁxed positions
without a security key. In our algorithm three layers of enforced security scramble the
resultant coeﬃcients, encrypt the sensitive data and generate a random order to hide
the bits dynamically in diﬀerent and random coeﬃcients. Table 2.6 highlights most
of the improvements over existing techniques.
2.6.2 MD2: Wavelet-based Steganography
In our experiments, a wide range of IoTs devices’ readings were randomly selected
from datasets that are collected and published as part of a project named ‘Smart*’
by the Laboratory for Advanced System Software [75, 76]. The datasets contain
minute-by-minute periodic readings for three months from three homes. The readings
are related to power (e.g. watts consumption and heat index) and the environment
(e.g. inside/outside temperature and humidity, and wind chill). They also contain
electricity power consumption from 400 anonymous homes every minute for (24×30×
3) hours. As per the spatial and temporal aggregations deﬁnition in [77], these readings
are regarded as temporal, because they are collected separately from every single house
by equipping it with a smart meter that releases its readings on a regular basis. In this
study, all types of readings mentioned were used to thoroughly consider the feasibility
of implementing the proposed algorithm to various IoTs streams. Experiments were
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Figure 2.17: Three examples of watts consumption readings collected from diﬀerent
homes: (a) direct plot for original form (b) stego form that contains the hidden
sensitive information (i.e. meter ID, household name, DoB, address and total watts)
and (c) extracted form (i.e. after removing the conﬁdential information).
performed to hide and extract the conﬁdential information according to our proposed
algorithm described in Sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.5. The conﬁdential data was a set of
information that is secret, such as smart meter IDs, geometric location data, household
names, DoBs, addresses and the total watts consumption all of which were converted
into bits to be hidden inside IoTs device readings.
To avoid biased results, we experimented our proposed algorithm with diﬀerent
keys as well as various IoTs sensor streams with lengths of 512, 800, 1024, 2048
and 4096 as samples. Also, to get the worst distortion eﬀect, all detailed sub-band
coeﬃcients have been used. For brevity, we present three cases of our results in this
section: 1) Fig. 2.17 shows an example of a plot with three original smart meter
readings showing watts consumption used to hide sensitive information, and the stego
form before and after the stego extraction process; 2) Fig. 2.18 shows an example of
another plot of six original smart meters’ readings of inside/outside temperature and
humidity, wind chill and heat indices, and the stego form before and after the retrieval
process; 3) Tables 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 show the exact PRD results from the watts, heat
2.6. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 51
0 200 400 600 800
65
70
75
80
(a) O Inside Temperature
0 200 400 600 800
20
40
60
80
100
(a) O Outside Temperature
0 200 400 600 800
30
40
50
60
(a) O Inside Humidity
0 200 400 600 800
20
40
60
80
100
(a) O Outside Humidity
0 200 400 600 800
20
40
60
80
100
(a) O Wind Chill
0 200 400 600 800
20
40
60
80
100
(a) O Heat Index
0 200 400 600 800
65
70
75
80
(b) S Inside Temperature
0 200 400 600 800
30
40
50
60
(b) S Inside Humidity
0 200 400 600 800
20
40
60
80
100
(b) S Outside Humidity
0 200 400 600 800
20
40
60
80
100
(b) S Wind Chill
0 200 400 600 800
20
40
60
80
100
(b) S Heat Index
0 200 400 600 800
65
70
75
80
(c) E Inside Temperature
0 200 400 600 800
20
40
60
80
100
(c) E Outside Temperature
0 200 400 600 800
30
40
50
60
(c) E Inside Humidity
0 200 400 600 800
20
40
60
80
100
(c) E Outside Humidity
0 200 400 600 800
20
40
60
80
100
(c) E Wind Chill
0 200 400 600 800
20
40
60
80
100
(c) E Heat Index
0 200 400 600 800
20
40
60
80
100
(b) S Outside Temperature
Figure 2.18: Six additional examples of possible smart meter readings: (a) direct plot
for original form (b) stego form that contains the hidden conﬁdential information and
(c) extracted form (i.e. after removing the conﬁdential information).
index, temperature and humidity readings between the original and stego form, as
well as between the original and the extracted forms.
From all cases, despite the diﬀerent sample lengths of IoTs streams and various
ranges of values, all PRDs are less than ≤ 0.6 %. This means that the impact will
only be to the third or fourth decimal digits which are usually ignored in many cases;
for example, watts, temperature and humidity. To avoid inaccurate calculation of
ﬁnancial bills, the total watts consumption is also hidden. Consequently, this proves
that our proposed algorithm will have stable and little distortion on the original IoTs
streams. On the other hand, it oﬀers a great solution with a paradigm shift for securing
the conﬁdential information that should be transmitted, as well as the authenticity
of smart meter readings. The advantages of this solution are: 1) strong end-to-end
conﬁdentiality and authenticity where the hidden secured information (including the
total watts consumption) can only be retrieved and veriﬁed by an authorised receiver,
whereas others can only see the stego form which is almost similar to the original IoTs
readings; 2) no increase in the actual size of smart meter readings, and 3) no change
to the original form of readings which helps the authorised recipients quickly use
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Table 2.7: PRD results for Watts and Heat Index readings
Watts Heat-Index
No
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Extracted
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Extracted
1 0.0006 0.0007 0.0016 0.0021
2 0.0005 0.0006 0.0016 0.0020
3 0.0004 0.0005 0.0015 0.0020
4 0.0006 0.0007 0.0016 0.0019
5 0.0006 0.0008 0.0015 0.0019
6 0.0003 0.0004 0.0016 0.0019
7 0.0004 0.0005 0.0018 0.0021
8 0.8797 0.5797 0.0016 0.0020
9 0.4689 0.4689 0.0018 0.0023
10 0.0003 0.0003 0.0017 0.0020
11 0.0003 0.0004 0.0016 0.0020
12 0.0007 0.0008 0.0017 0.0021
13 0.0004 0.0005 0.3638 0.3638
14 0.0004 0.0006 0.1700 0.1700
15 0.0006 0.0007 0.0019 0.0023
operational administrations, such as cloud providers, without disclosing any sensitive
information.
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Figure 2.19: Distortion Comparison for diﬀerent PRD results of 512 samples of power
consumptions between our algorithm and the model in [1]. (a) PRDs between the
original and Stego form, (b) PRDs results between the original and the extracted
form.
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Table 2.8: PRD results for Inside and Outside temperature readings
Inside Temperature Outside Temperature
No
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Extracted
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Extracted
1 0.0015 0.0019 0.0016 0.0021
2 0.0014 0.0019 0.0016 0.0021
3 0.0015 0.0018 0.0016 0.0021
4 0.0015 0.0019 0.0016 0.0020
5 0.0015 0.0020 0.0016 0.0020
6 0.0015 0.0018 0.0016 0.0020
7 0.0014 0.0018 0.0017 0.0021
8 0.0014 0.0018 0.0016 0.0020
9 0.0015 0.0019 0.0018 0.0023
10 0.0015 0.0018 0.0016 0.0021
11 0.0014 0.0018 0.0015 0.0019
12 0.0015 0.0019 0.0016 0.0021
13 0.0015 0.0018 0.3341 0.3341
14 0.0015 0.0019 0.1599 0.1599
15 0.0015 0.0019 0.0018 0.0024
Table 2.9: PRD results for Inside and Outside humidity readings
Inside Humidity Outside Humidity
No
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Extracted
PRD %
Stego
PRD %
Extracted
1 0.0023 0.0029 0.4201 0.4215
2 0.0022 0.0027 0.4580 0.4589
3 0.0022 0.0029 0.1471 0.0613
4 0.0023 0.0029 0.0612 0.0020
5 0.0023 0.0030 0.0087 0.0088
6 0.0026 0.0032 0.3224 0.3224
7 0.0024 0.0031 0.0014 0.0018
8 0.0025 0.0031 0.5102 0.6102
9 0.0026 0.0033 0.0015 0.0019
10 0.0024 0.0031 0.2643 0.2643
11 0.0024 0.0030 0.1432 0.1433
12 0.0024 0.0030 0.1011 0.1011
13 0.0020 0.0025 0.4278 0.5278
14 0.0029 0.0034 0.3898 0.3898
15 0.0027 0.0034 0.0015 0.0019
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Figure 2.20: Distortion comparison for diﬀerent PRD results of 512 samples of
Humidity readings between our algorithm and the model in [1]. (a) PRDs between
the original and Stego form, (b) PRDs results between the original and the extracted
form.
Comparison with Existing Models To the best of our knowledge, there is no
research work that uses steganography with wavelet transformation signal processing
to hide IoTs conﬁdential information in the resultant wavelet tree. However, recently
there is a proposed study [1] uses a similar approach in a diﬀerent context. Therefore,
our proposed technique is compared with this recent model in [1] where the authors
proposed a steganographic technique to hide patients’ conﬁdential information in
their collected electrocardiogram signals using signal processing. There are two main
improvements in our algorithm: 1) After experimenting both models on diﬀerent sets
of IoTs streams (see Fig 2.19 and Fig 2.20), it should be noted that our algorithm
has much less distortion and is more stable than the model in [1]. This is because
only high-frequency sub-bands are used in the hiding process, whereas all sub-bands
coeﬃcients are used in their model. 2) Both algorithms use a security key to encrypt
the conﬁdential information; however, our algorithm is more eﬃcient in terms of
generating and managing the random hiding order matrix. This is because in our
model, this matrix is dynamically generated on the ﬂy using the security key, whereas
in the model [1] the random order is statically stored in a form of 2D matrix of size
128× 32 which obviously consumes the storage space in addition to the security risk
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of storing and managing this matrix.
2.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, two novel steganography algorithms that rely on diﬀerent
mathematical security models (the vector space and the two-dimensional tree) have
been designed and implemented by using the key to encrypt the sensitive information,
reshape the coeﬃcients into a random hierarchy, and randomly generate an order
used in the hiding process. To broaden the hiding capacity, insertion of sensitive
information and to maximise the randomisation process, the Fast Walsh-Hadamard
and DWT processing techniques were exploited - we transformed the IoTs high streams
from their spatial domain to their frequency domain in order to recognise and collect
most of the readings’ features in some coeﬃcients, thus allowing others to be used
freely to hide more data. The two new proposed models in this chapter vary in their
simplicity by using the MD1: Walsh Hadamard-based steganography versus security
with MD2: Wavelet-based steganography. The key contribution of both techniques is
that they protect the privacy and the authenticity by neither increasing nor changing
the form of the transmitted IoTs readings. This means only data owners can retrieve
the seal, whereas others are just monitoring the protected form of the readings which
is almost similar to the original readings. On the other hand, the protected streams
can be directly used without revealing privacy nor the authenticity at the third-party
cloud servers.

Chapter 3
Protected IoTs Manipulation
Detection and Recovery
This chapter answers the second research question discussed in Section 1.2. The
main concerns about the possibility of intentional or unintentional noise are examined
along with the issues of losing the hidden secret information and damaging the
transmitted readings. This chapter highlights how a combination of steganography,
error detection and correction is a possible technique to overcome some of the
challenges. Section 3.1.1 introduces the main contributions of this chapter and how
they were accomplished. Section 3.2 brieﬂy highlights the key related works and the
eﬀorts of other researchers to solve the issue. Section 3.3 explains in detail our novel
model including the design, secret information encoding, readings decomposition and
manipulation, readings re-composition, manipulation detection and recovery. The
evaluation of various characteristics of our model including complexity analysis and
correction capabilities are introduced in Section 3.4. Experimental examinations of the
model are presented in Section 3.5 detailing the test bed scenario and the ‘wide range
of noise mimicking the real world’ scenario, recovery of lost hidden data, a possible
remedy of the actual IoTs high streams and a comparison of existing techniques.
Section 3.6 summarises this chapter.
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CHAPTER 3. PROTECTED IOTS MANIPULATION DETECTION AND
RECOVERY
3.1 Introduction
The classic power grid of the past 100 years is now regarded as unsuitable to 21st
Century requirements for reasons such as outage management deﬁciencies, a lack
of automated and real-time analysis [78, 79]. Consequently, a new Internet of
Things (IoTs) infrastructure called the ‘smart grid’ has presently emerged and can
be used to automatically gather periodic smart meter readings at every second or
minute for power consumption and environmental characteristics of the premise, and
transmit them to operational centres using various techniques [80, 81]. Signiﬁcant
beneﬁts include improved eﬃciency for automated outage management, accuracy
for continuous-dynamic electricity distribution and sustainability regarding climate
change mitigation. However, the unusual amount of the continuous transmitted data
from millions of premises and the enormous demand on the spectrum reservation
results in wireless communications issues, such as ‘spectrum scarcity’ [82].
To solve these issues, a new wireless communication technology emerged called
Cognitive Radio (CR) [83, 84]. The basic idea is that the licensed spectrum for
various parties (e.g. premises) can be shared by Secondary User (SU) whenever the
Primary User (PU) is idle (i.e. white space). The main purposes are: (1) improving
the communication performance and throughput, and (2) reducing the interference
between the applications that use the identical or overlapping bands, such as Bluetooth
and ZigBee at 2.4 GHz [85–87]. Therefore, tremendous eﬀorts are made to exploit
this opportunity in the IoTs context [23, 88–91]. Despite the obvious advantages, CR
smart grids cause many security and robustness issues due to sharing the transmission
spectrum [92, 93].
Recently, a widely-known technique in multimedia domain called steganography
was exploited to ensure privacy without changing the form of the transmitted readings,
such as in models [2–4] in Chapter 2. Steganography can protect the sensitive
information where a piece of a secret message is hidden inside the host data and can
only be retrieved by authorised users. However, due to shared spectrum characteristics
in CR mechanism, where PUs and SUs are sharing the same band simultaneously,
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Figure 3.1: The main unique challenges that highlight the contribution of this chapter.
the transmitted data are highly prone to an intentional (i.e. interference) and
unintentional (i.e. noise) attacks rendering the existing solutions impractical [23].
This is simply because any slight change in the transmitted stego form of readings
will result in a loss of hidden information, such as household sensitive data, and more
signiﬁcantly, a loss of faith in the received readings. There are three possible outcomes:
it may be too late to ask the source to resend (especially in critical cases), the source
is often conﬁgured to forget what it sends directly due to resource constraints, and
the destination has no return channel to the source. In an extreme case, this may
happen to a million premises on the same day!
To overcome the deﬁciencies of the aforementioned models, we are compelled to
address the following questions (see Fig. 3.1).
1. How can any change in the hidden secret information be detected and recovered?
2. Can the recovered secret information be used to remedy the received collected
CR IoTs readings?
3. Can above two be met without revealing the sensitive information to cloud
providers or without changing the form of the transmitted readings?
3.1.1 Contributions
• To the best of our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst novel hybrid model that combines
advanced steganographic algorithms with error detection and correction
techniques (Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) syndrome codes) in the
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Figure 3.2: The main scenario of our proposed model where customers conﬁdential
information is encoded and hidden inside IoTs normal readings and only authorized
users can retrieve, detect, recover this conﬁdential data and remedy the received
readings.
context of IoTs streams. This will allow us to detect and recover any loss
from CR shared spectrum noise drawn from hidden conﬁdential information
without privacy disclosure, and it will also allow us to remedy the received
normal readings by using the corrected version of the secret hidden data. Both
cases have been examined carefully and are explained in Section 3.5.
• To the best of our knowledge, it is the ﬁrst model that strengthens the security
of hiding and increases the randomisation into a 3D level using a fast signal
processing technique called 3D Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT).
• The integration of BCH with advanced steganographic algorithms highlighted
a new ﬁnding this paper will explore in Section 3.5 by simply integrating
error detection and correction techniques with most of the previously proposed
steganography algorithms. These algorithms use the widely-known hiding
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positions - Least Signiﬁcant Bits (LSB) - will fail to recover the corrupted
hidden bits. Therefore, the hiding positions and coeﬃcients are chosen carefully
to achieve the best Bit Error Rate (BER), that is the recovery accuracy of
the hidden secret information, and the Percent of Root-mean-square Diﬀerence
(PRD)/Root Mean Square (RMS) - meaning the remedy precision of the normal
readings. This has been examined thoroughly and is presented in Section 3.5
after monitoring the PRD, RMS and BER results with various ranges of hiding
positions.
In our model (see Fig 3.2), IoTs smart meters are used to collect normal readings
from diﬀerent customer premises for wattage consumption, heating index, inside and
outside temperature, and humidity. Customer secure information (e.g. grid ID,
geometric location, name, Date of Birth (DoB), address and total power consumption)
will be then encoded using BCH syndrome codes and randomly hidden inside the
normal readings. Finally, the stego normal readings are transmitted to the remote
operational centres via CR shared spectrum. Consequently, the real-transmitted data
size is only of the normal readings with no additional overhead, because the encoded
conﬁdential information is embedded inside them. The stego readings that contain the
hidden information will be stored at operational centres. However, only authorised
users can retrieve the secretly encoded information from the stego normal readings by
using an appropriate key, to detect and recover any alteration to them due to possible
CR interference, as well as to remedy the stego form of readings. Alternatively, oﬀshore
cloud-based servers (and others) can only see the stego form. The second advantage
is that based on our experimental results, even the stego CR smart meter readings
can be cured so there is no need to resend the stego whenever the data is corrupted.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 summarises the relevant
work. Section 3.3 presents our algorithm and its preliminaries. The evaluation of
diﬀerent characteristics of our proposed technique is introduced in Section 3.4. Section
3.5 discusses the experiments we performed and the results we obtained. We draw
our conclusions in Section 3.6.
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3.2 Related Work
Any solution proposed to protect the transmitted CR IoTs information should
carefully consider the nature of CR smart meters shared spectrum and their
surrounding environment with: (1) security (the privacy of conﬁdential information
and the authenticity of transmitted readings), (2) robustness (detection and recovery
of loss), and (3) eﬃciency (direct usage of the received readings without privacy
disclosure). However, most current proposed solutions lack a suitable balance between
these three features.
To ensure robustness, most of the existing solutions use traditional error detection
and correction techniques (e.g. BCH or LDPC) in the low level data-link layer where
the packets are independently encoded at the sender location and decoded at the
receiver end [94–97]. The outcomes of these processes will be in the form of a
‘codeword’ that is completely diﬀerent to the original packet in both size and shape.
Therefore, despite their technical functionalities, their main concern is to ensure the
robustness of the transmitted packets and to totally ignore the other two aspects of
security and eﬃciency.
On the other hand, a majority of the solutions that focused on the security
(the ﬁrst aspect) neglect robustness and eﬃciency. For example, models shown in
[98, 99] provide strong security by using traditional cryptography techniques, such as
asymmetric encryption. However, their eﬃciency is poor, because all the data should
be decrypted whenever it is used.
An other category of solutions targeted this issue by using a new cryptography
technique, homomorphism, as models in [100–102]. Although they attempted to
achieve a reasonable balance between security and eﬃciency by using homomorphic
encryption, this non-traditional cryptography is still not feasible in practical
applications for its complexity [2].
The third group of solutions applied steganography - a well-known technique used
in multimedia to ensure privacy and authenticity without neglecting the eﬃciency
aspect. For example, models [2–4] show applied steganography used to hide a tenant’s
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conﬁdential information in the collected premises readings using signal processing in
[2], whereas the model in [3] was to protect the privacy of the remote CR sensors’
nodes using steganography. On the other hand, the model in [4] proposes a least
signiﬁcant qubit (LSQb) information hiding algorithm for quantum images. However,
the existing steganography models have limitations - changing a single bit in the
transmitted readings means that results with hidden information cannot be retrieved
and the received readings cannot be trusted.
With all these streams of solutions, none have carefully considered the three aspects
together. This is mainly because they are transplanting widely-known techniques to
a completely new territory, IoTs, without considering characteristics such as using
shared spectrum for robustness issues, applying direct operations at operation centres
for eﬃciency issues and performing oﬀshore operations using cloud infrastructure for
privacy issues.
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter is the ﬁrst to research work that tackles
this unique challenge (see Fig. 3.1).
3.3 Methodology
This paper is introducing the ﬁrst hybrid BCH-based steganography model that can
recover lost hidden secret information and remedy the received corrupted readings.
Due to CR shared spectrum interference in CR IoTs networks, we ﬁrst recall the
steganography theoretical process as preliminaries which is formulated based on our
previously published works [2, 3].
3.3.1 Preliminaries
The main steps secure the sensitive information, randomise the normal collected
readings, hide the sensitive bits inside the resultant coeﬃcients and ﬁnally reconstruct
the readings.
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Securing the hiding At this stage of this paper, we target the hiding process of the
sensitive information in the normal IoTs smart meter readings that must be entirely
random and diﬀerent among other CR smart meters. This prevents unlawful parties
from retrieving them correctly. Therefore, a security key will be generated for every
CR smart meter and will only be known to the end recipient of the data (i.e. operation
centres). This key has two main tasks:
1. Encrypt the sensitive information that is related to CR smart meters (e.g. IDs,
geometric location), and the household (e.g. name, DoB, address and the total
watts consumption) before the hiding process using symmetric encryption (i.e.
AES), which is very fast and suits the CR smart grid’s technical capabilities (see
Fig. 3.3). This can be deﬁned in Eq 3.1.
fE(O,K) ⇒ E˜ (3.1)
where fE is an AES algorithm, O is the original smart meter IoTs and household
sensitive information, K is the key, and E˜ is the encrypted form.
2. Generate random sequences of coeﬃcients to be used to hide the conﬁdential
smart meter IoTs information. This will be completely clear after reading
Section 3.3.2.
Convert
into bits
100100010100111...
Encrypt
1010100110110001...
i
Grid ID: 12345678
Geomtric Location: X/Y/Z
Household
Name: Alsharif Abuadbba
DoB : 1/1/1984
Address: 60 X XX Total Watts: 17000
CR Smart Meter
.........Date: 04/10/2015
Convert
into bits
Figure 3.3: An example of how the sensitive information is encrypted before encoding.
Embedding After encrypting the sensitive information, the randomly generated
order will be followed to hide the sensitive bits, such as power consumption, in the
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normal collected readings. However, to increase the level of randomisations before
the hiding process, diﬀerent signal processing techniques have been applied (e.g. 1D
and 2D wavelet decomposition). Finally, an inverse process of these signal processing
techniques should be performed to reconstruct the stego readings as they contain the
hidden bits.
Retrieving The legitimate recipient of the stego readings must have the security
key. The process is almost identical to the hiding process except that it extracts the
bits instead of hiding them.
3.3.2 The Proposed Scheme
This section sheds the light on the crucial steps in our algorithm such as encoding, 3D
wavelet transformation, 3D random order generation, and ﬁnally decoding, as well as
correction and recovery.
Secret Information Encoding In information theory, BCH syndrome codes are
cyclic linear block error detection and correction codes that are constructed using
ﬁnite ﬁelds or more precisely, the Galois ﬁeld [103]. The BCH abbreviation stands
for the discoverers, Bose, Chaudhuri, and independently Hocquenghem. BCH simply
works by breaking the information into chunks of size k, calculating parity check bits
of size p after the division process by a generated arithmetic polynomial gx belongs
to the same chosen Galois ﬁeld. Each k+ p block is called a ‘codeword’ and its size is
n. These resultant codewords will be packed together and used in the detection and
recovery of the corrupted bits. Theoretically, every BCH (n,k) codes can correct up
to t errors [95].
In this paper, BCH is chosen for two main reasons. (1) The encoding process, which
will be at the IoTs smart meter, is very simple and fast (see Eq. 3.2) compared with
other error detection and correction codes (e.g. LDPC) [96], and so it ﬁts the remote
IoTs devices technical capabilities. (2) It exhibits a stable behaviour in terms of its
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correcting capabilities up to its theoretical entropy t, which explains its wide usage
with satellite communications, disk storage and Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs).
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩k mod gx ⇒ pp+ k ⇒ n (3.2)
Therefore, various BCH syndrome codes are used to encode the encrypted sensitive
information before hiding process by: (1) detecting and correcting the conﬁdential
information in their encrypted format to avoid privacy disclosure, and (2) unlike all
the aforementioned applications, our algorithm uses BCH in such a way that does not
increase or change the actual transmitted IoTs smart meter readings, meaning it has
an eﬃciency advantage.
Readings Decomposition/Randomisation 3D Wavelet Transform (WT) is a
widely-known linear technique used in signal and image processing that is performed
on the given signal that decomposes into diﬀerent values called coeﬃcients. These
represent the frequency components at a given time [64]. 3D WT is shown in Eq 3.3.
C(a, b, c) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(t)ψ(a, b, c)dt (3.3)
where C represents resultant coeﬃcients, a, b and c are positive integers that represent
transform parameters, and ψ is wavelet function [65].
There are two ways of using wavelet which are discrete and continuous. However,
the preferred format is discrete, because it simulates the reality where most of the
produced and analysed real-life information comes in discrete numbers rather than in
continuous functions [66].
There are two main targets when choosing 3D DWT for this paper: (1)
Unpredictable randomisation, robust detection and recovery of the IoTs smart meter
readings by decomposing the waves into 3D frequency domain sub-bands coeﬃcients;
all while avoiding to increase the size in their time domain when the stego form
of readings are transmitted to the operation centres. (2) The readings can almost
be reconstructed from only the low-frequency components, as the approximation
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sub-band coeﬃcients, allowing other detailed sub-band coeﬃcients to be freely used
to embed the encoded sensitive information with a minimum amount of distortion
on the originally transmitted IoTs readings (e.g. watts consumptions). This inspired
us to further use this technique to ensure high randomisation with enough space to
embed more encoded secret information related to IoTs without aﬀecting the actual
smart meter readings.
To conduct the 3D DWT decomposition, two levels of ﬁlters (high-band and
low-band) are applied to the original readings. Consequently, two sub-signals
called sub-bands are obtained. The ﬁrst relates to low-frequency components that
represent the approximation of the original readings. The second sub-band relates
to high-frequency components that represent the detailed coeﬃcients. To avoid the
complexity of multi-level 3D decomposition, a type called ‘single 3D transform’ was
used [65] which is deﬁned in Eq 3.4.
D(i, j, k) =
∑
i
∑
j
∑
k
X(i)Φijk(n) (3.4)
where D(i, j, k) represents 3D DWT coeﬃcients, i, j and k represent the shift and
scale transform parameters and Φijk(n) represents the base time wavelet function that
is shown in Eq 3.5.
Φijk(n) = 2
−i/2Φ(2−i(n− j).(n− k)) (3.5)
Therefore, in this chapter, diﬀerent real-time collected IoTs smart meter readings
of watts, heat index, wind chill, temperature and humidity will be decomposed into 3D
wavelet sub-bands coeﬃcients as shown in Fig. 3.4. The chosen wavelet family in the
decomposition is called Daubechies with the order 2 (db2) because its performance in
analysing discontinuous-disturbance-dynamic consecutive readings has already been
proven to be perfect [68]. To guarantee the lowest amount of distortion, the most
important sub-bands coeﬃcients will not be utilized because they represent the most
signiﬁcant parts of the IoTs readings. On the other hand, a number of bits will
be inserted in the rest of the detailed sub-bands coeﬃcients, which is called the
steganography level, meaning how many bits can be embedded into each sub-bands
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coeﬃcient. To ensure the minimum acceptable distortion on the actual readings, many
experiments have been performed in [2] and [3] to select an appropriate steganography
level. Consequently, about ﬁve bits can be hidden in the randomly-selected high
frequency sub-bands coeﬃcients.
High Fequency
     bands
Low Frequency
   bands
CR Smart meter
readings
e.g. Watts
XY
Z
3D Wavelet Tree
Figure 3.4: Decomposing CR smart meter readings in a 3D sub-bands tree.
Random Coeﬃcients Order The key is utilised to generate three random
coeﬃcients’ sequences in a 3D matrix format that will be used to hide the encoded
secret information. This is deﬁned in Eq 3.6.
fx(K) ⇒ X˜ × Y˜ × Z˜ (3.6)
where X˜ × Y˜ × Z˜ is the generated 3D sequence of coeﬃcients.
Fig. 3.5 shows an example of how the key can be utilised to generate the selected
3D DWT sub-bands coeﬃcients’ order. It initialises by converting the key into ASCII
and a default position value will be assigned. Then, the key ASCII will be arranged
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  X = 4 2 3 5 8 1 7 6
Key Character Set : Z     M    W    a     i      3     f      d
Defult ASCII Order : 90   77   87   97  105   51  102  100
 Defult Position Order : 1      2      3     4    5    6    7    8
Ascending ASCII Order : 51  77  87  90  97  100  102  105
Defult Postion Order : 6    2    3    1    4    8     7      5
Ascending Position Order : 1    2    3    4    5    6     7      8
 Defult Position Order :1    2     3    4     5      6     7     8
Ascending Position Order : 4   2     3     5    8     1     7     6
1
2
3
Defult ASCII Order : 90  77   87   97  105   51  102  100
Portion of the 3D matrix 
Split key into 2, take 3 char
from part 2 and order in an 
      ascending way
5
Z = 2 1 3
Build 3D random order matrix 
Repeat steps 1,2 and 3
 in Descending order
4
Y = 3  2  8  1  4  6  7  5
6
Rows
Depth
Columns
iii
Z
Y
X
Figure 3.5: An example of how the 3D hiding matrix order X˜ × Y˜ × Z˜ is generated
from the key.
in an ascending manner and another position order will be given, again in ascending
order. Next, return the key ASCII to its original format using the default position
order (to avoid producing two similar sequence of coeﬃcients from diﬀerent keys)
which represents X˜. Almost the identical steps are repeated using a descending order
to generate another sequence of values representing Y˜ . After that, Z˜ is generated by
splitting the key’s characters into two parts, taking three characters from the second
part and calculating the ascending order. Finally, X˜, Y˜ and Z˜ are used to build the
random sequence 3D matrix. However, in our algorithm, the key length will be ≥ 128
bits in length.
Coeﬃcients Rescaling/Manipulation After applying 3D DWT to the normal
CR smart meter readings, the resultant low frequency coeﬃcients are split and rescaled
to 3D X×Y ×Z matrix form (see Fig 3.6). The key is then used to encrypt household
conﬁdential information. The secret information will be encoded using various BCH
syndrome codes. Next, the key will be utilised to generate the 3D random coeﬃcients
order. The encoded bits will ﬁnally be packed and embedded corresponding to the
generated order. The detailed process of hiding is shown in Figs. 3.3, 3.5, 3.6 and
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Resultant DWT Coefficients
Frequency sub-bands
Split Low frequency sub-bands
 in 3D form (XxYxZ Matrix)
1
Rescale the numbers to int
and convert into bits2
X x Y x ZPortion of the coefficients matrix
ii
X
Y
Z
X
Y
Z
3D levels Tree
Figure 3.6: Block diagram presents how the 3D DWT sub-bands coeﬃcients are split,
reshaped, rescaled and converted into bits.
00010..01000..101100011...
00010
01000
Portion of the 3D order 
matrixPortion of the 3D Coefficients X x Y x Z
Hide in Coefficient
 (4,3,2). Then, 
(4,2,1) and so on
Hide encoded bits in the 3D XxYxZ coefficients matrix 
following the 3D random order (Fig. 3)
(Fig. 5)
(Fig. 6)iii
ii
X
Y
Z
i
X
Y
Z
X Y Zx x
Dim 2 (4,3,2)
Figure 3.7: Block diagram summarises the hiding process and uses the information
explained in Figures 3.3, 3.5 and 3.6.
summarised in Fig 3.7
Readings Re-composition The resultant sub-bands values after the embedding
process are called ‘stego coeﬃcients’. At this stage, these coeﬃcients will be
re-combined into a 3D sub-bands coeﬃcients matrix and the inverse 3D DWT will
be applied to convert smart meter readings from their frequency domain to their
original time domain. The result is a reconstructed form called stego IoTs readings
(i.e. contains hidden encoded information) which is quite similar to the IoTs normal
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readings. The signiﬁcance of that is even the stego IoTs readings can be used as the
original form. However, only authorised recipients with a security key can retrieve the
hidden secret information (e.g. meter IDs, household name, DoB, address and total
watts),and can detect and correct any possible manipulation. The inverse 3D DWT
is deﬁned by Eq 3.7.
X =
∑
i
∑
j
∑
k
D(i, j, k)Φijk(n) (3.7)
where X is the original form of IoTs streams.
Apply
3D DWT
Noisy Stego CR smart meter
readings (e.g. watts)
Split and
rescale
   3D coefficients
   Tree
Key
Generate
order in 3D
Retrieve
Secret Bits3D
coefficients
Coefficients
Order
Decrypt
secret bits
Secret
bits
Household
Sensitive info.
Detect/Correct
secret bits
Remedy Stego
Readings
Cured Stego
Readings
Figure 3.8: An overview of the extraction, correction and remedy processes.
3.3.3 Error Detection and Recovery
To guarantee the robustness of the received IoTs smart meter streams without privacy
disclosure, the BCH decoding process will be performed on the encrypted form
of retrieved secret bits. The main algebraic BCH decoding steps are syndrome
computations, error locator’s polynomial determination, error roots ﬁndings, and
ﬁnally inversing and correcting [103] which can be summarised as follows:
• Let r(x) = r0+r1x+r2x2+ ....+rn−1xn−1 be the received codewords, c is secret
bits and e(x) is the error pattern. Then, r(x) = c(x) + e(x).
• The required syndromes are 2t as s = s1, s2, ...., s2t and is calculated by r×Ht,
where H is a parity-check matrix related to BCH (n,k,t) and its members α are
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Noisy Received Readings
Cured Readings
3D Decompose
Re-compose
Retrieve random hidden bits and organise
11001... 00011... 01010... 11001...
Detect/Correct the secret bits using Syndrome
10011... 11011... 10010... 00111...
Extract
Recovered secret bits
......
.....
Remedy
Figure 3.9: Detecting and correcting the random hidden secret bits (in their encrypted
form) and remedy the received noisy readings at the operation centres.
the primitive elements in the chosen Galois ﬁeld. H is shown in Eq 3.8.
H =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 α α2 · · · αn−1
1 α3 (α3)2 · · · (α3)n−1
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 α2t−1 (α2t−1)2 · · · (α2t−1)n−1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(3.8)
• Every si is a result of dividing r(x) by a consecutive minimal polynomial ∅i(x)
of αi in the chosen Galois ﬁeld.
• If any s(αi) 	= 0, this means that the transmitted CR smart meter readings have
been tampered with and so these syndromes will be used to locate the errors as
shown in Eqs 3.9 and 3.10.
σμ+1(x) = σμ(x) + dμ × d−1ρ × x2(μ−ρ) × σρ(x) (3.9)
dμ+1 = s2μ+3 + σ
μ+1
1 s2μ+2 + σ
μ+1
2 s2μ+1 + ...+ σ
μ+1
l s2μ+3−l (3.10)
where σi is the coeﬃcients in the i-th term in σ
μ(x), μ is 12  μ  t, ρ are the
preceding values and l is the degree of current σμ+1(x).
• The roots of the located errors Λ(x) can be found in the form of Eq 3.11.
Λ(x) = (αi1x− 1)(αi2x− 1)....(αivx− 1) (3.11)
• The calculated roots Λ(x) will be inversed within Galois ﬁeld and used to recover
the corrupted secret bits.
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Finally, the recovered version of the secret bits is used to remedy the received stego
form of IoTs smart meter readings as is shown in Fig 3.9.
However, only the legitimate receiver can decrypt the secret bits by using the key
and to reveal the sensitive information. Fig. 3.8 shows an overview of the extraction,
correction and remedy processes.
3.4 Evaluation
This section focuses on the proposed algorithm evaluation in terms of the key strength,
the security of hidden secret information, the maximum size of household’s sensitive
data that can be hidden, the distortion measurements, and detection and correction
capabilities.
3.4.1 Key Strength
The security of the proposed BCH-based steganographic technique relies on the fact
that, unless the collected IoTs readings and the security key are known in full and in
advance by the recipient, the hidden secret information cannot be retrieved, decoded
and decrypted correctly.
However, the security key is the most critical parameter, because it is used to
enforce two layers of security as seen in Figs. 3.3, 3.5 and 3.6: (1) encrypt the
sensitive information, and (2) generate a random coeﬃcients’ order in the form of the
3D X˜× Y˜ × Z˜ matrix to hide the encoded sensitive bits. Therefore, this key should be
kept secret and known only to two parties: (a) the sender (remote IoTs smart meter)
where the key should be burned and used at any time the collected IoTs readings are
sent, and (b) the legitimate receiver (operation centres) which can properly extract,
decode and verify the validity of the hidden sensitive information. Other parties,
including the cloud, can only see the transmitted stego IoTs readings.
In this chapter, the key is generated and will be kept secret at the IoTs end-point
device and at the recipient’s ends. The key strength of our algorithm can be
quantiﬁed as the number of entropy bits Δ (see Eq. 3.12) where 2Δ is the total
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possible combinations that would have to be exhausted by illegitimate parties during
a brute-force attack.
Δ = log2 S
L
p (3.12)
where L is the symbol’s length and Sp is the symbols’ probabilities. Table 3.1 shows
examples of various key lengths, key symbols sets and the total number of possible
combinations. Therefore, the longer the key and the symbol combinations are, the
stronger is the algorithm.
3.4.2 Unlawful Retrieval
To prevent certain parties from unlawfully extracting the hidden secret information
correctly without the key, which is a brute-force attack, the rescaled 3D X × Y × Z
coeﬃcients matrix after 3D DWT decomposition of the host data, meaning IoTs smart
device readings, should have an appropriate size (e.g. > Key length) (see Eq 3.13).
P =
x∑
i=ϕ
X!×
y∑
j=ϕ
Y !×
z∑
k=ϕ
Z!×ΔL ×
∏
GF (pm)! (3.13)
where P is the total possible combinations, X, Y and Z are the rescaled 3D coeﬃcients
matrix, ϕ is a threshold that represents the minimum selected coeﬃcients number from
each row, L is the key length, GF is the chosen Galois ﬁeld, p and m are its base and
space respectively.
For example, assume IoTs smart meter wattage readings are one hour in length,
and rescaled to 3D coeﬃcients matrix of size 32× 16 × 16 after applying 5 levels 3D
DWT. The assumed threshold is 16× 8× 8, the key symbol collection is UTF-16, its
length is 128, and the chosen Galois ﬁeld of base 2 and space 9 (see Eq 3.14).
P =
32∑
i=16
32!×
16∑
j=8
16!×
16∑
k=8
16!× 65536128 ×
∏
GF (29)! ⇒ P = ∞ (3.14)
This proves that accurately retrieving and decrypting the intended secret sensitive
information is highly impossible.
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Table 3.1: Example of various used keys strength
Key length Symbol Set Possibilities
64 US-ASCII 7.3e+134
64 UTF-8 1.4e+154
64 UTF-16 ∞
128 US-ASCII 5.3e+269
128 UTF-8 ∞
128 UTF-16 ∞
256 US-ASCII ∞
256 UTF-8 ∞
256 UTF-16 ∞
3.4.3 Hiding Capacity
The maximum amount of hidden data fundamentally relies on two parameters: (1)
the total number of transmitted periodically collected readings (e.g. smart meter
samples) and (2) the steganography level (or number of hidden secret bits in each
sub-band coeﬃcient) (see Eq 3.15).
M =
n∑
i=1
((X × Y × Z)−Hc)× Sl (3.15)
where M is the maximum number of hidden secret bits, n is the total IoTs smart
device readings, X, Y and Z are the rows, columns and the depth of the rescaled 3D
coeﬃcients matrix after applying 3D DWT decomposition to the original readings, Hc
is the high frequency coeﬃcients and Sl is the steganography level in each sub-band
coeﬃcient.
For better understanding, assume that 5-level 3D DWT decomposition is applied
to normal IoTs smart meter readings, each resultant sub-band coeﬃcients number is
512 (i.e. value of n). The size of the rescaled 3D matrix is 32×16×16 (i.e. values of X,
Y and Z). Also, assume about 5 bits (i.e. value of S) are hidden in each coeﬃcient.
Therefore, around 5110 bytes (5 KB) of sensitive secret data can be hidden inside
these coeﬃcients.
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3.4.4 Distortion Measurements
To carefully evaluate the eﬀect of our algorithm on the transmitted IoTs streams and
to certify their usability in their stego format, the diﬀerence between the original and
stego forms of the readings with resultant distortion has been completely monitored
using a widely-known measurement called a ‘percent of root-mean-square diﬀerence’
(PRD). The PRD can accurately measure any reconstruction error between the
original and the reconstructed forms of the signal as shown in Eq. 3.16 [104].
PRDj =
√∑n
i=1(Ri − R˜i)∑n
i=1(R
2
i )
× 100% (3.16)
where Ri and R˜i are the original and the reconstructed form of the sub-bands
coeﬃcients, and n is the length of the transmitted IoTs smart meter readings.
Similarly, the PRD is also used to accurately measure the resultant distortion after
the retrieval and correction processes between the original and the recovered form of
signals after correcting the hidden secret bits. All results are presented in Section 3.5.
In addition, to deeply highlight the detailed impact of the proposed algorithm
on the frequency domain level, we used another well-known benchmark called ‘Root
Mean Square’ (RMS) [105]. The RMS uses a mathematical model called ‘Parseval’s
theorem’ to precisely monitor the diﬀerences between two signals on frequency domain
coeﬃcient level as shown in Eq 3.17.
RMS =
1
N
N∑
m=1
| X(m)− Y (m) |2 (3.17)
where X and Y are the 3D wavelet form of coeﬃcients before and after applying the
algorithm. N is the total number of manipulated coeﬃcients.
The same process has been repeated to measure the feasibility of our remedy
operation on the distorted form of received readings. The obtained results have been
summarised in Section 3.5.
3.4.5 Correction Capabilities
To avoid biased results while testing the feasibility of our algorithm, the ability of
detecting and correcting the hidden secret information in their encrypted form, as
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well as using the recovered bits to remedy the received readings, have been carefully
examined. To achieve that goal, three main steps have been followed. (1) The
transmitted stego form has been attacked using diﬀerent levels of random noise, such
as Gaussian noise, which mimics the impact of many random processes that occur
in nature that is the CR shared spectrum characteristics [106]. (2) The retrieved
and corrected form of secret hidden information was examined using a well-known
measurement called ‘Bit Error Rate’ (BER) which is the number of bit errors per unit
time (see Eq. 3.18). Therefore, the lower the BER is, the better the correction is. (3)
The recovered form of stego readings, after their remedy using the corrected secret
bits, has been compared with their original format using PRD. (See Section 3.5 for
results.)
BER =
Berr
Btotal
× 100% (3.18)
where Berr is the total corrupted bits, and Btotal is the total original hidden secret
bits.
It should be mentioned that every BCH syndrome code (n,k) has a maximum
theoretical entropy t (or maximum correction capability) based on the chosen Galois
ﬁeld space and the number of secret bits k in each codeword n [103]. However,
the beauty of BCH syndrome codes is that (1) the entropy of detection capabilities
are almost double the correction and so it can easily detect the occurrence of the
manipulation, and (2) the t can be dynamically determined and varied even in the
same Galois ﬁeld. In other words, it can be scaled based on the criteria of the CR
shared spectrum - the noisier the channel, the higher t should be and vice versa.
3.4.6 Complexity Analysis
Because of the smart meters power and memory constrains, the algorithm’s
functionalities have been designed carefully to avoid the worst computational
complexity such as exponential and factorial. Therefore, the worst computational
complexity of our main functions has been thoroughly measured. (1) Theoretically
using big O notations (see Table 3.2). From Table 3.2, it should be noticed that
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Figure 3.10: The required time and space needed by our algorithm to accomplish
both hiding and retrieval process: (a) 7 types of readings of size 512 samples and (b)
7 examples of readings of size 1024 samples.
most of our functions are linear and have stable time complexity including random
order generation where it has been improved from quadratic to linear by using radix
sorting. Also, to avoid the complexity of the decomposition and reconstruction of
3D wavelet, a single-level 3D-wavelet was chosen instead of the real multi-level 3D.
(2) Experimentally by involving all resultant coeﬃcients from all used datasets in the
process and proved that it is very low - < 0.3 seconds - in all the cases as shown in
Fig 3.10.
Table 3.2: Algorithm Functionalities Computational Complexity
Complexity Time Space
Best Average Worst Worst
3D-DWT/Inverse O(n2) O(nc) O(nc) O(nc)
Random Order O(nk) O(nk) O(nk) O(n+ k)
Scramble Secret O(m) O(m) O(m) O(m)
BCH Encode O(w) O(w) O(w) O(w)
Embedding O(ncb) O(ncb) O(ncb) O(nc +m)
BCH Decode O(wt) O(wt) O(wt) O(wt)
The main functionalities of our algorithm (see Table 3.2) especially that should run
on the remote smart meters are 3D-DWT and its inverse, random order generation,
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encoded information scrambling, embedding and BCH encoding. In addition, the
correction algorithm (BCH decoding) runs on more powerful machines, such as
operating centres. Firstly, let’s assume f(n) is O(g(n)) if f grows at most as fast
as g. Therefore, f(n) = O(g(n)) only if there exists c, n0  R+ such that for all
n ≥ n0, f(n) ≤ c.g(n). Thereby, for each 1D vector of collected reading of size n (i.e.
varies from 512 to 4096 in this example), the worst complexity of these functionalities
is as follows. (i) O(nl) for both the time and space required for 3D-DWT and its
inverse [65], where l is the dimensional level. This is caused by using single-level 3D
instead of the much more complicated multi-level 3D. (ii) O(nk) is for generating
random orders using a constant key length k  Z - 128 in the implementations - where
it has been improved from quadratic to linear by using radix sorting. The maximum
required space will be an accumulated size of n and k. (iii) The worst time and
space complexity for scrambling the encoded information of size m where at least
< n/2 is O(m). (iv) O(w) -linear- for both the time and space required for BCH
encode, where w  Z is the number of codewords. (v) O(nlb) for embedding b  Z
(varies from 1 to 5) the number of bits per coeﬃcient of total size n, whereas the
required space will be a total size of both nl and m. (vi) O(wt) is for the time
required for BCH decode [107], where w  Z is the number of codewords. However,
the maximum required space will be an accumulated size of w and t.
Finally, it is clear from the time complexity analysis that the best, average and
worst complexities are stable and almost the same. This is because all the collected
readings of size n are used in each functionality of the hiding and correction algorithms.
In addition, to avoid the cost of the 3D model, most of the functionalities have
been designed to have complexity less than polynomial especially those run on the
smart meters. Therefore, the smaller the transmitted periodical readings are, the less
complex is the algorithm.
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3.5 Implementations
3.5.1 Datasets
The datasets of various IoTs smart end-point devices readings have been used in
our experiments, and collected and published by Laboratory for Advanced System
Software as part of a project named ‘Smart*’[75, 76]. The datasets comprise
continuous readings, every minute, from three homes for three months. The readings
are categorised into: (1) power usage, such as watts consumption and heat index,
and (2) environmental features, such as inside and outside temperature, inside and
outside humidity and wind chill. The datasets also provides periodic electricity power
consumption, every minute, from around 400 anonymous homes for (3 × 30 × 24)
hours. Based on the deﬁnition of the spatial and temporal aggregations [77], these
readings are temporal, because they are collected separately from every single house
after equipping them with a smart meter that gathers its readings periodically.
3.5.2 Cognitive Radio Characteristics
In our experiments, a well-known CR sensing mechanism which is standardised as
IEEE 802.22 [10] has been simulated. This standard encompasses cognitive capabilities
such as sensing interface, spectrum management, Geo-location and database access.
Table 3.3 depicts the key parameters.
Table 3.3: Cognitive Radio Key Parameters [10]
Feature Value
Operating Frequency 54 ∼ 862 MHZ
Users ≤ 255 Channels
Sensing Time ≤ 2ms Per channel
Burst Allocation Linear
Self-Coexisting Dynamic spectrum sharing
Superscription ratio 40 : 1
Capacity 1.5mbps Upstream
384kbps Downstream
Area Typically 33km Radius
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3.5.3 Experiments Setup
Our main performed experiments are four steps which can be categorised into two
main parts and each has two steps. The ﬁrst part which is performed by distributed
CR smart grids as follows. (1) Encoding of CR smart meter and household secret
information using BCH. (2) The random hiding by embedding the encoded secret bits
in the household collected normal readings and the steps explained in Section 3.3.2.
The second part will be at the recipient’s end (e.g. operation centres) as follows.
(3) Retrieving the hidden bits as described in 3.3.2, and (4) decoding the secret bits
using BCH. Therefore, even if the IoTs smart meter normal readings that contain the
hidden conﬁdential information are intercepted or tampered with intentionally (i.e.
unauthorised parties) or unintentionally (i.e. channel noise), (1) it will not disclose
any information, (2) it can be easily detected and recovered.
In this chapter, all aforementioned types of readings were used to fully observe the
feasibility of implementing the proposed algorithm on various smart meters. For each,
experiments were performed to embed and retrieve the encoded sensitive information
according to our proposed algorithm described in Sections 3.3.2. The sensitive data
was a set of information that have to be secret which are related to smart meter (e.g.
ID, geometric location), and household (e.g. name, DoB, address and the total watts
consumption). This information is all converted into bits to be encoded and randomly
embedded inside IoTs smart meter readings.
To avoid biased results, our proposed algorithm was experimented with diﬀerent
key lengths as well as various IoTs streams with lengths such as 512, 1024, 2048, 4096
and more. Also, to obtain the most possible worst distortion result, all low-frequency
3D sub-bands coeﬃcients have been used.
3.5.4 Base Testing Scenario
To validate the eﬀectiveness of the error detection and correction capabilities of
our algorithm, these steps have been followed. (1) We used various best codeword
combinations in every Galois ﬁeld space; for example, (7,4,1), (15,5,3),(31,6,7) and
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Figure 3.11: Comparison of 40 cases (i.e. after applying 40 random noise levels into
the transmitted stego form of readings) of BER of the recovered secret bits (i.e. after
extraction, decoding and correction) using BCH codes (7,4,1) and various cases of
hiding positions.
(65,7,15). The size of codeword n in Galois ﬁeld will be 7, 15, 31, 63, 127, 255 and
511 for an easier understanding. Each has maximum theoretical recovery capabilities
t. For example, for k = 7 ⇒ t = 1, for k = 15 ⇒ t = 3, for k = 31 ⇒ t = 7, for k = 63
⇒ t = 15 and so on. So in our experiments, and to avoid unbiased results, the same
levels of random noise have been applied more than 1000 times on every best (n, k, t)
possible combinations. (2) During the transmission of the stego readings that contain
the random hidden encoded bits, various random Gaussian noise levels from the worst
(-9) to medium (30) were imposed to simulate the possible CR channels interference.
To get stable and precise recovery capabilities of our algorithm, these experiments were
repeated more than 1000 times with every single codeword combination possible. (3)
To examine the possibility of improving detection and recovery capabilities of our
algorithm, diﬀerent hiding positions from 1-to-5, 2-6, 3-7, 4-8, 5-9 and 6-10 were used
with every codeword. (4) Similarly, these steps have been repeated to compare the
best outcomes from the proposed algorithm with previous models as shown in Section
3.5.7.
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Figure 3.12: Comparison of 40 cases (i.e. using 40 random noise levels) of BER of the
recovered secret bits using BCH codes (15,5,3) and various cases of hiding positions.
In all the cases, three benchmarks were carefully measured after the correction and
remedy processes of the received stego form of readings. These are (1) the possible
recovery capabilities using BER, (2) the remedy eﬀectiveness on the time domain
using PRD, and (3) the remedy eﬀectiveness on the frequency domain at 3D level
using RMS.
3.5.5 Results
Our main concerns discussed in the results are that after applying random levels of
noise to the transmitted stego readings, can that manipulation be detected? Can
the hidden secret bits be recovered? And, can the recovered secret bits be used
to remedy the received signal? For brevity in this paper, only a few cases of our
results are presented. (1) Fig. 3.11 shows 40 cases after applying 40 diﬀerent noise
levels into the transmitted stego form of readings of BER of the recovered secret
bits (i.e. after extraction, decoding and correction) using BCH codeword (7,4,1)
and various cases of hiding positions. (2) Fig. 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14 also show 40
cases of BER of the recovered secret bits using BCH codewords (15,5,3),(31,6,7) and
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Figure 3.13: Comparison of 40 cases (i.e. using 40 random noise levels) of BER of the
recovered secret bits using BCH codes (31,6,7) and various cases of hiding positions.
(65,7,15) respectively with the same hiding positions cases. (3) Fig 3.15 shows a
comparison between diﬀerent BCH codewords combinations using the best observed
resultant hiding positions (i.e. 6-10) from previous experiments. (4) Figs. 3.18 and
3.19 show the exact PRD and RMS results - from all hiding positions combinations
used - between the original and stego forms before applying the noise, as well as
between the original and the cured forms (i.e. after recovering the secret bits and
remedying the signal). (5) Fig. 3.16 shows an example of a plot of three original IoTs
smart meter readings (i.e. power consumption) used to hide sensitive information,
and the stego form before transmission and after recovery process. (6) Finally, Fig.
3.17 shows an example of another plot of six original IoTs smart meter readings (i.e.
inside/outside temperature and humidity, wind chill and heat index), and the stego
and the recovered forms.
3.5.6 Discussion
In all cases, despite the diﬀerent sample lengths of the IoTs readings, the various
characteristics and value ranges, all PRDs are < 1%, RMS < 0.01 and up to BER=0.
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Figure 3.14: Comparison of 40 cases (i.e. using 40 random noise levels) of BER of the
recovered secret bits using BCH codes (63,7,15) and various cases of hiding positions.
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Figure 3.15: Comparison of 40 cases (i.e. using 40 random noise levels) of BER
of the recovered secret bits using best hiding positions with various BCH syndrome
codes(n,k,t).
This proves that our proposed algorithm is stable with little distortion impact, reliable
recovery and remedy mechanisms. However, it should be noticed that from the detailed
experiments performed, it was discovered that the same BCH codewords have diﬀerent
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Figure 3.16: Three examples of watts consumptions’ readings collected from diﬀerent
homes: (a) direct plot for original form (b) stego form that contains the hidden
sensitive information (i.e. grid ID, household name, DoB, address and total watts)
and (c) recovered form (i.e. after applying the noise and remedy processes).
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Figure 3.17: Six additional examples of possible IoTs (i.e. smart meter) readings:
(a) Direct plot for original form (b) stego form that contains the encoded hidden
information and (c) recovered form (i.e. after applying the noise and remedy
processes).
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behaviours, being the recovery capabilities, based on the hiding positions used. For
example, the least signiﬁcant hiding positions (1 to 5) that have been used in lots of
papers such as [2–4], are the worst in terms of detecting and correcting the random
hidden bits, whereas the newly conﬁgured hiding positions from 6 to 10 are the best
in terms of recovery. Additionally, BCH codeword (63,7,15) has the highest ability to
detect and recover data among these various codes whenever the transmitted stego
readings are faced with high noise interference: it can recover more random error bits
with the penalty of more control bits and less payload. On the other hand, BCH
codeword (7,4,1) is the most desirable among these codes in terms of detecting and
correcting capabilities when the channel is faced with less noise or attack; for example
one corrupted bit in every seven bits.
In summary, the hiding positions (6 to 10) and the BCH codeword (63,7,15) are
the most powerful combinations whenever the transmission channels are prone to
higher noise and attacks, especially in shared environments such as CR spectrum.
Their resultant PRDs are all < 1%, RMS < 0.01% and BER =0. The BER results
mean that all secret hiding information can be recovered from the distorted readings.
The PRD and RMS results mean that the distorted reading can be cured using the
corrected hidden information and the eﬀect will only be to the third or fourth decimal
digits, which are usually ignored in many cases, such as watts, temperature and
humidity. On the other hand, it oﬀers a great solution with a paradigm shift for
securing the sensitive household information that should be transmitted as well as
the authenticity of IoTs smart device readings. The advantages are as follows. (1)
Strong detection and correction mechanisms recover both the hidden bits and the
transmitted readings up to the theoretical entropy without any increase in the actual
size of smart meter readings. (2) There is no change to the original form of readings
that facilitate the usage of operational administration such as cloud providers by the
authorised recipients without disclosing any conﬁdential information.
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Figure 3.18: (20×6) PRD results obtained from various combinations of used hiding
positions both (a) after hiding and (b) after recovery of lost bits and remedy the
received signal in relation to BER. This proves that all resultant distortion has been
minimised to < 1% which means the readings still can be used.
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Figure 3.19: (20×6) RMS results obtained from various combinations of used hiding
positions (i.e. as in Figures 3.11, 3.12,3.13 and 3.14) on 3D frequency domain
coeﬃcients level both (a) after hiding and (b) after recovery of lost bits and remedy
the received signal in relation to BER. This also proves that even on the 3D frequency
domain coeﬃcient level, the resultant distortion are very low < 0.01% which means
the recovery of the original readings is possible after the interference at CR channels.
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3.5.7 Comparison with Existing Models
To the best of our knowledge, there is no research that combines steganography with
error detection and correction techniques, such as BCH syndrome codes, to embed
household sensitive information in their IoTs smart device readings in such a way
that it helps to protect the privacy, and authenticate and provide robustness, as
in detecting and recovering the lost information, without hindering the eﬃciency of
direct operations on the transmitted readings. However, there are recently proposed
works [2], [3] and [4] that use only steganography in a diﬀerent context. Therefore, our
proposed technique is compared with these recent models in [2] where a steganography
used to hide tenants’ conﬁdential information in their collected premises readings
using signal processing (Wavelet-stego), whereas the model in [3] was to preserve the
privacy of the remote IoTs nodes using Walsh-stego. On the other hand, the model
in [4] proposes the least signiﬁcant qubit (LSQb-stego) information hiding algorithm
for quantum images.
There are three main improvements in our algorithm. (1) After applying 40 levels
of random noise on the stego form of readings of all models (see Fig 3.20), it should
be noticed that our algorithm is more robust in terms of detecting and recovering the
distorted hidden information as well as curing the received form of readings (i.e. up to
the theoretical entropy) than the models in [2], [3] and [4]. This is because privacy was
the only concern in those models, so they have zero detection and recovery capabilities,
whereas the targets of this algorithm are privacy, authenticity and robustness. (2) The
selected hiding positions of the models [2], [3] and [4] (i.e. LSB) are much more prone
to be lost whenever the transmitted readings are faced with intentional interference or
unintentional noisy channel attacks as shown in our results (see Fig. 3.20). Therefore,
the hiding positions of the proposed algorithm were chosen carefully to minimize the
loss to the lowest possible level. (3) All algorithms use a security key to cipher the
sensitive information; however, the proposed algorithm is much more secure in terms
of generating the random hiding order matrix. This is because in the proposed model,
this matrix is dynamically generated on the ﬂy using the key in 3D format, whereas
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in the model [3] the random order is only in a vector complexity, in [2] is in a 2D
complexity and in [4] relies on the randomness of the used frequency transformation
technique.
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Figure 3.20: Comparison of 40 cases (i.e. using 40 random noise level cases) of
detection and recovery capabilities (i.e. BER) between the proposed algorithm and
the models in [2], [3] and [4] respectively.
3.6 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, a novel secure BCH based stenographic technique was proposed that
allows legitimate recipients to: (1) detect and recover any loss due to CR shared
spectrum noise from the hidden sensitive information without privacy disclosure; (2)
remedy the received stego readings by using the corrected version of the secret hidden
data, and (3) directly work on the stego form of the normal IoTs readings without
neglecting the privacy or the authenticity of the received readings. To guarantee the
minimum distortion, high randomisation and robust detection and recovery, a 3D
WT is used to decompose the normal IoTs readings to their frequency domain. The
less signiﬁcant sub-bands are used to embed the encoded sensitive information. To
thoroughly measure the detection and recovery capabilities, random noise levels are
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applied to the transmitted readings. Then, the detection, recovery of the sensitive
information and the remedy of stego readings are deeply examined using BER, PRD
and RMS. It is evident from the experiments that our technique has solid recovery
capabilities (i.e. BER = 0, PRD < 1% and RMS < 0.01%).

Chapter 4
Protected IoTs Size Reduction
This chapter answers the third research question discussed in Section 1.2 by
introducing two novel models. This chapter discusses the main concerns about the
transmission of the unusually large size of Internet of Things (IoTs) readings, the
resultant negative eﬀect on the bit error rate and transmission energy consumption.
Further on, we discuss the issues around the current lossy models and their eﬀect
on hidden secret information, and on the damage of transmitted readings. This
chapter then highlights how a blind lossless compression technique is a likely candidate
to overcome the reduction of protected IoTs readings size at intermediate hops
without revealing the hidden information. This chapter then highlights how a
blind lossless compression technique is a likely candidate to overcome the reduction
of protected IoTs readings size at intermediate hops without revealing the hidden
information. Section 4.1.5 introduces the main contributions of this chapter and
how they have been accomplished. Section 4.2 brieﬂy highlights the key-related
works and the eﬀorts that other researchers took to solve the issue. Section 4.3
explains in detail our ﬁrst novel model including the design, Gaussian approximation,
margin calculation, Burrow-Wheeler and Move-To-Front (MTF) transform, and
entropy coding. Section 4.4 explains in detail our second novel model including,
design, splitting, stable group reduction, noise group reduction, and code chaining.
We evaluate various characteristics of our models, including a theoretical entropy,
empirical ratio improvement, and performance analyses which are introduced in
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Figure 4.1: Our model where power consumptions readings from houses are collected
as waveform readings and compressed before transmission to operation centres.
Section 4.5. Section 4.6 presents detailed experimental examinations of the models,
including the test bed scenario and a wide range of protected IoTs readings after the
stego process, their possible reduction ratios (i.e. compress), the actual IoTs protected
high streams after decompression and comparison with available techniques. Section
4.7 ﬁnally summarises this chapter.
4.1 Introduction
The IoTs such as smart meters are currently being investigated and deployed into
premises. These can be used to gather periodic waveform readings automatically
every second, such as the power consumption of a premise, and can transmit them
to operational centres using various techniques [79]. According to the latest survey
conducted by the International Council on Large Electric Systems (CIGRE) [108],
there are more than twelve key applications using cases that can be achieved from the
distributed IoTs smart meters. At the top of the list are automatic metering services,
load forecasting and energy feedback. Therefore, there will be an unusual volume of
collected readings from small meter devices that should be transmitted simultaneously
on real-time through limited bandwidth and low energy environment.
By reducing the huge size of the collection of readings before transmission, we
noticed many operational beneﬁts. These are discussed further into the chapter.
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4.1.1 Limited Bandwidth Reservation
Many IoTs smart meter projects are connected through Narrowband Power-Line
Communication (PLC) Links. In Germany, 13 out of 24 metering projects use PLC
[109]. Narrowband PLC works at lower frequencies (3-500 kHz), lower data rates
up to 100s of kbps, and has a longer range going into distance of kilometres. The
collision probability increases relatively with the rise of data volume. Therefore, the
more data every meter must transmit, the more time the bandwidth is required, as
a result disallow or disrupt each other. With the compression model, the data rate
decreases signiﬁcantly, and likewise, the probability of the collusion.
4.1.2 Energy Saving
The power required for bits’ transfer considerably exceeds the power needed for
the computational complexity of operations on the same device. For example,
transmitting a single bit from embedded devices, such as Mica2Dot, is equivalent
to executing around 2090 clock cycles [110]. Therefore, up to 6270 clock cycles in
every 8260 are saved by the proposed compression in this chapter.
4.1.3 Bit Error Rate Reduction
By reducing the volume of collected data, the time interval required by every meter
to transmit reduces signiﬁcantly lowering the bit error rate this assists with avoiding
repeated retransmissions of corrupted traﬃc [109]. This will open space allowing room
for the addition of more devices; thereby, enhancing the reliability and extensibility
of communication infrastructure.
4.1.4 Low Storage Cost
The cost of storing collected data increase exponentially due to the readings volume.
For example, the generated data volume from IoTs smart meters projects of 40 million
households in Germany alone exceeding 25TB per day [6]. Management of the data
worsens due to many government regulations that enforce the preservation the data
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for many years without losing any of its features. Therefore, compression is an ideal
remedy for this problem.
Compression methods of IoTs waveform readings can be classiﬁed into two
groups: ‘lossy’ and ‘lossless’ [30]. Lossy compression relies on losing some information
while trying to maintain the main features of the waveform signal. Therefore, the
decompressed signal is somewhat diﬀerent from the original signal. This kind of
compression was acceptable in the traditional grid model, and so lots of research went
into this ﬁeld (see summary table 4.1). However, lossy compression has been recently
discouraged for two reasons: (1) the recent IoTs smart devices usage demonstrates
the use of data for crucial purposes such as billings, and (2) to maintain the privacy
and authenticity of the transmitted readings, current models are using steganography
to hide the secret information randomly inside these readings [3]. Consequently,
losing any bit of these readings is no longer tolerated.
In contrast, lossless compression has an obligation to reconstruct the exact
waveform signal as the original with zero loss. With these constraints in mind,
some research has been done in the following categories [5, 8, 9]. However, as per
a recent state-of-the-art study [30], this route is far from being as mature as image,
voice and video lossless compressions. Therefore, we were compelled to look for
better lossless compression mechanisms that achieve a higher compression ratio, while
preserving all features of IoTs transmitted readings. Therefore, the main question
that drives this chapter is that, how can the waveform IoTs protected readings
be pre-processed to signiﬁcantly reduce the entropy?
4.1.5 Contributions
In this chapter, we introduce the compression algorithms of two novel lossless IoTs
smart meter readings that reduces the protected readings size at intermediate hops
without revealing the hidden information. The ﬁrst generic Gaussian-based model
target is representing IoTs smart device readings in few parameters regardless of
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the roughness in the signal. This is successfully accomplished using the Gaussian
approximation [111]. The diﬀerence between the approximated and the actual
waveform is calculated. Therefore, the compression will be only for margin space
rather than the entire stream of waveform readings. The margin space values
are ﬁnally encoded. After thorough evaluation under the same conditions, our
technique was superior to existing models mathematically (the entropy was halved)
and empirically (the achieved ratio was 3.8:1). In the second target model (or the
N-Split model), we lessened the randomness in the IoTs streams into a smaller ﬁnite
ﬁeld to expand the possibility of repetition and avoid the accumulated rounding
errors due to ﬂoating operations. This has been successfully achieved by splitting
the collected readings into diﬀerent groups before reducing them independently. The
achieved ratio was 4.48:1.
4.2 Related Work
Most studies have been conducted on the waveforms collected IoTs smart meter
readings focusing on lossy compression. This is because (1) the readings were not
directly transmitted and used for crucial purposes, such as billings and real-time
analysis in the tradition grid; (2) the eﬀectiveness of a transform technique called
‘wavelet’ helps to represent waveform signals in few values, this means losing some
bits from every reading. The lossy compression can be grouped based on the used
techniques into transform, parametric coding and mixed.
Firstly, transformation models such as the work of J. Ning et al. [33], is where
discrete wavelet transform has been applied to identify most of the signal energy
in low-frequency coeﬃcients (i.e. using dbX), and allowed others to be removed.
Additional work has been conducted using diﬀerent families of wavelet such as Sluntlet
[115] and B-Spline [116]. Secondly, parametric coding models such as the work of
Tcheou Michel et al. [32] where they used damped sinusoids models to extract signal
features before compression. Finally, mixed transformation and parametric models
such as the work proposed by Ribeiro Moises et al. [121], is where fundamental
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Table 4.1: Related Work Summary.
Set Category Main
Tech
Rept
CRi
Test
CRi
Mat-
ric
ValueComments Ref
Loss-
DictionaryLemp-Ziv 5:1 2.5:1 - - Measurement should be
bin-bin not text to text
[7]
Entropy
Huﬀman
&
Del-Huf
1.7:1
&
2:1
1.8:1
2.2:1
- - Accurate numbers based on
bin-to-bin
[5]
Arithmic
Code
2.5:1 2.4:1 - - Better than Huﬀman [9,
112]
less Invert
Golomb
2.8:1 2.8:1 - - Accurate results & less
overhead
[8]
Mixed
Prediction
& LZMA
2.5:1 2.5:1 - - Improve 10% over LZMA [113]
Bzip2 &
Del-Bzip2
2.8:1
&
3:1
2.7:1
2.9:1
- - The best existing lossless
model
[9]
General 2:1
&
4:1
1.7:1
&
1.9:1
- - Reported CRi tested with ≤ 2
decimal precision / Measured
CRi Tested with 4 decimal
[114]
Normalise
based
2:1
&
5:1
1.5:1
&
2.2:1
- - Reported CRi tested with ≤ 2
decimal precision / Measured
CRi tested with 4 decimal
[6]
Lossy
Transform
Daubech
DWT
5:1 - RMS 10−3 Losing info [33]
Slantlet
DWT
10:1 - MSE -
19dB
Serious loss [115]
B-Spline
DWT
15:1 - MSE -
25dB
Very high distortion [116]
WPT &
AC
6:1 - NM
SE
10−5 Losing info. [117]
EZW 10-16:1- NM
SE
10−5 Losing info. [118]
Lifting
WT &
Huﬀman
20:1 - SNR > 25 Huge loss [119]
Singular
Value
> 20 - MAE
MPE
4.1%
0.036
Losing many bits [120]
Param.
Coding
Damped
sinusoids
modeling
16:1 - SNR >
30dB
Very high distortion [32]
Mixed
Trans &
Param
Basic,
Hamonic
& Trans
16:1 - MSE 30dBHigher distortion [121]
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harmonic and transient coding are used together.
On the other hand, a few studies have been conducted on lossless compression due
to its restrictions and nature of waveform readings. The lossless compression can be
classiﬁed based on the technique used into the dictionary, entropy and mixed based
models.
Dictionary-based algorithms rely mainly on general compressors (e.g. ZIP, GZIP
and LZO) where a dictionary is built, more frequent samples will be represented in
fewer bits, whereas more bits are allocated to less frequent samples; for example,
Gerek Omer et al. [7] used Lempel-Ziv to compress a stream of waveform readings.
The achieved compression ratio was 2.5:1 bin-to-bin. However, dictionary algorithms
are fundamentally designed for letters (e.g. English characters) where the number
of options is limited. This is ill-suited for waveform signals because of their ﬂoating
point nature. This means every integer number has thousands of images due to its
ﬂoating values.
Entropy-based algorithms are statistical models designed by measuring the
probability of every symbol within a stream and allocating a fewer number of bits
for a higher probability and vice-versa; for example, the work of Kraus Jan et al. [9],
Arithmetic coding was used to replace the input symbols with a single ﬂoating-point
value. The achieved compression ratio was 2.6:1. Zhang Dahai et al. [5] also proposed
a model that improves Huﬀman coding by preprocessing the data by using a higher
order delta modulation. The improvement was from 1.7 to 2.3:1. Additionally, Joseph
Tate [8] recently introduced a model that uses Golomb-Rice coding after preprocessing
the data using several methods, such as frequency compensated diﬀerence. The
achieved compression ratio was 2.8:1.
Mixed algorithms are more sophisticated techniques using both dictionary and
statistical algorithms. This allows the exploitation both the frequency of repetition
and its probability within a stream of values. For example, Kraus Jan et al. [113]
introduced a model that improves LZMA algorithm by reducing the redundancy in
waveform readings. This is accomplished by using prediction models based on interval
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selection optimisation and diﬀerential encoding. The achieved compression was 2.6:1.
Kraus Jan and Tobiska Tomas [9] also proposed a model that improves BZIP2 by using
delta modulation after applying an eﬃcient block sorting Burrows-Wheeler algorithm.
The achieved compression ratio was 2.9:1.
Additionally, M. Ringwelski et al. [114] utilised various general-purpose mixed
algorithms (e.g. Adaptive Huﬀman Coding, tiny Lempel-Ziv Markov Chain, and
Lempel Ziv Markov Chain Huﬀman Coding) and performed them on public data
sets (i.e. REDD and TUD) that have either integer entries with one or a maximum
two decimal points. The achieved compression ratio varies between 2-4:1. Andreas
Unterweger et al. [6] also achieved a better compression ratio (e.g. > 2.5-5:1) using
the same data sets by proposing a multi-steps algorithm. They started by normalising
the collected readings before deriving the diﬀerential coding. Then, variable length
coding is applied followed by resultant code concatenation before entropy coding.
The eﬀect of data granularity and a wider detailed precision (e.g. three decimal)
of both works [6, 114] have been examined thoroughly by Andreas Unterweger et al.
in [122]. Although they performed well in some appliances-levels, they become less
eﬀective at a coarser granularity especially when the decimal precision exceeds two.
This is because both are designed and performed well for datasets that have either
an integer, and one or a maximum two decimal precisions. In cases relating to recent
use and published datasets (e.g. the datasets targeted in this paper [78, 79]), the
recommended precision is four decimal. Table 4.1 summarises most of the related
work.
4.3 Model 1 (MD1): Gaussian-based Model
The principle behind this proposed technique is to represent IoTs smart meter
collected readings using only a few parameters as accurately as possible. Various
curve ﬁtting functions (e.g. radial base, polynomial, exponential, Gaussian, Fourier
and linear) are investigated to approximate the signal using certain parameters while
maintaining the minimum error margin. Gaussian approximation function is chosen
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Figure 4.2: Three examples of Gaussian approximation optimisation. (a) Plot of more
than 1500 IoTs (e.g. smart meter) power readings and their Gaussian approximations
and (b) plot of the resultant residuals after calculating the margin (i.e. highlighted in
blue). b3 is obviously better due to its very low residuals.
due to its superiority over the others. The margin space between the approximated and
the actual readings has been calculated before encoding them using Burrow-Wheeler
Transform (BWT). This has been followed by MTF and Run Length (RLE) to
eliminate the repetition. Entropy coding is ﬁnally applied. The core challenging
task of our model is that the precision of Gaussian model and the selection of its
appropriate parameters is to produce accurate approximated smart meter readings.
4.3.1 Gaussian Approximation
In mathematics, Gaussian approximation is a well-known continuous probability
distribution. It’s signiﬁcance comes due to its ability to represent real-value random
ﬂuctuated signals whose distribution are not known [111]. This inspired us to use
Gaussian distribution functions in our compression algorithm to approximate the IoTs
smart device readings. Simple Gaussian function is depicted in Fig 4.2 and shown in
Eq. 4.1
f(x) = ae
−
(
(x−b)
2c
)2
(4.1)
where x is a discrete variable and the Gaussian function parameters are represented
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by a = 1
σ
√
2π
, which is the amplitude of the highest peak value, b = μ is the centroid
of the model and c = σ is the peak’s width.
To depict a multi-peak signal, the identical Gaussian equation can be reformulated
as shown in Eq. 4.2.
f(x) =
n∑
i=1
aie
[
−
(
(x−bi)
2ci
)2]
(4.2)
where n reﬂects the number of Gaussian functions (i.e. the required peaks to
ﬁt). f(x) represents the IoTs readings. The crucial part is that hthe values of
the parameters are selected? Therefore, a suitable optimisation theory called trust
region algorithm is used to calculate these parameters in our model, due to its robust
behaviour in bad conditions while maintaining very strong convergence properties.
This resulted in minimising the diﬀerence between the approximated and the actual
values of the IoTs smart meter readings. The variation between the original readings
(y) and the Gaussian approximated signal (ŷ) is carefully measured by using a
non-linear least square equation as in Eq. 4.3
f =
n∑
i=1
(yi − ŷi)2 (4.3)
where f demonstrates the sum of the squared-residuals that should be reduced.
Therefore, the Trust region algorithm [111] is used to ﬁnd the optimum Gaussian
parameters x that is utilised to minimise the objective function represented in f .
This is done by approximating the original function f utilising a quadratic equation
mδ(p) to ﬁnd out the optimum step size p by which the parameter values x should
be scaled up or down. Additionally, the step value at iteration δ can be speciﬁed by
resolving this quadratic equation [123] as shown in Eq. 4.4
mδ(p) = fδ + p
T gδ +
1
2
pTBδp (4.4)
where the value of the objective function at iteration δ using the current parameters
values xδ can be reﬂected as fδ = f(xδ), Bδ is the Hessian of f , and gδ is the gradient
of both the parameter values of xδ at iteration δ and f . The step size value p (i.e. the
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solution of this problem) is restricted to a particular region Δk called trust region as
depicted in Eq. 4.5
‖p‖ ≤ Δδ (4.5)
The trust region can be scaled up or down based on the original objective function
and its accuracy in the approximated quadratic function. For this target, a reduction
factor rk is introduced to examine the performance of the quadratic approximation as
formulated in Eq. 4.6
rδ =
f(xδ)− f(xδ + pδ)
mδ(0)−mδ(pδ) (4.6)
The trust region Δδ is changed based on rδ as follows:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Δδ ↑ if rδ > 34
Δδ ↓ if rδ < 14
Δδ → else
(4.7)
The parameters are ﬁnally updated utilising step pδ and the operation is repeated
until the stop condition is reached.
For clarity, Fig 4.2 shows three examples of Gaussian approximation optimisation.
(a) Plot for more than 1500 smart meter power readings and their Gaussian
approximations. (b) Plot of the resultant residuals after calculating the margin
(i.e. highlighted in blue), which clearly shows the more the accuracy of Gaussian
approximations is the less left margin values are. In this process alone, more than
50% of the values have been zeroed and others have been signiﬁcantly reduced. The
advantage of that is achieving higher compression ratio while keeping just a few
parameters to reproduce Gaussian approximation to recover the readings.
4.3.2 Margin Calculation
Gaussian distribution optimisations have been thoroughly examined to achieve the
best possible generic distribution. To avoid unbiased results, the ﬁnal optimum
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collection of parameters has been used in all our experiments. Next, the diﬀerence
between smart meter readings and their Gaussian approximation is calculated (see
Eq. 4.8). The signiﬁcance of that is the compression will only be on the calculated
margin space rather than the entire set of readings. Also, to avoid large diﬀerences in
any consecutive margin calculated values, the ﬁrst derivative is applied as shown in
Eq. 4.9.
ϕ =
∫ n
i=1
[yi − ŷi] (4.8)
D = [ϕ(2)− ϕ(1)ϕ(3)− ϕ(2)...ϕ(Ω)− ϕ(Ω− 1)] (4.9)
where ϕ is the calculated margin, Ω is the length of ϕ and D is the resultant derivative
vector.
4.3.3 Burrow-Wheeler Transform
After calculating the ﬁrst derivative on the margin space, we observed there were less
than 10% unique values (see Fig. 4.3). However, they are scattered which minimise
their compression eﬀectiveness. Therefore, BWT is used to rearrange the values to
be in a consecutive long sequence of identical symbols. BWT is originally introduced
by M. Burrows and D. Wheeler [124] to transform text into a diﬀerent format to
increase its compressibility by applying techniques, such as the MTF technique. The
signiﬁcance of this algorithm is that it is reversible with zero additional information;
the general idea is to rotate the data (i.e. 1 to n blocks) . Let’s Λ be the block
of symbols in textual or numerical (i.e. numerical in our algorithm) form to be
compressed).
Λ = Λ1,Λ2, ...,Λn (4.10)
The BWT begins by left rotation of the vector Λ in an iterative manner. This generates
a 2D matrix called ω, as in Eq. 4.11
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Figure 4.3: Comparison between the calculated margin and their unique values.
ω =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Λ1 Λ2 Λ3 · · · Λn
Λ2 Λ3 · · · Λn Λ1
Λ3 · · · Λn Λ1 Λ2
...
...
. . .
...
Λn Λ1 Λ2 · · · Λn − 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(4.11)
It is clear from Eq. 4.11 that the rows in ω represent various rotations of Λ. A
new version of the initial ω called ω˜ is generated by sorting its rows in ascending way.
The last column C of ω˜ is retrieved and accompanies the index I that points to the
original block Λ.
For a better understanding, let’s assume that the resultant values after the
calculation of the margin and ﬁrst derivative as shown in Table 4.2. For simplicity,
they have been converted to characters (i.e. represent Λ). Λ is rotated n times (i.e.
number of elements) to generate ω as shown in Eq. 4.12.
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Table 4.2: Conversion from numerical to character values
Λ 0.0999 0.2000 0.1000 0.2000 0.1000 0.2000
Ch b a n a n a
0
0.4
0.7
0.8
1
b
n
a
x
"b" "bn" "bnn" "bnna" "bnnax"
0 0.16 0.208 0.2332 0.23608
0.4 0.28 0.244 0.2368 0.2368
Arithmetic encoding process for the message "bnnax"
Lower tag Values
Upper tag Values
Figure 4.4: Graphical representation for encoding a message ”bnnax”.
ω =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∧ b a n a n a |
| ∧ b a n a n a
a | ∧ b a n a n
n a | ∧ b a n a
a n a | ∧ b a n
n a n a | ∧ b a
a n a n a | ∧ b
b a n a n a | ∧
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(4.12)
| represents the end of data. ω then is sorted to generate ω˜.
L (i.e. last column) and I (i.e. the index) will be the ﬁnal output from this stage.
The decoder will rely on L and I to retrieve the original form. This is done by
inserting L as the last column in a temporary 2D matrix of size n×n (i.e. the number
of elements). This column is sorted to ﬁgure out the ﬁrst column. Then the ﬁrst and
last columns (of each row) together give you all the pairs of successive characters.
Finally, the resultant matrix is identical to ω˜. Therefore, the original form of data is
easily accessible using the parameter I.
4.3. MODEL 1 (MD1): GAUSSIAN-BASED MODEL 107
4.3.4 Move-To-Front
Although the output of BWT perfectly clusters similar symbols in long runs, in the
case of IoTs smart meter readings these symbols vary from very small (e.g. 10) to
large values (e.g. 5000). Therefore, to expand the compression eﬀectiveness of any
entropy encoder such as Arithmetic Coding, MTF transform is applied. MTF is a
lightweight algorithm proposed by Ryabko [125], used to increase the probability of
small numbers near zero while decreasing the large numbers in a data list. The general
idea is that each symbol in the data is replaced by its index in the list of currently
used symbols. Therefore, long sequences of similar symbols are replaced by many
zeros, while a rear symbol that has not been used for a long time will be replaced by
a larger number.
Let Υ be all the distinct symbols in the list L obtained from BWT stage which
is shared between the encoder and decoder The MTF algorithm can be summarised
in three steps. (1) Υ is initialised using L. (2) Each Lx in the list L is encoded as
its preceding number of symbols in Υ, which will then be moved to the front of the
distinct list Υ. (3) The ﬁnal output is constructed in a list ∂ by combining the codes
of step 2.
The decoding process is the inverse of these steps.
For better clariﬁcation (see Table 4.3), let’s assume L = [b, n, n, a, a, a] which is
the output of BWT and its distinct symbols Υ = [a, b, n]. The ﬁrst symbol L0 is b,
and its preceding symbol index in Υ is 1. Consequently, the encoder will output 1 in ∂
and move b to the front of Υ = [b, a, n]. The second symbol L1 is n which is preceded
by two symbols, and so the encoder output will be 2 and updated Υ = [n, b, a]. This
will continue until Llast and the ﬁnal output of this stage is ∂ = [1, 2, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0].
Note that; two zeros have been added at the end of L to emphasize the signiﬁcance
of MTF.
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Table 4.3: MTF of L = [b, n, n, a, a, a] and Υ = [a, b, n]
Lx 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0
Υ abn ban nba nba anb anb anb anb
∂ b n n a a a a a
4.3.5 Run Length
The output from MTF contains many identical consecutive symbols; therefore, a
simple technique called RLE [126] is applied before the entropy codes. The general
idea behind this approach to data compression is this: let’s assume a data item d
occurs n consecutive times in the list of values, the n occurrences of this item will be
replaced with the single pair nd. The n consecutive occurrences of the item are called
a run length of n. For example, the consecutive zeros in ∂ = [1, 2, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0] will
be ∂ = [1, 2, 0, 2, 0#4].
4.3.6 Arithmetic Coding
An entropy encoding technique called Arithmetic Coding AC is applied in our
algorithm to achieve the most possible optimum compression ratio. AC is a statistical
variable length coding by which frequently used numbers will be stored with fewer bits
and not-so-frequently occurring symbols will be represented with more bits [126]. It
is superior in most respects to the better-known entropy coders, such as the Huﬀman
method. This is because that rather than segregating the input into component
symbols and replacing each with a code, it encodes the entire message into a single
number, a fraction n where (0.0 ≤ n < 1.0).
The main idea is initiating from a certain interval, reading the input list by symbols
and using the probability of each number to narrow the interval. In other words, AC
begins by deﬁning the current interval as (0,1). It then repeats the following two
steps for each symbol Si in the data list: (a) to divide the present interval into
subintervals whose sizes are proportional to the symbols probabilities, and (b) choose
the subinterval for Si which will be deﬁned as the new present interval. Finally, when
the entire data list is processed in this way, the output should be any number that
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Table 4.4: Frequency Distribution in message M
Symbol Probability Accumulative Freq
b 0.4 0.4
n 0.3 0.7
a 0.1 0.8
x 0.2 1
uniquely distinguishes the current interval (i.e. any number in the present interval).
The present interval gets smaller for each symbol processed. The ﬁnal output is
a single number, called ‘tag value’, and does not consist of codes for the individual
symbols.
To illustrate AC code construction, let’s consider encoding a portion of message
M˜ = (b, n, n, a, x). The full frequency distribution of that message is shown in Table
4.4. Default probability limit is between (0, 1). First, if b occurs, then the tag value
has to be between (0, 0.4). Next, n is detected, so the current interval (0, 0.4) should
be divided into subintervals by using lower and upper limit equations as shown in 4.13
and 4.14 [126].
ln = ln−1 + (un−1 − ln−1)× Fx(xn−1) (4.13)
un = ln−1 + (un−1 − ln−1)× Fx(x) (4.14)
where ln and un are the lower and upper limit of the nth symbol, Fx represents
its accumulative frequency.
After substituting in Eq 4.13 and 4.14, the tag value of the sequence b, n is
(0.16, 0.28). This must be repeated for the entire message accumulatively. All tag
values have been graphically summarised in ﬁg. 4.4. The ﬁnal compressed value is
the average of the lower and the upper tag values 0.2360+0.23682 = 0.2364 which will be
converted into binary.
On the decoder side, this tag value will be received and the probabilities of the
message must be known. Then, the steps are identical but an inverse where the letters
or numbers should be found by their accumulative probability.
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4.3.7 Decompression - Gaussian-based Model
The decompression is identical to the stated compression steps, but in an inverse
way. The algorithm begins by Arithmetic decoding. Next, the run length values are
segregated followed by MTF decoding. Burrow-Wheeler inverse transform then is
applied which will generate the calculated margin space values. After that, the ﬁrst
derivative inverse is conducted to retrieve the actual margin space values. The stored
Gaussian parameters are then used to calculate the approximated waveform readings.
The summation of the approximated readings and the margin space values is ﬁnally
calculated to reconstruct the exact lossless smart meter readings.
Fig. 4.7 in Section 4.6 shows a few examples of the original smart meter readings
and the decompressed version which obviously proves that the readings are fully
recoverable in our approach with zero loss.
4.4 Model 2 (MD2): N-Split Based Model
The principle behind this proposed technique is for minimising the randomness of IoTs
smart meter readings into a smaller ﬁnite ﬁeld to boost the possibility of repetition
and avoid the accumulated rounding errors due to ﬂoating operations. This was
successfully achieved by splitting the collected readings into diﬀerent groups. The
more stable group (the integer side) is highly compressed using the ﬁrst derivative
followed by BWT. This was followed by MTF and RLE to eliminate the repetition.
Entropy coding is ﬁnally applied. The more random group (the ﬂoating part) is
mapped to a smaller space using a mathematical model before applying BWT, MTF
and RLE followed by entropy coding.
Although it appears there is some stability in the collected readings, most of
the general dictionary and statistical compressors are ineﬀective due to the precision
problem. Most current readings formats are four decimal precision, which means every
single reading has ten thousand images from 12.0000 to 12.9999. Therefore, at this
stage every reading is split into N - two groups GA and GB. GA only contains the
more stable part (i.e. integer) of the readings and GB includes the noise (i.e. four
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Figure 4.5: Three examples of the split output. Group A represents the more stable
part, and group B highlights the noise part.
decimal precision) part. Every group is treated diﬀerently due to its characteristics.
4.4.1 Stable Group Reduction
To exploit the stability feature in GA, the ﬁrst derivative is calculated as shown in Eq
4.15.
D = [ϕ(2)− ϕ(1)ϕ(3)− ϕ(2)...ϕ(Ω)− ϕ(Ω− 1)] (4.15)
where ϕ is the ith reading in GA, Ω is the length of ϕ and D is the resultant derivative
vector.
We observed that there is lots of redundancy, but in scattered format. Therefore,
BWT (Read 4.3.3) is used to rearrange the values to be in the consecutive long
sequence of identical symbols. BWT simply rotates a suﬃx array SA values (GA
readings) and its original is T . BWT can be deﬁned as Eq. 4.16.
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BWT [i] =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩T [SA[i]− 1] if ⇐⇒ SA[i] > 1$ Otherwise (4.16)
To increase the eﬀectiveness of any entropy coding, MTF (see 4.3.4) is employed.
The basic idea is that each symbol in the resultant series from BWT - these symbols are
replaced by its index in the list of currently used symbols. Therefore, long sequences
of similar symbols by as many zeros.
The output from MTF contains many identical consecutive symbols; therefore, a
simple technique called ‘run length’ (see 4.3.5) is applied before the entropy codes. For
instance, the consecutive zeros in ∂ = [1, 2, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0] will be ∂ = [1, 2, 0, 2, 0#4].
AC (see 4.3.6) is ﬁnally applied on the stable group GA to achieve the most possible
optimum compression ratio.
4.4.2 Noise Group Reduction
The group GB contains the decimal parts of the readings and we called it ‘noise’. This
is because they have no stable pattern. However, the merits of pulling them aside are
explained thusly: (i) reducing the space from ten thousand images for every single
reading (e.g. 11.0000 - 11.9999) to ten thousand images for all readings together,
(ii) that operations of ﬂoating points are more expensive than the integer values,
because of the deﬁciency and limitations of handling ﬂoating points in the majority
of embedded systems. Therefore, the split values in GB (i.e. four decimal .9999) are
converted to an integer counterpart in our algorithm.
To eliminate unnecessary digits while not losing any details, the resultant values
are mapped into smaller digits space MGB. For example, 0001 value into 1, 0002 into
2 and so on.
The resultant mapped space MGB is then reshuﬄed employing BWT (see 4.3.3)
and MTF (see 4.3.4) to obtain consecutive sequences to be exploited later.
Finally, RLE (see 4.3.5) is used to eliminate redundancy before applying the
entropy coding AC (See 4.3.6).
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4.4.3 Code Chaining
The output from both groups GA and GB is in a bit format. Thus, the two streams
are concatenated in this step. One small, two bytes, delimiter is added prior to the
concatenated stream to identify the size of the ﬁrst part S1, which in tern tells the
second part T − S1.
4.4.4 Decompression- N-Split Based Model
The decompression is identical to the stated compression steps but in an inverse way.
The algorithm begins by code splitting to identify the bit streams that belong to
each group. (i) The more stable group (the integer side) is decompressed by entropy
coding, RLE segregation, MTF, BWT decoding and ﬁrst derivative inverse that are
conducted to retrieve the actual GA values. (ii) The more random group (the ﬂoating
part) is decompressed by AC, RLE segregation, MTF, BWT decoding and mapping
inverse is performed to recover the original GB set. Finally, N-Split stage is inverted
by concatenating the two groups to rebuild the exact original IoTs streams.
4.5 Compression Performance Metrics
This section discusses the theoretical and empirical matrices used to evaluate our
proposed algorithm.
4.5.1 Theoretical Entropy
In information theory, the term entropy of a signal represents the minimum bitrate,
meaning assuming the best compression, that is required to transmit this signal [127].
Therefore, to prove the eﬀectiveness of preprocessing the data in our algorithm, the
theoretical entropy is calculated for every data list of IoTs smart meter readings
before starting our algorithm. Then, a quantitative comparison of measurements will
be conducted between the theoretical entropy and the achieved compression ratio.
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of entropy before/after Gaussian approximation.
Let’s assume IoTs readings list consists of the data points d[1], d[2], ..., d[N ] with the
maximum likelihood that entropy (in bits) is measured as
H(d)  −
∑
v∈U(d)
p̂(v) log2(p̂(v)) (4.17)
p̂(v)  1
N
N∑
n=1
δv(d[n]) (4.18)
δv(d[n]) 
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1 if d[n] = v
0 else
(4.19)
where U(d) is the range of d and p̂(v) is the empirical probability of v ∈ U .
The highest entropy is the worst-case occurs when each value in U appears at the
identical frequency 1/|U |, where |U | represents the elements in original U (see Eq.
4.20).
Hmax = −
∑
v∈U
1
|U | log2(
1
|U |) = log2 |U |. (4.20)
Contrarily, the lowest entropy (or the best-case) occurs when all d values are similar,
which leads to Hmin = −1 log2(1) = 0.
Fig. 4.6 emphasises the average improvement in the entropy before and after
the major step which is applying the Gaussian approximation and utilising only the
margin space. The entropy has been almost halved.
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Table 4.5: Compression ratio
Meter Huf Del-Huf Norm+AC AC Lemp-Ziv P-LZMA Bzip2 Inv-Golomb Del+Bzip2 Our approach
[5] [5] [6] [9] [7] [113] [9] [8] [9]
1 1.72 1.97 1.78 2.43 2.47 2.44 2.60 3.07 3.13 3.90
2 1.08 1.71 1.93 2.41 2.21 2.54 2.53 2.81 3.11 3.91
3 1.14 1.63 1.88 2.39 2.13 2.53 2.58 2.73 3.01 3.90
4 1.29 1.64 1.87 2.37 2.14 2.51 2.54 2.74 2.97 3.89
5 1.78 2.01 1.91 2.36 2.01 2.26 2.47 2.61 2.90 3.87
6 1.81 1.78 1.86 2.36 2.28 2.48 2.52 2.88 2.83 3.85
7 1.34 1.70 1.96 2.36 2.20 2.50 2.56 2.80 2.88 3.83
8 0.91 1.62 1.99 2.37 2.12 2.54 2.54 2.72 2.84 3.82
9 1.18 1.58 1.86 2.38 2.08 2.53 2.61 2.68 2.77 3.80
10 1.03 1.80 1.91 2.41 2.30 2.36 2.65 2.90 2.82 3.78
11 1.32 1.67 1.99 2.42 2.17 2.33 2.66 2.77 2.86 3.76
12 1.52 1.74 2.05 2.44 2.24 2.22 2.67 2.84 2.84 3.73
13 1.03 1.84 2.01 2.46 2.34 2.53 2.67 2.94 2.91 3.70
14 1.47 1.92 2.04 2.46 2.42 2.48 2.69 3.02 2.95 3.65
15 0.95 2.09 2.02 2.44 2.09 2.22 2.69 2.69 2.96 3.60
16 0.91 1.74 2.12 2.44 2.24 2.50 2.68 2.84 2.97 3.54
17 1.09 1.80 2.06 2.43 2.30 2.61 2.68 2.90 2.97 3.97
18 0.79 2.06 2.10 2.42 2.06 2.55 2.67 2.66 2.99 3.91
19 0.68 1.74 2.16 2.42 2.24 2.64 2.63 2.84 2.99 3.85
20 0.67 1.81 2.08 2.44 2.31 2.30 2.63 2.91 2.98 3.80
Average 1.19 1.79 1.98 2.41 2.22 2.45 2.61 2.82 2.94 3.80
4.5.2 Empirical Ratio
The Compression Ratio CRi is the main benchmark to measure any proposed
compression algorithm performance. Let’s denote the original IoTs readings block
O (i.e. its unit in byte or bit) and the resultant compressed readings C. Therefore,
the empirical CRi in results section is calculated as shown in Eq. 4.21.
CRi =
O
C
(4.21)
A well-known and leading power quality storage format for electric power system
waveforms that is used in most of the IoTs smart devices called Power Quality Data
Interchange Format (PQDIF). This is deﬁned by the IEEE1159 working group [128]
and was used to accurately measure the original and compressed size of the readings
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in bits. Every reading is represented as 16 bits. The typical block size suggested is
around 1500 readings.
4.6 Experiments and Results
4.6.1 Datasets
Various datasets of IoTs smart meter readings have been utilised in our experiments
that were collected and published by the Laboratory for Advanced System Software
as a part of a project named ‘Smart*’ [129, 130]. The dataset includes continuous
readings (every minute) from three homes for three months. The readings’ types
can be classiﬁed into (1) power usage - watts consumption and heat index, and (2)
environmental characteristics - inside/outside temperature, inside/outside humidity
and wind chill. The datasets also provide periodical electricity power consumption
(every minute) from around 400 anonymous homes for (3× 30× 24) hours. According
to the deﬁnition of spatial and temporal aggregations, these readings are temporal,
because they are gathered separately from every single house after equipping it with
a smart meter that collects its readings periodically.
Our main performed experiments can be classiﬁed into two main parts. (1) The
compression performed by aggregators that receives an overwhelming amount of
collected readings from various entities (e.g. homes). (2) Decompression which is
performed at operation centres or on the cloud level.
4.6.2 MD1: Gaussian-based Model
To avoid biased results, all records of meter readings in the aforementioned datasets
have been used. The shown results in both Table 4.5 and Fig. 4.8 are from continuous
blocks from 15/Apr/2012 to 1/Jul/2012. Similarly, the existing lossless compression
models in this domain have been implemented under the same conditions to precisely
provide a clear comparison. For brevity, the results have been summarised in Table
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Figure 4.7: Three examples of watts consumptions’ readings of three homes: (a)
direct plot of original readings, (b) plot of the obtained compressed streams gathered
as 16-bit per value, and (C) plot of the readings after decompression.
4.5. Every column represents results from diﬀerent model as follows. (1) The second
and third columns show CRi of using techniques in [5] which mainly relies on Huﬀman
and delta-Huﬀman. (2) The fourth column presents results of employing the model in
[6] based on normalisation, diﬀerential coding and other steps before entropy coding.
(3) The ﬁfth column depicts the results of utilising models in [9] based on AC. (4)
The results of the sixth column are based on the model in [7] that uses Lempel-Ziv.
(5) The seventh column presents results obtained by utilising the technique in [113],
which is based on linear prediction model and LZMA. (6) The eighth and the ninth
columns highlight results using the technique in [9] which relies on bzip2 and delta
bzip2 (i.e. BWT,MTF and AC). (7) The ninth column shows the results using the
invertible transformation pre-processing followed by Golomb-Rice encoding [8]. (8)
The last column shows results using our Gaussian-based algorithm.
Fig 4.8 shows a larger number of the obtained CRi from our algorithm compared
to the ones above. Also, Table 4.6 presents the exact improvement factors compared
with the best existing model. In addition, Fig. 4.9 shows a comparison of the exact
required time between our model and the highest existing compressor working on the
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Figure 4.9: Average time required in millisecond to compress/decompress per value of
readings from 20 diﬀerent meter readings using both our approach and BZIP2 based
model [13].
same datasets that have four decimal precision. Finally, Fig. 4.7 shows an example of
a plot of six original CRi IoTs readings before the compression and after the recovery
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Table 4.6: our Gaussian approach against the best existing model
Factor Delta+Bzip2 [9] Our approach (MD1: Gaussian-based)
Best ratio 3.13 4.02
Worst ratio 2.49 3.50
Average 2.80 3.73
Standard deviation 0.02 0.11
Improvement percent 33%
(i.e. decompression).
Discussion The experiments obviously emphasise the eﬀectiveness of our
Gaussian approximation based lossless compression of IoTs smart meter readings
compared to other existing algorithms. This is due to the advantage of excluding
many data points and compressing only the margin space. This has been proved
by comparing the Shannon entropy before and after our approach (see ﬁg. 4.6) and
experimentally as shown in Fig. 4.8.
It is also obvious from Fig. 4.9 that our model requires less time (i.e. ≤ 2 ms vs. 4
ms) to accomplish both compression and decompression than the model that achieved
the highest compression among existing techniques. This is because our model uses
less number of stages (i.e. only six) and they use more than nine stages between
them building the Huﬀman dictionary which is not that eﬃcient in detailed numerical
datasets that have four decimal precision.
4.6.3 MD2: N-Split Model
To avoid biased results, all records of meter readings used in our Gaussian-based
model has been reused. The published results in both Table 4.5 and Fig. 4.8 are from
continuous blocks (i.e. from 15/Apr/2012 to 1/Jul/2012). For brevity in this chapter,
the results have been summarised in Table 4.7. Every column represents results from
a diﬀerent model as follows. (1) The second column portrays the CRi of using our
Gaussian-based model, and that has been proven to have the best compression ratio
among the existing size reduction algorithms in this ﬁeld. (2) The last column presents
results using our N-Split based algorithm.
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Table 4.7: our N-Split approach against the Gaussian model
Mater No (MD1: Gaussian Based) (MD2: N-Split Based)
Mater 1 3.90 4.67
Mater 2 3.91 4.61
Mater 3 3.90 4.56
Mater 4 3.89 4.52
Mater 5 3.87 4.48
Mater 6 3.85 4.45
Mater 7 3.83 4.43
Mater 8 3.82 4.42
Mater 9 3.80 4.41
Mater 10 3.78 4.42
Mater 11 3.76 4.43
Mater 12 3.73 4.45
Mater 13 3.70 4.27
Mater 14 3.65 4.39
Mater 15 3.60 4.22
Mater 16 3.54 4.14
Mater 17 3.97 4.56
Mater 18 3.91 4.57
Mater 19 3.85 4.58
Mater 20 3.80 4.58
Average 3.80 4.48
Table 4.8: our N-Split approach against the Gaussian model
Factor (MD1: Gaussian-based) (MD2: N-Split-based)
Best ratio 4.02 4.73
Worst ratio 3.50 4.09
Average 3.80 4.48
Standard deviation 0.11 0.05
Improvement percent 17%
Fig 4.10 shows a larger number of the obtained CRi from our N-Split based
algorithm compared to the Gaussian-based model. Also, Table 4.6 presents the exact
improvement factors compared with the best existing model. Additionally, Fig. 4.9
shows a comparison of the exact required time between our N-Split model and the
highest existing compressor (the Gaussian-based) as working on the same datasets
that have four decimal precision.
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readings from 20 diﬀerent meter readings using both our Gaussian based and N-Split
based models.
4.6.4 Comparison of our MD1 vs. MD2
It is very clear from the results that the Gaussian based model (MD1) achieved better
results of 3.80:1 than most of the best existing work in [9] (i.e. 2.80:1). It also requires
less time to compress and decompress (i.e. ≤ 2 ms vs. 4 ms). In addition, MD1 is a
122 CHAPTER 4. PROTECTED IOTS SIZE REDUCTION
generic model, because it relies on the Gaussian approximation function that learns
from the IoTs signal stream itself. Therefore, regardless of the signal form, MD1 can
achieve a stable CRi. On the contrary, our latest approach N-Split based model (MD2)
accomplished better CRi (i.e. 4.48) than the Gaussian-based algorithm. The required
processing time is also less (i.e. ≤ 0.6 ms vs. 2 ms). However, MD2 is dataset driven
model. In other words, there is no guarantee that we can achieve the highest CRi with
varied datasets. MD2 has been built based on the obtained datasets observations.
4.7 Chapter Summary
We introduced two novel compression algorithms for lossless IoTs smart device
readings that reduce the volume of protected readings at intermediate hops without
revealing the hidden secrets. The target of the ﬁrst generic (i.e. Gaussian-based)
model represents IoTs streams in several parameters despite the crudity of the signal.
This is successfully accomplished using the Gaussian approximation. The diﬀerence
between the approximated and the actual waveform is calculated in other words, the
compression will only be for margin space, rather than the entire stream of waveform
readings. The margin space values are ﬁnally encoded. The second target uses the
N-Split model to reduce the randomness in the IoTs streams into a smaller ﬁnite ﬁeld
to enhance repetition and avoid the ﬂoating operations round errors issues. After a
thorough evaluation under the same conditions, both of our techniques were superior
to existing models mathematically, meaning the entropy was halved; and empirically,
we achieved a ratio of 3.8:1 to 4.5:1. However, we discovered that the two new proposed
models in this chapter varied - the Gaussian-based MD1 is a generic model, whereas
the N-Split MD2 is a dataset driven model.
Chapter 5
Cloud-based Protected IoTs Size
Re-reduction
This chapter answers the fourth research question discussed in Section 1.2. Although
our privacy preserving size reduction models proposed in Chapter 4 reduce the size of
the transmitted Internet of Things (IoTs) streams signiﬁcantly, the unexpected volume
of these compressed streams required endless storage and data management space
which poses a unique challenge. Therefore, this chapter investigates the question: can
the incoming protected compressed IoTs readings be blindly re-compressed without
neither revealing their privacy nor decompressing them? Section 5.1.2 introduces the
main contributions of this chapter which is pre-processing the compressed streams
by ﬁnding their similarities. Section 5.2 brieﬂy highlights the key-related works and
why they are ineﬀective by applying them directly due to the high dissimilarities
among the streams. Section 5.3 explains in detail our novel model including the
design, similarity measurement, group interleaving, diﬀerential calculation, rotation,
dynamic run length and entropy coding. The evaluation of various characteristics
of our model (including a theoretical entropy and empirical ratio improvement,
performance and cohesion analysis among the subgroups) are introduced in Section
5.5. Section 5.7 presents detailed experimental examinations of the model, including
test bed scenarios and a wide range of protected compressed IoTs readings, its possible
reduction (i.e. re-compress) ratio, the actual IoTs protected compressed high streams
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after decompression, and a comparison with available techniques. Section 4.7 ﬁnally
summarises this chapter.
5.1 Introduction
Due to the lack of outage management, automation, poor real-time analysis and
deﬁciencies of the classic power grid of the past century, a new infrastructure
called ‘smart grid’ is recently being investigated around the world. It will
automatically collect periodic waveform readings using Phasor Measurement Units
(PMUs) every second (e.g. power consumption of a premises) and transmit them
to operational centres, such as cloud servers, using various techniques [78]. The
considerable advantages are high eﬃciency, outage management automation, accuracy
in continuous-dynamic electricity distribution and billings, and sustainability in
climate change mitigation. To that end, nations around the globe, standardisation
assemblies, companies and research entities are working around the clock to regulate
this ﬁeld.
However, the unusual volume of the periodically transmitted data from millions
of premises is posing unforeseen bandwidth and storage requirement challenges.
For instance, in 2009 and 2011, both the United States and China respectively
launched the largest electric grid modernisation investment in their history [131]. The
collected waveforms data from one of these projects called ‘Western Interconnection
Synchrophasor Program’ (WISP) that has been recently deployed, where 300 PMUs
have been distributed on the west coast of the United States for 15 months, was 100
Terabyte - in other words, more than 220 Gigabytes per day [79]. Therefore, the size
reduction of IoTs smart meter readings will have a strong impact on minimising the
required bandwidth and utilities communication infrastructure.
The proposed compression methods for readings from IoTs smart meter waveforms
can be categorised into two groups - lossy and lossless [30]. Lossy compression
is dependent on some information loss while preserving the main features of the
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waveforms signal. Consequently, the decompressed signal is somewhat dissimilar
to the original. This type of compression was acceptable in the classical grid
model - much research been done in this ﬁeld can be grouped into transformation
techniques[31, 33, 119], parametric coding [32] and mixed [121]. This is due to its
ability of achieving a higher compression ratio while losing some data. However, lossy
compression is recently not recommended for two reasons: (1) after the rise of smart
grids and the potential use of their remotely collected readings in billings and ﬁnancial
purposes, and (2) to preserve the privacy and authenticity of the transmitted readings,
recent models are utilising steganography to conceal the private information randomly
inside these readings [2, 3]. Therefore, losing any bit of these readings is unacceptable.
5.1.1 Motivations
Contrary to lossy, lossless compression is obligated to recover the same waveform
signal as the original with zero loss. Due to these restrictions, some work was done in
this category, such as in [8, 112, 120] . However, according to a recent state-of-the-art
study [30], this path is far from being as mature, in relation to image, voice and
video lossless compressions. Surprisingly, all this research was undertaken to compress
the transmitted streams from the premises to the operation centres, such as public
or private cloud servers, but little attention has been paid to the multi-incoming
compressed streams after their arrival. Especially, due to some regulations, these
streams should be stored for a certain number of years. This means there is an
exponential increase in the cost of storage space and an increased burden of available
data management.
One of the main limitations for any lossless compression is that less similarity
in waveform readings means less likelihood of compression. In information theory,
the mathematical benchmark called entropy (i.e. the minimum number of bits
required to represent a value after compression) (see 5.5). The entropy level relies
on the redundancy among the samples. This becomes worse in the compressed smart
waveform meter readings, because the similarity is already exploited. Therefore,
126 CHAPTER 5. CLOUD-BASED PROTECTED IOTS SIZE RE-REDUCTION
Normal readings collected at smart
meter then IEEE standard 
compressionprocess are 
applied before sending 
the data via public
 network.
Single compressed 
Smart meters stream. 
Operation Centres
Various Cloud-Based Servers
The similarity of the multi-incoming compressed
streams is exploited by using a similarity measurment 
mechanism then they are interleaved and their size 
will be reduced.
2 ways Shared Spectrum
  End-point
Smart Meters
  End-point
Smart Meters
  End-point
Smart Meters
Suburb X Suburb Y Suburb Z
Single compressed 
Smart meters stream. 
Single compressed 
Smart meters 
stream.
Figure 5.1: The main scenario of our proposed technique where the multi-incoming
compressed streams are categorised by their similarity in features followed by
interleaving and lossless size reduction.
the main question that drives this chapter is, can the multi-incoming IoTs
smart meter protected compressed streams be re-compressed? In other
words, can the size of received compressed streams be reduced without
decompression?
5.1.2 Contributions
In this chapter, a new lossless compression algorithm for waveform IoTs readings of
already compressed data is proposed. The main target is pre-processing the protected
compressed streams in such a way as to improve the theoretical entropy and invest
it. This is eﬀectively achieved using K-means clustering as similarity measurement
to classify the compressed streams into subgroups. The streams in every subgroup
has been interleaved followed by the ﬁrst derivative to reduce the values and increase
the redundancy. After that, rotation mechanisms have been applied to rearrange
the readings in a more consecutive format. Finally, Dynamic-Run Length (D-RLE)
and entropy coding are performed. We proved that it is possible to re-compress the
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already compressed streams up to 50% of their size without privacy disclosure by
re-compressing nor with losing any bits. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
other work that tackles this issue in the ﬁeld of IoTs.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 summarises the relevant
work. Section 5.3 introduces our algorithm in diﬀerent stages. Then, evaluation of
the various characteristics of our technique is introduced in Section 5.5. Section 5.7
discusses our performed experiments and the obtained results. Section 5.8 ﬁnally
draws our conclusions.
5.2 Related Work
Most of the existing research was conducted on gathering waveforms readings targeted
on lossy compression. This is because (i) the samples were not being directly
transmitted and utilised for crucial purposes, such as real-time diagnoses and billings
in the classical grid system, and (2) the eﬃciency of the transformation technique
called ‘wavelet transform’ that assists in representing waveform signals in a few values
(i.e. with losing some bits from every sample). The lossy compression studies can be
classiﬁed based on the techniques used into transformation, parametric coding and
mixed.
As with the work of Santoso et al. [31], transformation models used by employing
discrete wavelet decomposition to identify most of the signal energy in low-frequency
coeﬃcients by using dbX and allowing others to be neglected. Further work was
undertaken using various wavelet families such as B-Spline [116] and Sluntlet [115].
Secondly, parametric coding models, such as the work of Michel et al. [32], utilised
damped sinusoids models to elicit the main features of the signal before compression.
Finally, mixed transformation and parametric models, such as the work proposed by
Moises et al. [121], employed fundamental harmonic and transient coding together.
Contrarily, studies in lossless compression is sparse due to the imposed constraints
and the nature of waveforms readings. The lossless compression can be categorised
based on the technique utilised into the dictionary, entropy and mixed based models.
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Figure 5.2: An overview for the steps undertaken in our model where the similarity
measurement technique is used to split the compressed streams. Then, the grouping
and size reduction steps are performed in parallel to exploit the power of the cloud.
Dictionary-based techniques essentially rely on general compressors (e.g. GZIP,
ZIP and LZO) where a dictionary is constructed, and more frequent tokens will be
represented in fewer bits, whereas more bits are assigned to less frequent samples.
For instance, Omer and Dogan [7] employed the Lempel-Ziv to compress a stream
of waveforms readings. The accomplished compression ratio was 2.5:1 bin-to-bin.
However, dictionary algorithms are mainly designed for letters with English characters
where the number of choices is limited. This is unsuitable for waveforms signals due
to their ﬂoating-point nature. This means every real number has thousands of forms
because of its ﬂoating values.
Entropy-based techniques are mainly statistical models - these are designed based
on screening the probability of every token within a stream and assigning fewer bits
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for a higher probability and vice versa. For instance, the work of K. Jan et al. [9]
where Arithmetic Coding (AC) was employed to replace the input tokens with a single
ﬂoating-point value. The accomplished compression ratio was 2.6:1. Z. Dahai et al.
[5] also introduced a model that enhances Huﬀman coding by pre-processing the data
utilising higher order delta modulation. The enhancement went from 1.7 to 2.3:1.
Moreover, J. Tate [8] recently proposed a model that utilises Golomb-Rice coding
after pre-processing the samples with several methods, such as frequency compensated
diﬀerence. The accomplished compression ratio was 2.8:1.
Mixed techniques are more sophisticated algorithms using both dictionary and
statistical mechanisms. This permits exploitation of both the frequency of repetition
and its probability within a stream of samples. For instance, K. Jan et al. [113]
proposed a model that enhances the LZMA algorithm to minimise the redundancy
in waveforms readings. This is achieved by utilising prediction techniques based
on diﬀerential encoding after optimising the interval selection. The accomplished
compression was 2.6:1. K. Jan and T. Tomas [9] also proposed a model that enhances
BZIP2 by employing an eﬃcient block-sorting Burrow-Wheeler algorithm and delta
modulation. The achieved compression ratio was 2.9:1.
All the above models were conducted on original stream readings and so they
exploited the existing high redundancy probabilities among them. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no existing lossless compression work that targeted
already compressed streams.
5.3 Methodology
The main challenge that drives this model is whether multi-incoming compressed
streamed be re-compressed? Various of the existing lossless compression algorithms
(based on Huﬀman, Lempel-Ziv or AC) have been directly applied on several
compressed streams obtained from Chapter 4 (see Figs. 5.8 and 5.9). The
compression ratio was very poor from 0.5 to 1.1 due to the streams that were
already compressed. Consequently, the only possible way available is to exploit
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the similarities of these compressed streams and design an interlocking friendly
compression algorithm. Therefore, K-means clustering has been used as a similarity
measurement to classify the compressed streams into subsets. The streams in every
subset has been interlocked followed by the ﬁrst derivative to reduce the space of values
and increase the redundancy. After that, two rotation stages have been applied to
rearrange the readings in a more consecutive format before employing the developed
D-RLE. Finally, entropy coding is performed.
5.3.1 Similarity Measurement - K-means
Based on our preliminary results, mixing all compressed streams will result in a poor
re-compression ratio due to the dissimilarity in streams characteristics which increase
the noise. Therefore, a well-known unsupervised learning technique called K-means
[132] is used as a similarity measurement to classify n observations intoK groups. The
main idea is that, let’s assume (x1, x2, ..., xn) are the n incoming compressed streams
where each stream is a d-dimensional vector. K-means will partitions the n streams
into K(≤ n) groups (G1, G2, .., Gk) by summation of distance functions of each point
in the group to K centre. The objective is depicted in Eq 5.1
k∑
i=1
σi∑
j=1
(‖xi − μj‖)2 (5.1)
where σi is the data points in the i
th group, μj is the centre of the i
th group and
‖xi − μj‖ is the Euclidean distance between xi and μj .
The algorithm started by selecting cluster centres μj . The distance between each
reading point xi and μj is then calculated. Next, the reading point xi is assigned
to μj based on the best minimum distance. After that, a new cluster centre μj is
recalculated as shown in Eq. 5.2
μi =
(
1
σi
) σi∑
j=1
xi (5.2)
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where σi represents the reading points in i
th cluster. The distance between xi and μ
is then recalculated. The assignment process will be repeated (see Eq 5.3), until no
further data points need to be reassigned.
Gi =
{
xp : ‖xp −mi‖2 ≤ ‖xp −mj‖2 ∀j , 1 ≤ j ≤ k
}
(5.3)
The most crucial part is how centroid points are chosen. Therefore, to avoid the
exponential time complexity of standard algorithm, the idea proposed by Arthur and
Vassilvitskii [133] has been used by utilising a heuristic to ﬁnd the centroid seeds for
the algorithm as follows. Only one random centre μ is uniformly chosen from among
the readings. Then, the distance between xi and the closest centre (i.e. chosen one)
is computed. Next, one of readings is chosen to be the new centre μ using a weighted
distribution probability (see Eq. 5.4). These steps are repeated until k centres are
chosen.
d2 (xi, μp)∑
{j,xj∈p} (xj , μp)
(5.4)
where p is the group of all observations nearest to centroid. μp and xi are
belonging to p.
5.3.2 Parallel Size Reduction
After completing the similarity measurement process, each resultant group is combined
and its size will be reduced using the following steps. These steps are not dependent
and so designed to run in parallel to exploit the power of cloud.
Readings Interlocking
Let’s assume Gi is one of the resultant groups. It has 1, 2, ..., n vectors that represents
multiple compressed streams as shown in Eq. 5.5.
Gm,n =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a1,1 a1,2 · · · a1,n
b2,1 b2,2 · · · b2,n
...
...
. . .
...
cm,1 cm,2 · · · cm,n
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(5.5)
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Therefore, these streams will be overlapped to exploit the similar features (see Eq.
5.6).
a(1, 1), b(2, 1), ..., c(m, 1) (5.6)
To avoid any sharp exponential deviations in the overlapped readings and increase
the redundancy, the ﬁrst derivative is applied as shown Eq 5.7.
fd = [Υ(2)−Υ(1)Υ(3)−Υ()2)...Υ(Λ)−Υ(Λ− 1)] (5.7)
where Υ represents data points in the combined stream an Λ is the latest value.
Rotation
Rotation Stage 1: Based on experimental observations, the resultant values,
after applying the ﬁrst derivative, reﬂects that there is high redundancy, but in
a very scattered format that impedes any size reduction attempts. Consequently,
Burrow-Wheeler Transform (BWT) is employed to reshuﬄe the samples resulting in
a long consecutive and identical sequence. Originally, BWT was proposed by Michael
Burrows and David Wheeler [124] to rearrange text streams into a format that boosts
its compressibility by utilising mechanisms, such as Move-To-Front (MTF) and Run
Length (RLE). The beauty of this algorithm is that zero additional overheads were
needed to reverse it. Basically, the data (i.e. 1 to n) is rotated lexicographically. Lets
assume Ω is the textual or numerical of a symbols group form (i.e. numerical in our
algorithm) to be compressed.
Ω = Ω1,Ω2, ...,Ωn (5.8)
Iteratively, the vector Ω is rotated to the left which results in a new 2D matrix
called β, as shown in Eq. 5.9
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β =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
Ω1 Ω2 Ω3 · · · Ωn
Ω2 Ω3 · · · Ωn Ω1
Ω3 · · · Ωn Ω1 Ω2
...
...
. . .
...
Ωn Ω1 Ω2 · · · Ωn − 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(5.9)
From Eq. 5.9, it is obvious that each rotation of Ω is represented as a row in β.
These rows are then sorted in ascending order which will generate a new version of
the matrix called β˜. Only the last column C of β and the original block index I are
kept to be used for retrieving the original order.
For a clear understanding, a portion of the resultant ﬁrst derivative values are
presented in Table 5.1. These samples have been replaced by characters (i.e. represent
Ω) for the sake of simplicity. β is generated by rotating Ω for n (i.e. elements number)
times as shown in Eq. 5.10
β =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
$ a b a a b a
a $ a b a a b
b a $ a b a a
a b a $ a b a
a a b a $ a b
b a a b a $ a
a b a a b a $
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(5.10)
where $ represents the start of data. The rows of β will then be sorted which
results in a new form β˜ as depicted in Eq. 5.11
134 CHAPTER 5. CLOUD-BASED PROTECTED IOTS SIZE RE-REDUCTION
Table 5.1: Conversion from numeric to characters
ω 309 501 309 309 501 309
Ch a b a a b a
β˜ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
a $ a b a a b
a a b a $ a b
a b a a b a $
a b a $ a b a
b a a b a $ a
b a $ a b a a
$ a b a a b a
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(5.11)
The last column C and the index I (e.g. 3 in this example) represent the output.
C and I are the crucial parameters used by the decoder to recover the original
form. This is achieved by building a temporary n×n matrix (where n is the elements
number) and C represents its last column. By sorting this column, the ﬁrst column
is retrieved. Next, all successive pairs are recovered using those two columns and the
resultant matrix is like β˜. Subsequently, by using the index I, retrieving the original
form will be easy.
Rotation Stage 2: Despite the resultant BWT values precisely gathering
identical symbols in the long runs, these values still sharply vary from very low (e.g.
20 and 21) to much higher ﬁgures (e.g. 4000 to 6000). Consequently, MTF transform
is employed to boost the inﬂuence of any entropy based encoder (e.g. Arithmetic
Coding) to achieve the highest compression rate. MTF is a lightweight mechanism
introduced by Ryabko [125] to enhance the low values (e.g. close to zero) probability
while minimising the high values in a given list of data. The basic idea is that the data
list symbols are substituted by their positions in a unique list. Therefore, the long
sequential identical symbols will be substituted by as many zeros, whereas a posterior
(i.e. not regularly used) symbols will be exchanged for larger values.
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Table 5.2: MTF of L = [b, b, a, a, a, a, a, a] and u = [a, b]
Li u ϑ
b a, b 1
b b, a 0
a b, a 1
a a, b 0
a a, b 0
a a, b 0
a a, b 0
a a, b 0
Let’s assume L is an obtained list from the BWT process and u is the unique
symbols of L (i.e. u ∈ L). Then, the summary of MTF process can be depicted in
the following steps. (a) L is used to populate u. (b) Every item Li of vector L is
substituted as its the symbol numbers preceding it in u. (c) Latter output is built
as a list ϑ by collecting the resultant codes of step 2. The recovery process is the
opposite of these steps.
For a clear illustration, assume the BWT resultant list L = [b, b, a, a, a, a, a, a] and
its unique list u = [a, b] (see Table 5.2). The initial token L0 is b, and it is preceded by
one symbol in u. Therefore, the digit one is produced in ϑ and the symbol b is moved
to the front of u = [b, a]. The next token L1 is b, which is the ﬁrst in u, and so the
produced value is zero with no need to update u. These steps are continued until the
last token is reached, so the resultant output will look like: ϑ = [1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0].
Dynamic Run Length
Hypothetically, the MTF output includes a series of identical sequential tokens.
Consequently, to exploit this fact, a simple mechanism called Run Length (RLE)
[126] is employed before the entropy encoding. RLE focuses on substituting the
similar consecutive symbols by their count. Allow s to represent a symbol appearing
as n in sequential times in a vector V . The n cases are then substituted by ns.
The consecutive n appearances of the symbol are called ‘run length’. For instance,
the sequential zeros in ϑ = [1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] will be ϑ = [1, 0, 1, 0#5]. However,
the observation was that a naive implantation of RLE is not always useful and may
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Figure 5.3: Graphical representation of the consistency among various compressed
streams combined (or K-means) clusters. Obviously, six and eight clusters are the
best in terms of the cohesion.
increase rather than decrease. This is due to its static nature where each consecutive
symbol is replaced even in the case if no repeated tokens occurs. RLE is improved to
be a dynamic without the extra overhead based on the thresholds t = t1, t2, .., tn that
monitor the consecutive occurrences of the symbols in a given vector. Only one bit is
added at the beginning of the resultant encoded stream to indicate whether D-RLE
encoding process was employed or not.
Entropy Coding
To achieve the highest possible compression ratio, an entropy coding mechanism called
Arithmetic Coding (AC) is ultimately employed in our model. AC is a widely-known
variable length statistical coding by which repeatedly occurred values are represented
with fewer bits and less frequently appearing tokens are symbolised with higher bits
number [126]. AC proved its superiority in most respects to other well-known entropy
algorithms such as Huﬀman coding. This is due to its succinct representation of
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the entire message in a single value as a fraction n where (0.0 ≤ n < 1.0), whereas
other algorithms working on separating the input into isolated component tokens and
substituting each with a unique code.
The general idea is that after choosing a speciﬁc interval, the symbols list will be
scanned and based on its tokens probabilities the ultimate interval will be narrowed.
AC core steps are summarised as follows.
1. The current interval is speciﬁed as (0,1).
2. The following two steps are repeated for each token Si in the data vector.
a) The current interval is divided into subintervals under the condition that
their sizes are proportional to the tokens probabilities.
b) A subinterval for Si is chosen which will represent the new current interval.
3. After processing the entire data vector, the result should be any value that
distinctly identiﬁes the present interval (i.e. any value in the current interval).
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Table 5.3: The message m probability distribution
Symbol Probability Accumulative range
a 0.2 (0.0,0.2)
b 0.3 (0.2,0.5)
c 0.1 (0.5,0.6)
d 0.2 (0.6,0.8)
e 0.1 (0.8,0.9)
f 0.1 (0.9,1.0)
Interestingly, the deeper scanned values in the data vectors are, the smaller current
interval is obtained. The resultant output is a single measure called ‘tag value’ that
does not include the individual tokens codes.
To demonstrate the AC coding mechanism, let’s assume that an entire message
M has a probability distribution as given in Table 5.3. For brevity, a fraction of that
message m˜ = (b, a, c, c, f) is encoded. The probability boundary is between (0, 1). To
begin with, due to the occurrence of symbol b′, the tag value should be in the range
(0.2, 0.5). After that, the token ‘a′ is appeared, so the present interval between (0, 0.2)
that will be used to calculate the lower and upper appeared in the equations 5.12 and
5.13.
wn = ln−1 + (wn−1 − ρn−1)× Fx(xn−1) (5.12)
ρn = wn−1 + (ρn−1 − ρn−1)× Fx(x) (5.13)
w and ρ represent the lower and upper boundaries of the nth token. Fx is the frequency
accumulation. The resultant tag values of symbols sequence ‘ba’ are (0.2, 0.26). This
will accumulatively continue for the full message. The ultimate tag values output
has been summed up in Fig. 5.4. The average of both the ﬁnal upper and lower
tags wn+ρn2 =
0.23354+0.2336
2 = 0.23357 represents the compressed value and will be
transformed into binary.
The decoder side requires both the average value and the message probabilities.
Subsequently, it proceeds through similar steps but in an inverse manner where the
probability accumulation is used to ﬁnd the symbols.
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5.4 Decompression and Recovery
The recovery process is almost similar to the steps stated above, but in an opposite
manner. It begins by Arithmetic decoding followed by D-RLE if needed based on the
conditions mentioned in Section 5.3.2. Then, MTF and BWT are applied respectively.
The output represents the derivative values and so their inverse process is employed
to reconstruct the actual symbols. These symbols are the compressed streams in an
interlocking way. From that, they are disunited to their single compressed streams
and so their original format is recovered in a lossless format.
Fig. 5.7 in Section 5.7 presents instances of various compressed streams before
and after the size reduction process which clearly proves that the compressed streams
are totally retrieved with zero loss.
5.5 Evaluation
Various matrices are used to examine the eﬀectiveness of our lossless size reduction
model of the multi-incoming protecting compressed streams on cloud level from both
theoretical and experimental angles.
5.5.1 Silhouette Measurement
To validate the coherence of the used similarity measurement clustering techniques,
a mathematical model called Silhouette is used. It is a graphical representation
technique that was proposed by Peter J. Rousseeuw [134] that proves consistency
within data clusters and clearly reﬂects the correlation of the objects within that
group. The Silhouette model produces a value in the range of −1 to 1 in which the
higher the value, the more the object is well matched to that group and vice versa.
For clarity, let’s assume n vectors are clustered into K groups using any similarity
measurement model, for instance K-means. For each group G, x(i) represents the
average dissimilarity (i.e. distance ) of i within the group the lesser the value, the
better the matching. Also, let y(i) be the lowest dissimilarity of i within the group.
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Figure 5.5: Comparison between the consistency among the clusters by changing
two parameters. These are the number of clusters and the similarity measurement
technique (i.e. K-means vs Rand).
Hereby, silhouette s can be deﬁned as follows.
s(i) =
y(i)− x(i)
max{x(i), y(i)} (5.14)
s(i) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− x(i)y(i) , if x(i) < y(i)
0, if x(i) = y(i)
x(i)
y(i) − 1 if x(i) > y(i)
(5.15)
From 5.14 and 5.15, it can be derived that −1 ≤ s(i) ≤ 1.
5.5.2 Theoretical Entropy
The so-called entropy of a signal in the information theory ﬁeld represents the lowest
bit-rate (the optimum compression is assumed) needed for transmitting this signal
[127]. Consequently, to monitor the inﬂuence of pre-processing the compressed streams
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in our model, the theoretical entropy is measured for every smart grid compressed
stream before and after employing our model. After that, quantitative calculation
comparison is performed between the theoretical entropy and the accomplished size
reduction ratio.
Let’s assume a compressed incoming stream consisting of the symbol points
d[1], d[2], ..., d[N ]. The optimum likelihood entropy in bits is calculated as
H(d)  −
∑
i∈R(d)
p̂(i) log2(p̂(i)) (5.16)
p̂(i)  1
N
N∑
n=1
δi(d[n]) (5.17)
δi(d[n]) 
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
1, if d[n] = i
0, else
(5.18)
where p̂(i) is the experimental probability of i ∈ R and R(d) represents the range
of d.
The smallest entropy (or optimum case) happens when all d symbols are equal,
which results in Hmin = −1 log2(1) = 0.
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Figure 5.6: Comparison between the average entropy calculated from the compressed
streams before and after aggregation and processing.
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On the other hand, the worst-case (or maximum entropy) happens when each
symbol in R occurs at the similar frequency 1/R, in which |R| reﬂects the original
elements in R (see Eq. 5.19).
Hmax = −
∑
i∈R
1
|R| log2(
1
|R|) = log2 |R|. (5.19)
5.6 Experimental Ratio
The Compression Ratio (CRi) is the essential benchmark to empirically measure any
proposed compression model. Lets symbolise the original compressed streams block O
(i.e. its unit in bit or byte) and the resultant re-compressed symbols R. Consequently,
the experimental CRi in the results section is measured and deﬁned in Eq. 5.20.
CRi =
O
R
(5.20)
To produce the multi-compressed streams dataset, a widely-known leading power
quality storage standard for electric waveforms power system utilised in most of the
smart grids, is called the Power Quality Data Interchange Format (PQDIF) deﬁned
by the IEEE1159 working group [128], has been employed. Every reading represented
as 16 bit and the typical suggested block size used is about 1500 readings. Our generic
Gaussian-based size reduction explained in Chapter 4 is employed here and has proven
to give the best lossless compression ratio.
5.7 Implementations
5.7.1 Datasets
The Laboratory for Advanced System Software collected and published a detailed
smart meters datasets as a part of project called ‘Smart’ [75, 76]. These datasets have
been thoroughly used in our experiments. The datasets entries represent a periodical
readings per minutes from three houses for more than three months. The entries can be
classiﬁed into: (i) power consumption as watts and heat index, and (ii) environmental
5.7. IMPLEMENTATIONS 143
0 25 50
×104
0
2
4
6
8
0 25 50
×104
0
2
4
6
8
0 25 50
×104
0
2
4
6
8
0 25 50
×104
0
2
4
6
8
0 25 50
×104
0
2
4
6
8
0 25 50
×104
0
2
4
6
8
0 25 50
×104
0
2
4
6
8
0 25 50
×104
0
2
4
6
8
(b) Recovered form of compressed streams after disaggregation and decompression.
(a) Original Multi-incoming compressed streams (built in bytes).
Figure 5.7: Four examples of compressed watts consumptions readings collected from
diﬀerent homes: (a) Direct plot of single compressed streams form, and (b) plot of
these streams after disaggregation and recovery.
features as inside and outside temperature, inside and outside humidity, and wind
chill. Additionally, a detailed electricity consumption (i.e. per minutes) from about
400 anonymous premises for (24× 30× 3) hours is provided. According to the spatial
and temporal aggregations deﬁnition, these symbols are temporal due to their separate
periodical collection from every individual premise by equipping it with a smart meter.
Our generic Gaussian based compression (see Chapter 4) is applied on every
single stream, to generate the multi-incoming compressed streams as explained in
the evaluation in Section 5.5. The compressed streams are laid out as the bed-test in
all our experiments.
5.7.2 Experiments and Results
Our prime executed experiments will be done at the operation centres or cloud level
after receiving an overwhelming amount of protected IoTs compressed streams from
huge number of remote end-points. The experiments can be categorised into (a)
similarity measurements, interleaving and size reduction processes, and (b) an original
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Figure 5.8: Compression ratio after re-compressing single incoming streams directly
using various well-known lossless compressors both dictionary-based (Lempel-Ziv [7])
and entropy-based (Huﬀman [5] and AC[9])
.
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Figure 5.9: Average compression ratio after re-compression the multi-incoming
compressed streams all together which was very poor. This is because enforcing all
together will result in a high noise.
format recovery and disuniting. Both categories are designed in such a way that can
be done in parallel to take advantage of cloud power.
To obtain unbiased outcomes, all compressed streams mentioned above have been
employed in our model. Identically, many well-known lossless compression algorithms
have been applied directly on the multi-compressed streams as shown in Figs 5.8 and
5.9 to accurately provide a clear comparison and prove that these streams can not be
re-compressed using traditional models.
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For brevity in this chapter, the results have been summarised as follows. Firstly,
Fig 5.8 and 5.9 show the exact CRi (0.5 to 1.3) of single and collective (i.e. all together)
multi-incoming compressed streams after applying many-known lossless algorithms
from both entropy and dictionary ﬁelds such as Huﬀman [5], Arithmetic Coding [9]
and Lempel-Ziv [7]. Secondly, Fig 5.3 highlights the examination process of our
similarity measurement technique, K-means, to select the best K number (i.e. 6
and 8 are the best in the case of 56 streams) using the Silhouette benchmark. Also,
Fig. 5.5 reﬂects the superiority as a graphical comparison (i.e. using Silhouette
benchmark) between our similarity measurement using K-means against an agnostic
random grouping. Thirdly, Fig 5.10 emphasises a possible enhancement on the CRi
level by changing various parameters in our algorithm, such as static RLE, D-RLE,
agnostic similarity measurement, and K-means similarity measurement in relation to
the number of clusters. Each of which these groups contain 56 compressed streams.
Fourthly, Fig 5.11 shows the average of CRi ratio obtained from the above four groups
(i.e. 8 K-means clusters + D-RLE is the best). Fifth, Table 5.4 presents the exact CRi
achieved from the four groups shown in Fig 5.11. Finally, Fig 5.7 shows an example
of a plot of various original compressed streams before and after the aggregation and
size reduction process.
5.7.3 Discussion
It is obvious, from the experiments, that it is unlikely to re-compress the
multi-incoming compressed streams by simply applying known algorithms. This is
because the redundancy in these streams is already exploited and re-applying the
same algorithms will have little eﬀect if not worse (revisit Fig 5.8 and 5.9 ). On the
contrary, imposing all compressed streams together is also not useful due to the huge
dissimilarity in their features. In other words, forcing all streams together will boost
the noise and, therefore, decrease the chances of a size reduction.
By exploiting the possible similarities in various compressed streams using
similarity measurement techniques, our model achieved up to 2:1 size reduction level.
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Figure 5.10: 4 groups of achieved re-compression ratio of multi-incoming compressed
streams by changing the similarity measurement technique, number of clusters and
RLE. Every group contains 56 compressed streams.
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Figure 5.11: The average of re-compression ratio of the four groups examined in
Fig.5.10 which shows the best combination of our technique parameters.
This means every 1 Gigabyte byte can be reduced to 500 Megabytes. This has been
emphasised theoretically by comparing the entropy before and after our technique (see
Fig. 4.6) and experimentally as presented in Fig. 5.10.
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Table 5.4: Compression ratio
No Cluster No Static RLE (Rand) Static RLE (Kmeans) D-RLE (Rand) D-RLE (Kmeans)
1 2 1.03 0.40 1.30 0.75
2 2 1.08 0.31 1.36 0.73
3 2 1.12 1.46 1.31 1.77
4 2 1.01 1.52 1.30 1.73
5 4 1.07 1.53 .35 1.81
6 4 1.10 1.38 1.30 1.76
7 4 1.18 1.53 1.33 1.81
8 4 1.12 1.63 1.31 1.83
9 6 1.08 1.59 1.39 1.90
10 6 1.12 1.43 1.33 1.90
11 6 1.20 1.55 1.35 1.98
12 6 1.17 1.67 1.33 1.98
13 8 1.05 1.69 1.40 2.11
14 8 1.16 1.55 1.44 2.13
15 8 1.23 1.67 1.35 2.10
16 8 1.29 1.77 1.42 2.19
17 10 1.10 1.63 1.36 1.94
18 10 1.15 1.43 1.40 1.95
19 10 1.21 1.60 1.38 2.04
20 10 1.19 1.70 1.40 2.03
21 12 1.04 1.51 1.31 1.85
22 12 1.11 1.41 1.33 1.89
23 12 1.20 1.58 1.36 1.97
24 12 1.10 1.66 1.42 2.04
Avg 1.13 1.55 1.36 1.92
5.8 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, a novel lossless parallel compression algorithm was introduced to prove
the possibility of reducing the size of already compressed waveform IoTs readings. The
target was through pre-processing the data to enhance the entropy. This is successfully
achieved by employing K-means clustering as similarity measurements to classify the
compressed streams into subsets to reduce the noise of dissimilar compressed streams.
The tokens of every subset have been interlocked followed by the ﬁrst derivative to
reduce the space of values and boost the redundancy. After that, rotation mechanisms
have been applied to rearrange the symbols in a more consecutive format before
employing dynamic RLE. Finally, entropy coding is performed. Both mathematical
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and empirical experiments proved the possibility of enhancing the entropy, which
almost reduced by half, and the resultant size reduction (i.e. up to 50%). To the best
of our knowledge, there is no other work that tackles this issue in the ﬁeld of IoTs
streams.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this chapter, a holistic overview summary is presented, concentrating on the core
thesis challenges and the research questions derived from these challenges. The main
contributions achieved by answering the research questions are summarised along with
the core ﬁndings of this thesis. Section 6.1 highlights the main research goals and
restates the research questions. The contributions are reintroduced in Section 6.2.
Section 6.3 discusses some of the interesting ﬁndings of our research. Finally, Section
6.4 highlights the potential paths that can be followed to further develop using this
thesis work.
6.1 Research Aims
The Internet of Things (IoTs) sensor streams have become a vital category upon which
many applications rely. For example, smart meters collecting household power and
gas consumptions periodically every second and then transmit them wirelessly through
various channels and public hops to the operation centres [17]. For the unprecedented
volume of large streams and for real-time analysis, the operation centres are employing
third-party cloud servers where various entities process the data on a real-time basis
for billings and dynamic managements. There are many crucial projects that are
working towards making the world a more convenient place, such as with climate
change, transportation, healthcare and many more. Despite the clear beneﬁts of these
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applications, they pose the unique challenges [18], such as how can we have a suitable
balance between: (1) guaranteeing the streams security (i.e. privacy, authenticity and
integrity) while not hindering the direct operations on those streams, (2) handling the
data management issues, such as the size during the transmission and storage. These
challenges become more complicated in cases where the streams should reside on the
third-party cloud servers.
Therefore, the main targets of this thesis are to introduce congruous algorithms
that ensure the security (i.e. privacy, authenticity and integrity) of dynamic-high IoTs
streams in the cloud environment, while providing better data management (as in size
reduction). On the other hand, they allow direct operations on third-party servers
without security disclosure.
To overcome the above unique challenges and achieve the stated goals, we formed
the following research questions:
• RQ-1. How can the privacy of the sensitive information and the
authenticity of the transmitted IoTs sensor streams be ensured
without hindering direct operations at intermediate hops or cloud?
• RQ-2. How can any alteration to the transmitted information
be detected and recovered without hindering direct operations at
intermediate hops or cloud?
• RQ-3. How can the size of the protected transmitted streams which
contains the encrypted hidden information be blindly reduced without
any security disclosure?
• RQ-4. Can the multi-incoming protected compressed IoTs sensor
streams be re-reduced without privacy or authenticity disclosure?
6.2 Research Contributions
To address the research questions explained in Section 1.2, and to bridge the gap
between security techniques and data management models, this thesis introduced a
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novel framework that consists of several new techniques to the area of high IoTs
(sensors and smart meters) data streams. The detail list of these contributions is as
follows.
• Privacy preserving of conﬁdential information and authenticity of
gathered IoTs streams while not hindering direct operations on the
data
To ensure the privacy of conﬁdential information and the authenticity of the
transmitted readings at the same time, steganography is employed to embed
the sensitive information randomly inside the transmitted readings. The main
merit of steganography is that it adds another layer of security, requires much
lower processing capabilities without changing or increasing the form of original
data. However, steganography has two main issues: (1) authentication problem
where the adversaries can retrieve the embedded information once they know
of its existence, and (2) capacity and distortion issue on the source used for
hiding. Therefore, to overcome the ﬁrst limitation, two mathematical security
models were designed and implemented for employing the key to (1) encrypt the
conﬁdential information, (2) shuﬄe the coeﬃcients into a random hierarchy,
and (3) randomly generate an order used in the embedding process. To
broaden hiding capacity, insertion of the private information and to maximise
the randomisation, two signal processing techniques (i.e. the Walsh-Hadamard
and Discrete Wavelet Transform) were exploited to transform the readings from
their spatial to the frequency domain to classify and gather most of the readings
features sensitivity in a few coeﬃcients allowing others to be freely utilised to
embed more data. Two new models are proposed in this chapter that vary
in their simplicity (Walsh-Hadamard based stenography) vs. security (Wavelet
based stenography). Both techniques are neither increasing nor changing the
form of the transmitted readings. This means only data owners can recover the
seal, whereas others are just monitoring the protected form of the IoTs readings.
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• Manipulation detection, remedy, and recovery while not hindering
direct operations on the data nor changing the form of the readings
Error detection and correction algorithms (BCH) is employed with
steganography to guarantee a strong level of reliability and integrity of the
transmitted protected data. To conquer the main issue of error detection and
correction codes that is increasing or changing the original data form, a novel
hybrid model that combines advanced steganographic (stego) algorithms with
error detection and correction techniques (BCH syndrome codes) have been
designed. This allows us to (a) detect and recover any loss from the hidden
conﬁdential information without privacy disclosure, and (b) remedy the received
normal readings by employing the corrected version of the secret hidden data.
To randomise hiding process, minimise the distortion and boost the detection
or recovery, a three-dimensional (3D) wavelet is used to decompose normal IoTs
readings into a set of coeﬃcients. To strengthen the security, a key is utilised to
generate a randomly selected 3D order used in the hiding process. To accurately
measure the detection and recovery capabilities, random noise levels that mimic
the real world scenario in a wireless environment are applied to the transmitted
readings. The recovered sensitive information and stego readings are extensively
measured using BER, PRD and RMS. It was clear from the experiments that
our technique has robust recovery capabilities (i.e. BER =0, PRD < 1% and
RMS < 0.01%). This was achieved without increasing nor changing the form of
the transmitted IoTs protected readings.
• Hidden information preserving IoTs streams size reduction without
privacy and authenticity disclosure
Two novel lossless compression algorithms of IoTs streams were introduced.
These algorithms were created to ensure the reduction of the volume of protected
readings at intermediate hops without disclosing hidden secrets. The ﬁrst
Gaussian-based model target is representing IoTs sensor readings in a few
parameters regardless of the irregularity in the signal. This is successfully
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accomplished by employing Gaussian approximation. The margin between
the approximated and the actual waveform is measured. In other words, the
compression will be for margin space only rather than the entire stream of
waveform readings. The margin space values are ﬁnally reduced. The second
model target (N-Split) is minimising the randomness in the IoTs streams into
a smaller, ﬁnite ﬁeld to enhance duplications and avoid the ﬂoating operations
round errors issues. After a thorough evaluation, under the same conditions,
both our techniques were superior to existing models mathematically, meaning
the entropy was halved and empirically, meaning the achieved ratio was 3.8:1 to
4.5:1.
• Cloud-based hidden features preserving IoTs compressed streams size
re-reduction
This research answers the question: can the compressed, multiple incoming
readings of protected IoTs sensors be re-compressed? The answer was yes
by pre-processing the compressed streams in such a way that improves the
theoretical entropy and exploits it. This is successfully achieved by using
similarity measurement, such as using K-means clustering, to classify the
compressed streams into subgroups. The streams in every resultant subgroup
have been interleaved followed by the ﬁrst derivative to minimise the values
and increase the redundancy. After that, two-steps rotations were applied to
rearrange the readings in a consecutive format before applying dynamic run
length. Finally, entropy coding is performed. Both mathematical and empirical
experiments proved a signiﬁcant improvement in the entropy of the compressed
streams (almost reduced by half) and the resultant compression ratio is more
than 50%. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other work that tackles this
issue in the IoTs smart devices streams ﬁeld.
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6.3 Key Findings
This thesis discovers several key ﬁndings that can be summarised in the following
manner:
1. The continuity of the IoTs sensor streams represents a crucial feature that
renders them appropriate to be a credible host for other information. Therefore,
IoTs continuous smart device (e.g. meter or sensor) streams have been employed
as a host for sensitive information. It has also been proven from the ﬁndings
that the resultant protected IoTs streams can still be directly utilised in their
preserved form without revealing the hidden information contained within them.
2. Signal processing techniques, such as the Fast Walsh-Hadamard Transform and
Discrete Wavelet, showed very promising results in terms of boosting the hiding
randomisation and reducing the distortion impact. This eﬀect can be minimised
to almost zero when a few crucial frequency domain coeﬃcients, that contain
most of the signal features to be rebuilt accurately, were avoided.
3. The integration of BCH syndrome codes with advanced steganographic
algorithms revealed a new discovery (see Section 3.5). By combining error
detection and correction techniques with most of the previously proposed
steganography algorithms, that used the widely-known hiding positions - Least
Signiﬁcant Bits (LSB), failed to recover the corrupted hidden bits. Therefore,
the hiding positions and coeﬃcients are chosen carefully to achieve the best BER
(the accuracy in the recovery of the hidden secret information) and PRD/RMS
(the remedy precision of the normal readings).
4. Curve-ﬁtting functions are very ﬂexible mathematical models that can be used
to represent the IoTs streams in few parameters. Therefore, the Gaussian
approximation function is employed in this thesis to approximate the signal.
However, to avoid losing any signal features, the margin between the original
and the approximated signal should be calculated and further used.
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5. This thesis proves that is possible to re-compress multi-incoming IoTs protected
compressed streams by identifying their similarity and categorise them into
subgroups which then are treated separately.
6.4 Limitations and Future Work
Several problems have been solved in this thesis to bridge the gap between privacy,
authenticity, integrity and data management of IoTs sensor streams in cloud
environment. However, introduced solutions are just representing a few steps towards
the ultimate stable solution in this ﬁeld. Therefore, to facilitate further developments
on top of our solutions, this section concludes with few limitations of the proposed
techniques and highlights several suggestions for future research work.
1. In Chapter 2, steganography was used as an underlying layer to ensure privacy
and authenticity while not disrupting direct operations on the IoTs streams.
The authentication issue (once somebody knows where you hide, they can just
retrieve it) in setganography has been solved by two mathematical models that
use a secret key to generate random scrambled matrix orders for hiding. Two
end-points should share this secret key. However, there are two issues that need
be solved in order to render this solution as more robust: (a) in the cases where
this key was updated, how can this secret key be shared over an insecure channel
in the IoTs ﬁeld? and (b) in the cases where more than one legitimate party
wants to access the hidden information at the operation centres, how can an
access control (based on roles) model be developed around the steganographic
technique to control who can access what?
2. In Chapter 3, a hybrid model of BCH syndrome codes with advance
steganography has been developed to prove that even though the transmitted
bits through the channel are equal to its capacity and without changing the form
of transmitted streams, the detection and correction is still possible. However,
the selection of hiding positions was made based on the obtained Bit Error Rate
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(BER) after applying various noise levels onto the transmitted streams. Future
researchers may consider to address the question: can our achieved BER be
improved by employing other error detection and correction schemes that are
not relying on polynomials and Galois ﬁelds?
3. In Chapter 4, Gaussian approximation function was employed to represent the
IoTs streams by a few parameters. The drawback is that this function is using
Trust Region approximation to evaluate its parameters for every chosen IoTs
stream block that causes extra process overhead. Therefore, the question we
pose is how can Gaussian parameters be predetermined or at least pre-calculated
to work on various IoTs streams blocks?
4. Continuing with Chapter 4, the IoTs protected streams were compressed at the
streams origin without losing any bits or hidden features. However, the streams
should be decompressed without privacy disclosure at the cloud or at operation
centres for it to be used for analysis. This leads us to another developmental
question: can we learn anything from the compressed protected IoTs streams
without decompression? The answer to this question could be revolutionary in
the IoTs ﬁeld. This is because huge amounts of processing power and time will
be saved in the case that these streams can be somehow meaningful in their
compressed format.
5. In Chapter 5, a re-compression of already compressed IoTs protected streams
proved to be possible by identifying block similarities among the IoTs
compressed streams and to treat them separately. However, in our model
we relied on the compressed streams from its origin using our Gaussian-based
algorithm from Chapter 4. In other words, all the streams were compressed
using similar compressors at the source. This raises another question for
further investigation: can the IoTs streams that were compressed use diﬀerent
mechanisms at the source still be re-compressed?
To conclude, being involved in research that created algorithms to boost privacy,
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authenticity and eﬃciency of high Internet of Things streams in a cloud environment
was extremely exciting - we discovered something innovative and revolutionary that
it will be interesting to see where further studies can take this work. However, our
research represents just a few steps towards a reliable and eﬃcient IoTs applications
in cloud environment. This journey is still long because of many other issues including
but not limited to the highlighted limitations that should be addressed.
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Glossary
Aggregator refers to an action performed by a machine that is
responsible of collecting the data before transmission to
the cloud.
brute-force is a cryptanalytic attack by a trial-and-error of all possible
combinations to reveal the meaning of encrypted hidden
information.
codeword refers to a new block of bits comprising both the message
and generated control bits.
intruder refers to an illegitimate party who tries to reveal the
meaning of hidden secret information.
spectrum scarcity a situation in which there are a shortage in the available
spectra due to large number of requested channels to be
allocated.
stream is a set of readings (decimal) that have been measured by
an IoTs device over a short period of time (e.g. minute).
third-party refers to a public cloud service provider who is not the
owner of transmitted data.
vector space refers to the one-dimensional space in which the obtained
coeﬃcients formed.
white space refers to frequencies assigned to broadcasting services but
not in use.
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